Fabio Serranito

Despite his inclusion in Hadot’s foundational work on philosophy as a way of life (PWL), Aristotle tends to be sidelined in recent discussions. This is because Aristotelian contemplation is a goal in itself, not clearly associated with a project of transformation of the knower’s practical life. In this article, I use evidence from the Eudemian Ethics (EE) to re-evaluate the relationship between contemplation and practical life by reflecting on the notion of bios (way of life) and the question about the best possible bios. The exploration of the three bioi in EE problematizes the relationship between phronesis and theoria. Furthermore, EE reframes the question of the best possible bios as a thought experiment from an antinatalist stance: for the sake of which would you choose to be born? The result is a reconsideration of Aristotelian contemplation as a matter of vital importance, and as a valid goal within PWL.

This paper provides a tentative reading of the Euthydemus that emphasises the role of misunderstanding in the dialogue. It explores some of the differences between philosophy and eristic portrayed in the Euthydemus, namely their contrasting perspectives on ἐπιμέλεια ἀρετῆς. These perspectives are revealed in their radically different approaches to the protreptic challenge issued by Socrates. The paper argues that in displaying their eristic skills, the brothers are actually showing how they would encourage others to pursue knowledge and care for virtue – but with a different conception of knowledge and virtue than the one held by Socrates. In misunderstanding each other’s conceptions of ἀρετή and its ἐπιμέλεια, Socrates and the brothers enter into a dialogue of the deaf that emphasizes their radically different approaches to the care of the young.

This article maps the complex and changing interrelation of madness (μανία) and truth (ἀλήθεια) in the erotic speeches of thePhaedrus. I try to show that μανία is not merely a secondary aspect but rather a fundamental element within the structure binding together the sequence of speeches. I will show how what starts as an apparently simple binary opposition between μανία andἀλήθεια in Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech suffers an important modification at the beginning of the palinode, and is finally turned upside down in the radical reappraisal caused by the focus on erotic μανία. The result is a different understanding of μανία, as well as a reassessment of the status and cognitive reliability of day-to-day human perspective.