Fabio Fossa

The first chapter provides a summary of the aims and contents of the book. It states its main objective—i.e., to study the ethics of driving automation in order to shed light on the relation between artificial agency and human values. It presents an overview of the main technical components of connected and automated vehicles, discusses different categorisations of their so-called “autonomy”, and argues that many of the reasons backing driving automation are indeed of an ethical kind. Since ethics is to be acknowledged as an essential element of the whole phenomenon, driving automation offers a valuable occasion to study the moral significance of artificial agency.

The last chapter of the book draws the conclusions of the analysis. Driving automation holds fascinating prospects for the future of mobility. Its ethical impacts might truly be considerable. Turning them into reality, however, is not a matter of mere technological innovation. Rather, it will require commitment, responsibility, vision, participated discussion, and dedication. Clarifying the relation between driving automation and ethical values is essential to realise this point. Uncritical, simplistic, biased, and conceptually flawed configurations of it obfuscate the fundamental role that human morality still has to play. Moreover, they complicate the understanding of what yet needs to be done in this sense. The insights emerged from the study of the ethics of driving automation represent important stepping stones towards a philosophical theory of artificial agency.

Safety is arguably the most widely acknowledged ethical value in transportation. Driving automation makes no exception. What is more, it promises to bring about substantial safety benefits. According to the ‘safety argument’, CAVs will revolutionise road safety by defusing the cause of the vast majority of current crashes—human error. On this basis, driving automation is often presented as an ethical innovation per se. Such high safety expectations, however, stand in need of critical scrutiny. Normative and epistemological discussions, along with the consideration of emerging risks, suggest that safety improvements cannot be construed as guaranteed by-products of technological innovation. Rather, they will crucially depend on human choices and social commitment. The discussion on safety in driving automation helps realise that artificial agents cannot be delegated to solve ethical issues on our behalf. Rather, they mediate human moral agency in all its complexity. Their impacts depend on the ethical awareness and commitment of involved stakeholders.

The chapter presents ethical issues raised by upholding the value of sustainability in the domain of driving automation. After a cursory introduction on sustainability in mobility and AI, the environmental impacts of CAVs are considered. Secondly, effects on the job market and risks of technological unemployment are discussed. Finally, social problems related to inclusivity, discrimination, and justice are addressed. The study of sustainability issues in driving automation accomplishes two results. For what concerns CAVs, it shows that one-sided narratives strongly associating technical aspects of driving automation with ethically beneficial outcomes must be carefully complemented with awareness of potential setbacks and pitfalls. On a more general note, it helps realise that artificial agents cannot be expected to promote moral values by themselves. Ethical commitment and critical thinking are the necessary conditions for artificial agents to mediate the right values in the right way.

The chapter offers an overview of the ethical debate on unavoidable collision scenarios. It explains why the problem arises and what strategies have been proposed to program the behaviour of CAVs according to given ethical theories. Moreover, it addresses empirical research that has been carried out in the field by critically weighing its merits and demerits. In light of this, the chapter discusses reasons for and against the focus on unavoidable collisions in the ethics of driving automation. Furthermore, it considers the strengths and weaknesses of the debate with reference to the state of the art of the technology and the aims of engineering ethics. Finally, it focuses on the delegation of moral decision-making to CAVs as a crucial element to the interpretation of the concept of artificial moral agency.

The chapter is dedicated to analysing significant ways in which driving automation transforms road transport as an ethical experience. It starts with some preliminary considerations on the shifts of control inherent to delegating driving tasks to CAVs. Building on this, problems concerning the respect and support of personal autonomy are discussed. Moreover, moral responsibility issues are identified and examined. Finally, explainability as a value supporting both personal autonomy and moral responsibility is examined. The study of human control in driving automation brings to the surface the considerable changes undergone by critical moral concepts such as responsibility, autonomy, and self-determination when human agency is delegated to, and mediated by, artificial agents. Shedding light on such transformations is a core task for a philosophical theory of artificial agency.

