Fabian Hundertmark

This paper introduces the line-drawing challenge for ability-based accounts of health. What degree of which abilities is required for complete health? I argue that the answers provided by existing theories are flawed and propose the Blueprint View. On this view, an organism is completely healthy if and only if it has the abilities it would have in its design state, where design is determined by the etiology of its traits. This view provides an objective, naturalistic distinction between health and non-health. It strikes a balance between pure physiology and well-being, and distinguishes treatment from enhancement, as well as real pathology from pathologized variation.

In this article, we show that historical naturalistic theories of biological function can meet central desiderata, while ahistorical alternatives cannot. To this end, we develop a comprehensive taxonomy of naturalistic theories of function and malfunctioning and argue that all possible ahistorical theories are unable to meet the distinction challenge (i.e. explaining why different traits have different functions) and the futile functioning challenge (i.e. allowing functions and malfunctions even when the fulfilment of the function serves no further purpose). In contrast, the selected effects theory and other historical theories can easily meet these two challenges. We, therefore, have good reason to leave ahistorical theories behind.

In this paper, we explore whether a living being can have a medical disorder purely in virtue of its current structure, or whether its historical origins are also relevant. We do so by presenting two dialogues based on the Swampman thought experiment. These dialogues bring out two key points. First, although evolutionary history plays a central role in theoretical accounts of disorder, its relevance is less obvious in everyday medical practice. Second, there may be an asymmetry between somatic and mental disorders: somatic disorders are typically identified by biological dysfunction, while many paradigmatic mental disorders appear to involve violations of rationality. Nevertheless, we suggest that dysfunctions—and thereby historical considerations—still play a role in distinguishing normal from pathological irrationality. Rather than introducing a new theory, this paper tests existing accounts of function and disorder by applying them to an extreme but instructive case.

Potentialities are properties that can manifest. Many potentialities are instantiated in virtue of having causal bases that are possible causes for their manifestations. This chapter shows that a closer look at potentialities and their causal bases studied in the life sciences (from cell biology to psychiatry) gives us good reasons to revise our philosophical assumptions about causal bases. The investigation reveals that causal bases are often more dynamic and dependent on interactions with the environment than previously assumed. In particular, we argue that causal bases in the life sciences are regularly extrinsic and processual and that potentialities in the life sciences have causal bases at different levels.

In this first part of a two-part response, we respond to Dong and Piccinini’s goal-contribution account (GCA) by arguing that it fails to adequately capture what makes something a function. As we see it, the core problem is that GCA ignores the role of past selection. Without reference to selection history, GCA struggles to distinguish functions from mere effects, especially in cases involving novel traits, dysfunction, or systemic breakdowns. We show that these challenges can be met by acknowledging the inescapability of past selection—even if we want to remain open to pluralist uses of “function” in science. In the end, we propose a new framework—the blueprint account—which integrates intuitions from causal role, organizational, and selection-based theories. While we may want to rethink how we talk about functions, we argue that any viable account will still need to take selection seriously.

In this first part of a two-part response, we defend the selected effects (SE) theory of biological function against recent critiques by Dong and Piccinini. Challenging the claim that SE theory cannot accommodate novel mutations or artifacts, the authors argue that selection is inescapable for understanding function. They show that even novel traits often emerge from lineages with established functions and that artifacts can be integrated into SE accounts via intentional design and derived functions. Ultimately, we conclude that no compelling reason has been given to abandon or rethink the selected effects approach.

Even though the talk of causal bases is commonplace in traditional and contemporary discussions about dispositions, the concept of causal bases has never been systematically investigated. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing the causal-grounding account. This account takes two roles as definitory for causal bases. First, causal bases are possible causes of disposition manifestations. Second, causal bases are metaphysical grounds of disposition instantiations. In this paper, we show that the causal-grounding account (CGA) achieves crucial distinctions (for example between causal bases and manifestation conditions), captures relevant traditional features of causal bases, and can be invoked to support the causal efficacy of disposition instantiations. At the same time, CGA does not require that causal bases have to be categorical or intrinsic. This, in turn, allows us to remain neutral concerning fundamental properties, the existence of dispositional or extrinsic causal bases, multi-track dispositions, and the reducibility of dispositions. This neutrality grants the suitability of our account for different philosophical projects and discussions.

