Fabien Medvecky

Park rangers hold a unique set of knowledge—of science, of publics, of institutional structures, of place, and of self—that should be recognised as valuable. For too long, models of the knowledge of scientists and publics have set people like rangers in an inbetweener position, seeing them as good at communicating, translating or negotiating from one side to the other, but not as making knowledge that is powerful in its own right. In this paper we argue that focus groups with park rangers across regional and conservation parks in Aotearoa/New Zealand reveal the complexity and multiplicity of rangers’ knowledge-making that shows the science-public model as incomplete. We argue further that the model is flawed for its focus on the making and holding of knowledge and not also on how it is enacted. Rangers, we argue, are responsible every day for making knowledgeable decisions for the health and well-being of parks and people. Making good decisions, though, requires not just knowledge but also care. An understanding of the many ways rangers know and enact their knowledge is important for biosecurity practice, especially in models of adaptive governance.

Principlism might seem a lofty ideal, so this chapter takes an applied turn to ground the abstract discussion in real-world settings. This is done through three case studies of how the principles proposed in the previous chapters can be applied; the proposes principles being Utility (of the information communicated), Accuracy, Kairos and Generosity. The first case considered is a case the book opened with involving genetic testing. The second case we consider is the well-known L’Aquila earthquake case, and lastly, we consider the bias that arises because unsuccessful science communication fails to get mentioned. Each of these cases shows not only what is problematic, but also sheds light on how the principles can be used to be more ethical.

As explained in the opening of this book, science communication is often premised on the idea that knowledge and knowing are inherently good. But knowledge is a messy field. This chapter begins by distinguishing between knowledge, knowing, information and informing. Making the point that information is the currency of science communication, the chapter then considers what makes the information communicated valuable and worthwhile to the audience. Specifically, the relevance of the information to the audience and its usability (broadly understood) are considered. The chapter then offers a mirror discussion on the place (and value) of ignoring and ignorance in science communication.

Science communication is as much about the when as it is about the hows and whys. This chapter draws on the classical rhetoric notion of Kairos to help us think through some major ethical issues in science communication. Beginning with science communication’s uneasy relationship with persuasion, this chapter then considers the interaction of a fast-paced media landscape on the timing of science communication. Timing of communication matters to science communication as the when of communication is inextricably linked to both hype and urgency. The chapter closes with a discussion on the (historical) time in which the communication takes place, and how this relates to the (historical) time of our audience, because to be a good science communicator, the when really does matters.

Much of science communication has focused on doing effective communication. In closing the book, we bring it back to the idea that being effective without being moral is not, in itself, good. We acknowledge that doing morally good (as well as effective) science communication, whether as a practice or as research, takes resources, effort and know-how. This chapter aims to bring all of the previous chapters in a summary and provide some tools to help practitioners and researchers, teachers and students of science communication think about the ethics of what they do as they learn to do so effectively.

Science has a fraught relationship with values. Indeed, claims to the objectivity of science are still often heard. Taking the well-known Tuskegee study as a starting point, this chapter makes explicit the science, to be worthwhile and good science, not only can’t be value-free, but shouldn’t aim to be so. This leads into a discussion on various forms of values, namely sociocultural values, economic values and ethical values. Given the centrality of ethics to this book, special attention is given to ethical values, including a discussion on how different ways to apply ethics.

So far this book has focused on the ethics of science communication practice, culminating in a set of proposed principles for the field. This chapter takes a different tack and looks at the ethics of the field of science communication as a whole; is there something specifically moral about science communication as a field. The chapter considers oft-repeated claims that there is an anti-science crisis and a science communication crisis and argues there is no such crisis. There maybe an epistemic crisis, or an expert-trust crisis, but these stretch far beyond science. The chapter then looks at the effect of presenting these crises as being specifically about science on other fields of knowledge and to the social imagining of what good knowledge is.

Science communication sits funnily between the sciences and the humanities, sometimes pulled in one direction, sometimes in the other. This chapter focuses on the science side by considering three ways ethics and norms have already been included in science and the scientific process. These are the Mertonian norms of science which focus on science itself, the participant-centred bioethical principles that are generally applied to all research involving humans, and finally, the more recent Responsible Research and Innovation move, which is more broadly socially and environmentally concerned. The chapter closes with a discussion on the importance of communication in each of these.

Drawing on what has been so far discussed, this chapter turns face on to the task at hand and proposes a set of ethical principles of science communication. After reviewing existing effort to move science communication down the path of ethical principles, this chapter discusses ethics in an applied setting to make a case for why principlism and relational ethics are especially helpful in making headway into an ethics of science communication. The chapter then proposes four principles for an ethics of science communication, namely Utility (of the information communicated), Accuracy, Kairos and Generosity. These are each described and defined with reference to previous chapters.

Science communication takes resources. It costs money, time and effort to communicate. This chapter looks at the costs of communicating and what this means for science communication. Specifically, the effects of funding for science communication are considered, with an eye to how these effects communicators’ independence. A parallel with editorial independence is drawn before we consider the rise of native content as a form of science communication. The chapter closes with a discussion on the ethical implications of the funder-practitioner relationship for the often-stated science communication aspiration of truth and honesty.

A common refrain in science communication ‘how to’ guides and textbooks is ‘tell a story’. But what are the downstream ethical effects of narrativizing science? This chapter considers the ethical implications of three strategies for effective science communication—narrativizing, framing and selling. Thinking about narratives, stories and framing highlight two special issues, which point to what we might think of as ethical hybridity. Firstly, science communication there is an ethical hybridity in the science being communicated and the act of communicating it. A secondly, there is ethical hybridity because of the breadth of what comes under the umbrella of science communication, each with its own underlying values. The chapter closes by considering ethical systems in adjacent fields to see if these can provide a roadmap for science communication.

