F. Fabiano

These work proposes to delimit and put into perspective the spot of the particular in Theodor Adorno's aesthetics, based on his displacements, especially considering: 1) the relationship between specific works of art and the tradition; 2) the relationship between works of art with themselves and with society; and, 3) the relationship between the particular and the universal – as a critical appropriation of Hegel's thought by Adorno, explicit in specific works by Beethoven and Berg. The relational juxtaposition, as superscripted in the three topics, will allow us to perceive the effects of the displacements of the particular which, once configured within the works of art, establishes itself as a denial and criticism of the current state of affairs, insofar as it points to the contradictions of the social fabric, but, denying its modus operandi, by appearing as a mode of non-coercive totality of the universal over the particular, within which the particular moves and, in its movement, determines itself and determines the universal. It is this mode of determination, effected by the displacements of the particular, that will position the work of art as an articulating agent – ​​from within – of possible ways that are distinct from the current ways of knowing and living in society.

Pretende-se nesse artigo confrontar as posições de Theodor Adorno e Friedrich Hegel acerca da concepção de progresso, inferidas do rearranjo adorniano das categorias de particular e universal, que depreendem da filosofia hegeliana. O propósito é expor a crítica de Adorno, formulada na Dialética negativa, à noção de Hegel de que o curso da história universal é a realização efetiva do progresso do espírito do mundo em suas figuras particulares. Para tanto, o particular e o universal serão tomados como categorias explicativas da crítica adorniana à totalidade e à sistematicidade, no intuito de realocar o particular no interior da dialética, enfatizando seu caráter não identitário e resistente à sistematicidade e às formas de totalidade com pretensões universalizantes; em seguida, evocar-se-á os elementos da filosofia da história de Walter Benjamin presentes no pensamento de Adorno, para que, por fim, se sustente a hipótese de que a marcha do espírito condiz menos com o progresso, porém, muito mais com a regressão, o que ocorre na medida em que o progresso se serve de uma narrativa que oblitera a violência e a dominação do universal sobre o particular, ao ocultar as contradições deflagradas no contexto da marcha da história do espírito do mundo.

O objetivo deste trabalho circunscreve-se na tentativa de explicitar o posicionamento teórico do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) no âmbito da tradição do pensamento ocidental. Fundamentalmente, busca-se delinear a inserção de Heidegger no debate acerca da metafísica, no intuito de verificar as contribuições do autor à contemporaneidade. Para esta empresa, tomar-se-á como ponto de partida o parágrafo 6 e o parágrafo 44 da obra Ser e Tempo (1927), os textos O que é metafísica (1929), Sobre a essência da verdade (1936) e o ensaio A superação da metafísica (1936-1946); igualmente, porém, de forma mais periférica, serão utilizados como suporte teórico o texto Que é isto – A filosofia (1955), bem como o ensaio O fim da filosofia e a tarefa do pensamento (1964). O eixo em torno do qual se desenvolverá esta discussão é o projeto heideggeriano de “superação” da metafísica tradicional. A partir de então se verificará que se a clivagem de Heidegger não alterou substancialmente a senda da filosofia, ela seguramente introduziu um modo bastante original de se fazer filosofia que deixaria marcas na posteridade.

The objective of this work is to reconstruct the concepts of constellation, parataxis and essay, from the perspective of Theodor Adorno, in order to approach them by affinity, but demonstrating the way that each one expresses within its specificities the Adorno’s insistence in a model of thought in which the non-identical: 1) resists conceptual subsumption by arranging itself in a constellatory configuration; 2) it does not succumb to subordinate juxtapositions typical of merely communicative language; and, 3) finds its best philosophical expression in the essay form. In order to do so, we will take as a starting point the adornian reconstruction of the constellation category as a legacy of Walter Benjamin’s thought, so that later we can present the expansion of this category in Adorno’s thought, relating it both to the conception of parataxis as in the conception of the essay form, but aiming to understand these categories as way of thinking philosophically aiming to elucidate the place of the non-identical in the scope of dialectical thinking of Theodor Adorno.

Due to the naturalization of the protagonism of the concept of experience in the interpretation of Theodor Adorno's dialectic, this article intends to elucidate some lines of displacement from the category of experience to the category of mediation, from the critical appropriation of this category of Hegel's thought by Adorno; because, since all experience is mediated, mediation presents itself as a condition for the realization of the experience and, for this reason, mediation is established as a privileged instance in the process of knowledge in the scope of the subject and object relationship, given that defines itself as a cause and condition for the organization of experience. Fundamentally, the proposal is to demonstrate that both Hegelian and Adornian dialectics - despite their idiosyncrasies - have in mediation their motivic aspect of determining the subjective and the objective. Therefore, the concept of mediation will be presented as a transversal and reciprocal component that, at the same time that it brings together, distinguishes the related aspects, making dialectics a procedure, within which mediation becomes a condition and fundamental for the development and the determination of the concepts circumscribed in a given context or situation. In this sense, mediation will emerge as the structuring agent of experience, a fact that justifies its priority in relation to experience, as described by Hegel.

[Multiple authors] In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision quality, resource consumption, and efficiency.