Fabiana Caserta

Individuals with aphantasia report a lack of quasi-perceptual experience, yet perform comparably to imaginers on perceptual tasks. Among existing accounts – Description, Introspection, Disconnection, and Absence – the latter two are considered the most plausible. Disconnection posits that aphantasics succeed by relying on (non-phenomenal) imagery, preserving its central representational role in cognition. In contrast, Absence claims that aphantasics lack imagistic representation altogether and, as a last resort, rely on alternative strategies. We propose a middle ground: Ineffectivity. This account allows for the presence of (non-phenomenal) imagery but questions its effectivity. Imagery may be inaccessible (due to internal impairments, for example) or systematically bypassed in favor of alternative strategies. We argue that such strategies are not exceptional but banal, even among poor imaginers. This perspective offers a unified explanation for both “moderate” and “extreme” aphantasia. Unlike Absence, Ineffectivity accommodates preserved imagery mechanisms in some aphantasics. It also draws a clear distinction between aphantasia and blindsight, while Disconnection relies heavily on a parallel between the two. We conclude with a noteworthy implication: Ineffectivity challenges the assumption that imagery plays a central and representational role in cognition, akin to that of perception. Instead, we suggest shifting the research focus from representational performance to how (lack of) phenomenology impacts engagement with mental content.

Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder is a dissociative syndrome characterized by a sense of disconnectedness from one’s own self and the world around. People suffering from the condition report feeling like external observers, cut off from their own bodies, emotions and thoughts; their surroundings are perceived as unreal. The present thesis analyses DDD by sustaining the view that its phenomenology can be understood through Metzinger’s notion of phenomenal transparency. This idea is not entirely new: recent contributions have framed the dramatic experiences of depersonalization and derealization as instances of highly opaque mental states. However, more detailed discussions of phenomenal transparency are sparse. My contribution wishes to partially fill in this gap. To elucidate the concept of transparency, I will first highlight the distinction between the classical representationalist notion of transparency and the metzingerian, phenomenal account of it. I will then argue that phenomenal transparency adequately describes the associated depersonalized phenomenology. Finally, I will attempt to present and dissipate ambiguities contained in the concept and address potential criticism regarding the redundancy of transparency as an explanatory tool for dissociative phenomena.

Do all conscious states structurally necessitate self-consciousness? For many, the answer is affirmative: self-consciousness is an inherent property of phenomenal consciousness. I refer to this family of theses under the denomination of Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). However, reports of DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) and MIED (Meditation-InducedEgo Dissolution) seem to suggest otherwise: there are at least some extraordinary circumstances under which no sense of self contributes to the resulting phenomenology. Similarly, subjectivity is altered in depersonalisation, a condition whereby the subject feels detached from oneself. I argue that different varieties of self-consciousness are altered or missing in concomitance with ego dissolution and depersonalisation. Nonetheless, I speculate that depersonalisation per se does not involve a lack of basic self-consciousness — while some reports of ego dissolution indicate that even the most minimal formulation of phenomenal self-consciousness is not adequately present. I identify two modalities —boundlessness and centrelessness — whose implication seems to be crucial in experiences of total lack of self-consciousness. All things considered, I conclude that, while self-consciousness could be a frequent feature of our ordinary experience, SSC is not plausible. In the absence of phenomenal self-consciousness, what remains is the epistemic observation that experiences are self-bounded: no one can have access to each other’s experiences in a first-personal manner. This ontological fact, however, need not be accompanied by a corresponding “sense of self”. Finally, I propose an account explaining the conceivableness of selfless self-reports resting on the premise of the subject being conscious and on her dispositional ability for self-consciousness.