Fabien Muller

One of the central questions of Yogācāra studies is whether Yogācāra should be understood as a form of idealism. In addressing this question, scholars frequently invoke Hegel’s philosophy as a type of idealism fundamentally incompatible with Yogācāra. But those references are often made without direct engagement with Hegel’s texts, relying instead on reductive accounts of his philosophy. In this paper, I aim to uncover this reductivism and show that it does not withstand critical analysis. I begin by examining a recent example of anti-Hegelian scholarship, followed by a broader survey of similar positions over the past decades. I then bring these positions into a conversation with Hegel’s texts, revealing tensions between Hegel’s philosophy and its representation in Buddhist philosophy. On this basis, I advocate for a new interpretation of Yogācāra texts through a Hegelian lens.

Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234–305) was not only the biographer of his teacher Plotinus, and the editor of his Enneads, but an important Platonist philosopher in his own right. "On Theology and Theurgy" presents two of Porphyry’s texts, preserved in fragments, in which he tries to bring philosophy to bear on religion, and ultimately to align the two. In “Letter to Anebo” and “Philosophy from Oracles,” Porphyry explores questions of reason, revelation, and ritual, of theology and theurgy, of how divination serves divinization. This edition includes the Greek fragments and Latin quotations of both texts with facing English translation, a Greek-English glossary (including Latin equivalents), and a commentary.

Among the many questions raised by Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi, the most fundamental concerns the type of objects to which its negative statements apply. These statements deny the reality of conditioned Being, which can be understood in two ways: as a negation of our concept or knowledge of conditioned Being, or as a negation of conditioned Being as such. The first interpretation can be called “epistemological” and the second “metaphysical.” Scholarship has almost unanimously accepted the epistemological approach. In this paper I object to this approach and propose to reinterpret the catuṣkoṭi metaphysically, as a description of Being and its inherent principles. I ground my objection in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being” and argue that the catuṣkoṭi exhibits similar features to the Hegelian concept of substantial negativity. In the end, I draw some conclusions for the study of Nāgārjuna in general and highlight the limits of the parallelism.

Scholarship on death metal tends to emphasise its grotesque and provocative aspects, and to define it in terms of transgression. Like many other forms of extreme music, death metal playfully infringes the principles of morality and decency by representing topics that usually remain inexpressible. In this paper, I propose to draw on the methodology of Comparative Religion to reframe and complement this approach. I relate death metal to Buddhist meditation techniques that involve bodily decay and sickness, and suggest that underneath its grotesque appearance, death metal reveals a meditative element that likens it to religious practice. In the light of this comparative and religious approach, I draw some conclusions for the future of Metal Studies.

Powerviolence is a subgenre of hardcore music characterized by fast-paced rhythms, chaotic sound, and austere esthetics. Despite its seminal function for extreme music, there has been a notable lack of scholarly exploration into the genre. In this paper I draw on Comparative Philosophy to fill this gap. I argue that the powerviolence music and lyrics are fueled by anger. In Plato, anger serves as a tool for the irascible soul to support rational thinking and oppose injustice. Accordingly, I call for a Platonic interpretation of powerviolence as an incentive for moral reformation in a world rife with violence and immorality.

Scholars in recent decades have downplayed or completely denied that Evagrius Ponticus has a metaphysical system, instead suggesting that he merely borrows from various philosophies, particularly Stoicism, without a coherent system. In this paper, I propose a different perspective, arguing for a metaphysical and Platonic interpretation. I reconstruct Evagrius’s metaphysics systematically, relate its fundamentals to the environment of the late antique Medio- and Neoplatonic tradition, and show that by establishing the principles and structures of being, Evagrius indeed reveals himself to be a metaphysician.

The present article focuses on the idea that divine nature is prior to being. This idea was first articulated in John of Scythopolis’s commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius. It was adopted by Maximus Confessor and re-used in Meister Eckhart’s first Quaestio Parisiensis. The main tenet of this idea is that, if God is the origin of being, he must be more fundamental than being. Thus, being cannot be identical to divine nature. The conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion of this idea is that the importance that has been traditionally attached to the "Exodusmetaphysik" must be reconsidered, and that the pro-ontological conception of divine nature constitutes an autonomous tradition in Christian thought.