Justin Garson has recently argued that proper functions are proximal activities of traits selected by phylogenetic or ontogenetic selection processes, and that traits are dysfunctional only if they cannot perform their proper functions for constitutional reasons. We partially agree with Garson, but reject the view that functions are proximal activities, as well as his account of dysfunctions. Instead, we propose our own theory that biological functions are selected dispositions and that a trait is dysfunctional in virtue of not having the dispositions for which it was selected. This account can explain both defects (or dysfunctions in Garson’s sense) and dysfunctions due to environmental factors. Moreover, it offers a neat way to explain the graduality of dysfunction.

According to Karen Neander’s causal-informational teleosemantics, the contents of perceptual states depend on the etiological response functions of sensory-perceptual systems. In this paper, I argue that this theory is, despite its virtues, unable to explain how humans and other animals are capable of perceiving properties with which no sensory-perceptual system has ever been confronted. After rejecting Neander’s own proposal in terms of second-order similarity and a proposal inspired by Ruth Millikan in terms of simplicity, I offer a solution which equates functions with manifestations of dispositions that made a difference to evolutionary success. My suggestion is able to generate determinate and plausible contents for new perceptual states while still preserving the idea that etiological functions explain evolutionary success.

Teleosemantic theories aim to naturalize mental representation through the use of functions, typically based on past selection processes. However, the historical dependence of these theories has faced severe criticism, leading some philosophers to develop ahistorical alternatives. This paper presents a new dilemma for all ahistorical teleosemantic theories, focusing in particular on the theories proposed by Timothy Schroeder and Bence Nanay. These theories require certain dispositions in the producers or consumers of mental representations. But the appeal to dispositions puts the proponents in an undesirable position: mental content is either overly dependent on current circumstances or ultimately dependent on historical factors.

In her book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?” (2022), Anneli Jefferson proposes that brain processes that always realize mental dysfunctions are brain dysfunctions. This paper explores possible interpretations of two underdeveloped aspects of this thesis. First, it argues that “realization” should be interpreted as partial rather than full realization. Second, it argues that the “always” should only quantify over biologically normal situations. Taken together, these changes can account for the fact that some psychological dysfunctions are partially realized by functional mechanisms, for the existence of psychological dysfunctions due to mismatches rather than brain dysfunctions, and for the fact that brain dysfunctions do not cease to be brain dysfunctions just because they can be compensated.

Virtue Reliabilism holds that knowledge is a cognitive achievement—an epistemic success that is creditable to the cognitive abilities of the knowing subject. Beyond this consensus, there is much disagreement amongst proponents of virtue reliabilism about the conditions under which the credit-relation between an epistemic success and a person’s cognitive abilities holds. This paper aims to establish a new and attractive view of this crucial relation in terms of difference-making. We will argue that the resulting theory, Difference-Making Virtue Epistemology, can deal with cases of epistemic luck and testimonial knowledge while revealing the common core of knowledge and other achievements.

Perceptual representations are either correct or incorrect. Their correctness depends on their content and on the way the world is. Teleosemantics delivers compelling explanations of why our perceptual representations have contents, whereby it assigns the notion of "function" a central explanatory role. The author of this thesis engages in the search for a theory of function suited for this purpose. After a detailed evaluation of the selected effects​ theory and dispositional theories, the author argues that a synthesis is best suited to be used by teleosemantics.

Der These des erweiterten Geistes zufolge befinden sich manche mentalen Repräsentationen außerhalb der körperlichen Grenzen der Wesen, zu denen sie gehören. Einer der stärksten Einwände gegen diese These stellt das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit von Frederick Adams, Ken Aizawa und Jerry Fodor dar. Dieses Argument setzt voraus, dass genuine mentale Repräsentationen nichtabgeleitete Gehalte haben – ihre semantischen Eigenschaften sind also nicht durch Absichten, Wünsche oder Konventionen konstituiert. Repräsentationen mit nichtabgeleitetem Gehalt finden sich jedoch, so das Argument weiter, nur innerhalb der körperlichen Grenzen mentaler Wesen. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit scheitert, da es insbesondere bei Tieren externe Repräsentationen gibt, deren Gehalt nichtabgeleitet ist. Dies folgt jedenfalls aus der aussichtsreichsten Theorie nichtabgeleiteter Repräsentationen, der Teleosemantik, und es gibt gute Gründe anzunehmen, dass auch andere naturalistische Gehaltstheorien dieselbe Implikation haben.