Science communication is as much about communication as it is about science (if not more). In this chapter, we turn to the communication side of the field and presents Codes of ethics and principles from communication-related fields closely linked to various forms of science communication. Beginning with a case study of a science journalism to set the scene, the chapter then presents an overview of journalism ethics, public relations ethics and ethical principles from communication associations and discussed what these can bring to our understanding of ethics relevant to science communication. The chapter closes with a discussion on the role of rhetoric in science communication.

Valuing conservation and biodiversity outcomes in economic analysis is difficult, as it is in health economics. Because health economics has previously had to respond to the many challenges currently faced by conservation economics, health economists have developed very successful tools for responding to these challenges which conservation economists can draw upon. What is surprising is that despite rhetorical support for the use of these economic analysis tools in conservation valuations, in practice, these economic tools are used far less frequently in conservation and biodiversity decision then they are in health decisions. Drawing on a simple database search and an analysis of universities that lead in both economics and environmental studies, this paper considers why conservation economists stick with philosophically and pragmatically difficult economic tools when they have other options, and argues that part of the reasons is the way conservation economics is framed and conceptualised.

This book presents the first comprehensive set of principles for an ethics of science communication. We all want to communicate science ethically, but how do we do so? What does being ethical when communicating science even mean? The authors argue that ethical reasoning is essential training for science communicators. The book provides an overview of the relationship between values, science, and communication. Ethical problems are examined to consider how to create an ethics of science communication. These issues range from the timing of communication, narratives, accuracy and persuasion, to funding and the client-public tension. The book offers a tailor-made ethics of science communication based on principlism. Case studies are used to demonstrate how this tailor-made ethics can be applied in practice.

Science communication, as a field and as a practice, is fundamentally about knowledge distribution; it is about the access to, and the sharing of knowledge. All distribution brings with it issues of ethics and justice. Indeed, whether science communicators acknowledge it or not, they get to decide both which knowledge is shared, and who gets access to this knowledge. As a result, the decisions of science communicators have important implications for epistemic justice: how knowledge is distributed fairly and equitably. This paper presents an overview of issues related to epistemic justice for science communication, and argues that there are two quite distinct ways in which science communicators can be just in the way they distribute knowledge. Both of these paths will be considered before concluding that, at least on one of these accounts, science communication as a field and as a practice is fundamentally epistemically unjust. Possible ways to redress this injustice are suggested.

The risk posed by anthropogenic climate change is generally accepted, and the challenge we face to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to a tolerable limit cannot be underestimated. Reducing GHG emissions can be achieved either by producing less GHG to begin with or by emitting less GHG into the atmosphere. One carbon mitigation technology with large potential for capturing carbon dioxide at the point source of emissions is carbon capture and storage (CCS). However, the merits of CCS have been questioned, both on practical and ethical grounds. While the practical concerns have already received substantial attention, the ethical concerns still demand further consideration. This article aims to respond to this deficit by reviewing the critical ethical challenges raised by CCS as a possible tool in a climate mitigation strategy and argues that the urgency stemming from climate change underpins many of the concerns raised by CCS

Summary 1. Ecologists and conservation biologists consider many issues when designing a field study, such as the expected value of the data, the interests of the study species, the welfare of individual organisms and the cost of the project. These different issues or values often conflict; however, neither animal ethics nor environmental ethics provides practical guidance on how to assess trade-offs between them. 2. We developed a decision framework for considering trade-offs between values in ecological research, drawing on the field of ecological ethics. We used a case study of the population genetics of three frog species, in which a researcher must choose between four methods of sampling DNA from the study animals. We measured species welfare as the reduction in population growth rate following sampling, and assessed individual welfare using two different definitions: (i) the level of suffering experienced by an animal, and (ii) the level of suffering combined with loss of future life. 3. Tipping the tails of tadpoles ranked as the best sampling method for species welfare, while collecting whole tadpoles and buccal swabbing of adult frogs ranked best for the first and second definitions of individual welfare, respectively. Toe clipping of adult frogs ranked as the worst sampling method for species welfare and the first definition of individual welfare, and equal worst for the second definition of individual welfare. 4. When considering species and individual welfare simultaneously, toe clipping was clearly inferior to the other sampling methods, but no single sampling method was clearly superior to the other three. Buccal swabbing, collecting tadpoles and tail tipping were all preferred options, depending on the definition of individual welfare and the level of precision with which we assessed species welfare. 5.Synthesis and applications. The decision framework we present can be used by ecologists to assess ethical and other trade-offs when planning field studies. A formal decision analysis makes transparent how a researcher might negotiate competing ethical, financial and practical objectives. Defining the components of the decision in this way can help avoid errors associated with human judgement and linguistic uncertainty.

A central point of debate over environmental policies concerns how future costs and benefits should be assessed. The most commonly used method for assessing the value of future costs and benefits is economic discounting. One often-cited justification for discounting is uncertainty. More specifically, it is risk aversion coupled with the expectation that future prospects are more risky. In this paper I argue that there are at least two reasons for disputing the use of risk aversion as a justification for discounting when dealing with longterm decisions, one technical and one ethical. Firstly, I argue that technically, it implies an inconsistency between theory and practice. And secondly, I argue that discounting for uncertainty relies on a form of individualism which, while reasonable in standard microeconomic theory where an agent chooses how to spread her own consumption over her own lifetime, is inappropriate in the context of intergenerational social decisions