My aim in this book is to formulate a comparativist, Buddhist-Neoplatonic interpretation of the idea of “logos” in the Prologue to the Gospel according to John. I proceed in three steps. I begin with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness. Nāgārjuna thinks that that all things are empty because they depend on causes and conditions in a way that makes it impossible for them to genuinely exist. Vasubandhu responds to Nāgārjuna that things are not completely non-existent, for they possess the appearance of something that exists. Emptiness is not ultimate because there is the appearance of empty things. The place where this appearance unfolds is the mind, which, in an absolute sense, exists, but which, in the sense of external, objectifiable reality does not exist. Vasubandhu thinks of the mind as an entity that does not conform to the categories of ordinary existence. In turn, this corresponds to Meister Eckhart's concept of God. God is a Mind (intellectus). But due to his fundamental ontological role, God transcends ordinary existence and cannot be compared to any specific being. To conclude, I use this triadic constellation of Buddhist and Neoplatonic concepts to read John’s Prologue. The Prologue describes the generation of a foundational concept, “logos,” by a primordial, divine Mind. Since this Mind is, in a Buddhist sense, “empty,” the concept that it generates can be said to be absolute. It has no beginning and no cause. Against this background of Buddhist and Neoplatonic ideas, John’s Prologue can thus be interpreted as a narrative describing the foundation of reality as an intellectual process.

Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation.

In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of ontology.

Evagrius famously characterises divine nature as γνῶσις οὐσιώδης, ‘substantial knowledge’. In the Alexandrian, Cappadocian, and other intellectual contexts informed by Platonic, Aristotelian, and Philonic thought, characterisations of God as a noetic or intellectual being are fairly common. However, these traditions concur in using the term νοῦς rather than γνῶσις. How can we explain that Evagrius deviates from the metaphysical mainstream? In this paper, I review this question from an historical and systematic point of view. I propose to examine ancient theories of Mind about the function and structure of the νοῦς, compare them to the Evagrian theory, and identify a possible explanation for the substitution of γνῶσις to the νοῦς. Since God is the key element in Evagrius's metaphysics, a clearer vision of the divine essence will help us appreciate the whole system more fully.

In recent decades Evagrian psychology and asceticism have attracted much attention. It has, however, also become clear that to understand these aspects, it is necessary to observe the greater metaphysical framework to which they relate. Although this framework presents evident parallelisms with other ancient systems of metaphysics, its relations to these systems have not yet been fully brought to light. In this paper, I propose to shed light on central elements of Evagrius’ theory of contemplation and their metaphysical background by drawing on Neoplatonist ideas. To that end, I cross-read passages from the Evagrian corpus and Plotinus’ Enneads, in particular the treatise on contemplation (III 8). In these passages, I identify various conceptual and structural parallelisms that allow us to suppose a common philosophical background to both systems. Based on these parallelisms, I then outline some conclusions for future perspectives in Evagrian scholarship.

One of the most prolific approaches to the comparative study of Buddhist and Christian philosophy has been the use of Buddhist anti-metaphysicism to overcome the allegedly obsolete metaphysical discourse of Christianity. This approach has been practiced, among others, by Edgar Bruns, Frederik Streng, Joseph O'Leary, and John Keenan. Keenan's 1980–1990s seminal works were determinative in that they appeared to rely on intuitive and evident premises: Christianity became infused with Greek metaphysical concepts early on; consequently, it adopted the forms of essentialism and ontological discourse practiced in metaphysics. That discourse has now become obsolete and must be overcome; Buddhist anti-metaphysicism helps overcome it; hence, Christianity can learn from Buddhism. In this paper, I show that although Keenan presents the first of these claims as self-evident, it is in fact highly polemical. Its origins lie in Albrecht Ritschl's and Adolf von Harnack's Hellenization theory. While the theological and historical background to this theory has been debated, Keenan does not engage in these debates. Even more, he transforms the theory in such a way that it becomes incongruent with its inherent aim. Following the problems implied on these two levels, I suggest that Keenan's project makes itself vulnerable to incoherencies. In the end, I argue for the overcoming of antimetaphysicism as a basis for Buddhist-Christian dialogue.