The chapter focuses the attention on issues raised by CAVs as data gathering and communication devices. Collecting and sharing more and more data on automated driving sessions is key to almost all stakeholders seating at the transportation table. Different interests push parties to acquire or request access to data gathered through CAVs. The resulting landscape is extremely composited. The chapter sketches a preliminary outline of the driving automation data landscape and, on its basis, elaborates on the notion of privacy in this particular context, its ethical profile, and the main risks from both a philosophical and legal perspective. Moreover, it discusses two case studies to show how privacy risks connected to driving automation might not at all be implausible and overviews propositions on how to tackle privacy issues on the design, regulatory, and educational levels. The discussion on privacy shows with particular clarity how important it is for the philosophy of artificial agency not to over-rely on similarities between human and artificial agents. Conversely, it is critical to thoroughly trace the tracks of difference and follow its lead.

The present paper aims at contributing to the ethical debate on the impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) systems on human autonomy. More specifically, it intends to offer a clearer understanding of the design challenges to the effort of aligning driving automation technologies to this ethical value. After introducing the discussion on the ambiguous impacts that AI systems exert on human autonomy, the analysis zooms in on how the problem has been discussed in the literature on connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). On this basis, it is claimed that the issue has been mainly tackled on a fairly general level, and mostly with reference to the controversial issue of crash-optimization algorithms, so that only limited design insights have been drawn. However, integrating ethical analysis and design practices is critical to pursue the implementation of such an important ethical value into CAV technologies. To this aim, it is argued, a more applied approach targeted at examining the impacts on human autonomy of current CAV functions should also be explored. As an example of the intricacy of this task, the case of automated route planning is discussed in some detail.

Remote driving, i.e., the capacity of controlling road vehicles at a distance, is an innovative transportation technology often associated with potential ethical benefits, especially when deployed to tackle urban traffic issues. However, prospected benefits could only be reaped if remote driving can be executed in a safe and responsible way. This paper builds on notions elaborated in the philosophical literature on technological mediation to offer a systematic examination of the extent to which current and emerging Human–Machine Interfaces contribute to hindering or supporting the exercise of responsibility behind the remote wheel. More specifically, the analysis discusses how video, audio, and haptic interfaces co-shape the remote driving experience and, at the same time,the operators’ capacity to drive responsibly. The multidisciplinary approach explored in this research offers a novel methodological framework to structure future empirical inquiries while identifying finely tuned multi-sensory HMIs and dedicated training as critical presuppositions to the remote drivers’ exercise of responsibility.

This short paper offers a preliminary inquiry into the impacts of driving automation on personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is a key ethical value in western culture, and one that buttresses fundamental components of the moral life such as the exercise of responsible behaviour and the full enjoyment of human dignity. Driving automation simultaneously enhances and constrains it in significant ways. Hence, its moral profile with reference to the value of personal autonomy is uncertain. Ethical analysis shows that such uncertainty is due not just to the complexity of the technology, but also to the multifaceted normative profile of personal autonomy, which offers reasons to support both conditional and full driving automation. The paper sheds light on this duplicity, underlines the challenges this poses to the ethics of driving automation, and advocates for further research aimed at providing practitioners with more fine-grained guidelines on such a delicate issue.

Recent research in the field of social robotics has shed light on the considerable role played by biases in the design of social robots. Cues that trigger widespread biased expectations are implemented in the design of social robots to increase their familiarity and boost interaction quality. Ethical discussion has focused on the question concerning the permissibility of leveraging social biases to meet the design goals of social robotics. As a result, integrating ethically problematic social biases in the design of robots-such as, e.g., discriminatory gender stereotypes-has been opposed as morally unacceptable. Building on this debate, the present paper explores a related but different question: would it be permissible to design social robots in ways that intentionally challenge widespread discriminatory social biases, thus fostering moral education? The analysis shows that, while the potential benefits of such a design strategy could be significant, its practical endorsement raises important ethical issues. Hence, caution and further discussion are advised.

