Faeze Fafa Fazeli

In Avicenna’s Flying Man Thought Experiment (FMTE), we are invited to imagine someone who suddenly comes into existence, flying in the air, in a state of complete sensory deprivation, and without any memory. The Flying Man (FM) is claimed to be aware of something while he is unaware of his body. What exactly FM is aware of has been a topic of some debates. To answer this question, we study FMTE through two lenses: the essence-existence distinction and the distinction between the inside observer and the outside observer in thought experiments, highlighted by Einstein in his elevator thought experiment. Relying on these distinctions, we argue against the claim that FM is aware of the essence of his self by showing that it is inconsistent with major aspects of Avicenna’s philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. We defend the view that FM is only aware of the existence of his self. It is commonly suggested that if this view is correct, Avicenna commits a fallacy in using FMTE to argue that FM’s self is not FM’s body. We argue against this position and show that within the Avicennian framework, FMTE is a sound argument.

In Avicenna’s Flying Man Thought Experiment (FMTE), we are invited to imagine someone who suddenly comes into existence, flying in the air, in a state of complete sensory deprivation, and without any memory. The Flying Man (FM) is claimed to be aware of something while he is unaware of his body. What exactly FM is aware of has been a topic of some debates. To answer this question, we study FMTE through two lenses: the essence-existence distinction and the distinction between the inside observer and the outside observer in thought experiments, highlighted by Einstein in his elevator thought experiment. Relying on these distinctions, we argue against the claim that FM is aware of the essence of his self by showing that it is inconsistent with major aspects of Avicenna’s philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. We defend the view that FM is only aware of the existence of his self. It is commonly suggested that if this view is correct, Avicenna commits a fallacy in using FMTE to argue that FM’s self is not FM’s body. We argue against this position and show that within the Avicennian framework, FMTE is a sound argument.