This essay explores Jonas’s multifaceted and rich enquiries into the notion of image. In particular, it argues that reflecting on the “image” helps Jonas clarify the unique condition of human existence, where the twine of thought and being reveals a paradoxical (and yet crucial) relationship between time and eternity, change and permanence, immanence and transcendence. The employ of the interpretative device provided by the image enables a nuanced understanding of the human complexity which goes beyond the partial and reductive descriptions of relativistic immanentism, on the one hand, and immutable transcendence, on the other. By commenting upon its anthropological, aesthetic, and ethical significance, we propose that the study of Jonas’s thoughts on the image not only offers valuable insights into the philosophical understanding of such a fascinating object, but also sheds a new and interesting light on the unity of his oeuvre.

The present paper aims at contributing to the ethical debate on the impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) systems on human autonomy. More specifically, it intends to offer a clearer understanding of the design challenges to the effort of aligning driving automation technologies to this ethical value. After introducing the discussion on the ambiguous impacts that AI systems exert on human autonomy, the analysis zooms in on how the problem has been discussed in the literature on connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). On this basis, it is claimed that the issue has been mainly tackled on a fairly general level, and mostly with reference to the controversial issue of crash-optimization algorithms, so that only limited design insights have been drawn. However, integrating ethical analysis and design practices is critical to pursue the implementation of such an important ethical value into CAV technologies. To this aim, it is argued, a more applied approach targeted at examining the impacts on human autonomy of current CAV functions should also be explored. As an example of the intricacy of this task, the case of automated route planning is discussed in some detail.

L’Intelligenza Artificiale Generativa (IAG) pone sfide inedite all’educazione universitaria. Dalla definizione dei contenuti alla valutazione delle prove e alla determinazione delle modalità di esame, questo nuovo e potente strumento inaugura una stagione di cambiamenti su cui è urgente riflettere. La tecnologia contribuisce da sempre a dare forma al lavoro didattico, il quale evolve anche alla luce delle opportunità e dei rischi che essa introduce. Come far sì che l’evoluzione stimolata dall’IAG sia felice, ovvero serva i valori e gli obiettivi della didattica e delle persone che la vivono? Ne ho discusso con alcuni colleghi dell’Unità di Studi META del Politecnico di Milano – docenti impegnati a vario titolo in corsi di carattere filosofico e sociale rivolti a studenti di formazione tecnica.

This book reports on theoretical and practical analyses of the ethical challenges connected to driving automation. It also aims at discussing issues that have arisen from the European Commission 2020 report “Ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles. Recommendations on Road Safety, Privacy, Fairness, Explainability and Responsibility”. Gathering contributions by philosophers, social scientists, mechanical engineers, and UI designers, the book discusses key ethical concerns relating to responsibility and personal autonomy, privacy, safety, and cybersecurity, as well as explainability and human-machine interaction. On the one hand, it examines these issues from a theoretical, normative point of view. On the other hand, it proposes practical strategies to face the most urgent ethical problems, showing how the integration of ethics and technology can be achieved through design practices. All in all, this book fosters a multidisciplinary approach where philosophy, ethics, and engineering are integrated, rather than just juxtaposed. It is meant to inform and inspire an audience of philosophers of technology, ethicists, engineers, developers, manufacturers, and regulators, among other interested readers.

Among the many forms of artistic expression that characterize the digital era, remix occupies a rather central position. At the same time, however, the success of remix as an artistic practice raises several hard questions. What is original and what is derived? How can we sort out and make sense of questions concerning origination and derivation in situations where one thing is appropriated, reused, and repurposed for something else? What theory of moral and aesthetic value can accommodate and explain these situations where authorship, authority, and origination are already distributed across a network of derivations, borrowings, and re-appropriated found objects? This paper develops a response to these questions, and it does so in three steps or movements. The first briefly introduces the concept of remix and the opportunities and challenges that this now wide-spread, content creation practice presents to existing models and theories of moral and aesthetic value. The second outlines the three elements of what I call “remixology”—a new axiology (or theory of moral and aesthetic value) that is designed to scale to these new opportunities and challenges. The third and final movement investigates the consequences of this proposal, demonstrating how remixology can be read backwards through time, providing us with some new perspectives on artistry and creativity in all human endeavors, and read forwards into the emerging challenges that have been made available by innovations in algorithmic content generation and computational creativity.

The purpose of Machine Ethics is to develop autonomous technologies that are able to manage not just the technical aspects of a tasks, but also the ethical ones. As a consequence, the notion of Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) has become a fundamental element of the discussion. Its meaning, however, remains rather unclear. Depending on the author or the context, the same expression stands for essentially different concepts. This casts a suspicious light on the philosophical significance of Machine Ethics. In particular, the risk arises of discarding Machine Ethics as a whole on the basis of accusations that, however, apply exclusively to one specific understanding of what AMAs are – but not to other, more adequate and convincing conceptualisations. To avoid this pitfall, this essay tries to elaborate a philosophically sound interpretation of AMAs and to sketch its primary component, i.e., the notion of functional ethics.

Artificial agents are commonly described by using words that traditionally belong to the semantic field of organisms, particularly of animal and human life. I call this phenomenon the game of semantic extension. However, the semantic extension of words as crucial as “autonomous”, “intelligent”, “creative”, “moral”, and so on, is often perceived as unsatisfactory, which is signalled with the extensive use of inverted commas or other syntactical cues. Such practice, in turn, has provoked harsh criticism that usually refers back to the literal meaning of the words to show their inappropriateness in describing artificial agents. Hence the question: how can we choose our words appropriately and wisely while making sense of artificial agents? After a brief introduction (§1), in §2 I present the starting point of my argument, which consists in the assumption that the dimensions of technology and language are deeply entangled. In §3 I discuss how this assumption impinges on the issue of choosing the right words to talk about artificial agents. §4 is an exposition of the main features of the game of semantic extension, while §5 reviews the related opportunities and risks. Finally, §6 elaborates some practical suggestions on how to play the game well

The concept of autonomy is crucial for the theoretical characterization of robots and, more in general, complex technological artifacts. The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual and logical framework in which it is possible to define two concepts of autonomy: autonomy of performance and autonomy of process. The analysis is carried out exploiting the logical resources of the counterfactual semantics-developed by Lewis' and Stalnaker's seminal works-and branching structures of the possible courses of actions. It allows to differentiate the autonomy of a robotic arm from the autonomy of a highly complex machine-like rovers for the explorations of the planets. The clarification of the concept of autonomy is, moreover, an essential precondition for the investigation concerning the ethics of artificial agents.

This book offers a systematic and thorough philosophical analysis of the ways in which driving automation crosses path with ethical values. Upon introducing the different forms of driving automation and examining their relation to human autonomy, it provides readers with in-depth reflections on safety, privacy, moral judgment, control, responsibility, sustainability, and other ethical issues. Driving is undoubtedly a moral activity as a human act. Transferring it to artificial agents such as connected and automated vehicles necessarily raises many philosophical questions. When driving is automated, what happens to its ethical dimensions? Could artificial agents accomplish ethical objectives on our behalf, take moral decisions in our place, and drive us into a more ethical transportation future? In doing so, would they be “moral” as we are or in a way that is similar to, but also remarkably different from, our own? And what role is yet to be played by human responsibility and commitment? The book addresses these questions with the aim of stimulating an interdisciplinary dialogue between different stakeholders. They include automotive engineers, computer scientists, and moral philosophers, as well as industry representatives, policymakers, regulators, transportation experts, and the general public. Indeed, connected and automated vehicles will not take the high road for us . We must drive them there.

In this paper we offer an overall account of the complex and multilayered Italian reception of Hans Jonas’ philosophy, with an eye to its specific features compared to what happened elsewhere. After an introductory foreword the paper is structured in four sections and a brief conclusion, each of which deals with a peculiar aspect of Jonas’ thought: ethics and bioethics, philosophical biology and ontology of life, gnostic and religious studies, studies in the history of philosophy. In the final section we sum up the overall meaning of the «Wirkungsgeschichte» of Jonas’ philosophy in Italy and highlight possible lines of research still to be accomplished.

Between Timelessness and History: The Image of the Human Being in Hans Jonas’ Ethics. This essay offers a contribution to the inquiry into the notion of image of the human being in Hans Jonas’ ethics. More specifically, passages from Das Prinzip Verantwortung and Technik, Medezin und Ethik are discussed to shed light on the complex temporal character that the image exhibits, stretched between the atemporality of what is equal to itself and the vulnerability that is distinctive of historical time. Particular attention is dedicated to the fact that Jonas depicts the image as cross-cutting usual dichotomies such as temporal and timeless, permanent and changing, historical and non-historical – perhaps even transcendent and immanent. Albeit within its limits, the present work identifies the paradoxical temporal character of the image and, in so doing, points to a middle way between essentialism and relativism that may help rethink the relation between ethical values and historical time.

The purpose of this essay is to determine the domain of validity of the notions developed in Machine Ethics [ME]. To this aim, I analyse the epistemological and methodological presuppositions that lie at the root of such technological project. On this basis, I then try and develop the theoretical means to identify and deconstruct improper applications of these notions to objects that do not belong to the same epistemic context, focusing in particular on the extent to which ME is supposed to feedback onto moral philosophy. By highlighting the inadequacy of many approaches to the supposed philosophical implications of ME, I wish to redirect attention to its actual scope and to stress its relevance for the social acceptance of autonomous technologies. The essay is structured as follows. After a brief introduction (§ 1), in § 2 I shed light upon the link between the current trend of robotic development toward greater degrees of autonomy and the corresponding need for artificial moral agents that fuels research in ME. I then present the epistemological profile of ME in § 3, focusing on its main component, i.e., the modelling of human moral agency in the language of robotics and computer science. In § 4 I deal with cases in which such model is brought to bear on human ethics and moral philosophy as well, whilst in § 5 I develop a criticism of this extension based on an account of the actual epistemological relations that obtain between philosophical and technological knowledge in the context of the ME project. In § 6 I discuss the role that the ordinary use of language plays in the process of extending machinerelated notions to other domains of knowledge and, finally, I clarify what the appropriate scope of machine ethics is notwithstanding its many utopian or dystopian misinterpretations.

In response to the many social impacts of automated mobility, in September 2020 the European Commission published Ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles, a report in which recommendations on road safety, privacy, fairness, explainability, and responsibility are drawn from a set of eight overarching principles. This paper presents the results of an interdisciplinary research where philosophers and engineers joined efforts to operationalize the guidelines advanced in the report. To this aim, we endorse a function-based working approach to support the implementation of values and recommendations into the design of automated vehicle technologies. Based on this, we develop methodological tools to tackle issues related to personal autonomy, explainability, and privacy as domains that most urgently require fine-grained guidance due to the associated ethical risks. Even though each tool still requires further inquiry, we believe that our work might already prove the productivity of the function-based approach and foster its adoption in the CAV scientific community.

Dalle decisioni algoritmiche alle raccomandazioni sugli acquisti, dai sex robot alla sorveglianza sociale, dalla cybersicurezza all’autonomia operativa dei veicoli e delle armi, l’impatto dell’intelligenza artificiale e della robotica sulla vita delle persone è sempre più ramificato e pervasivo. Il volume offre un quadro d’insieme delle questioni etiche sollevate dall’incontro tra automi e individui nella società contemporanea: la protezione dell’autonomia a fronte della raccolta minuziosa di dati personali, le forme di benessere collettivo da promuovere attraverso l’automazione, la trasparenza e l’equità delle decisioni prese con il supporto di un algoritmo, il ruolo dei sistemi intelligenti nella crisi ambientale. L’automazione non è segno incontrovertibile di sventura, ma nemmeno indizio sicuro di progresso. Cosa sarà delle persone, delle società e della vita sul nostro pianeta dipende in modo cruciale da come sapremo affrontare le sfide etiche dell’età degli automi.