Farid Saberi

. In this paper, I argue that Frances Egan’s proposed understanding of mental states and her eliminativism about intentionality is an unattractive proposal. I offer two reasons for this claim. Firstly, from the perspective of some philosophers of mind like Mendelovici, Bourget, and Chalmers, even if we grant her reductionist understanding of cognitive sciences, there is no strong reason to accept her conclusion about the nature of intentionality as a general and philosophical concept. All her account accomplishes is just a solution to the easy problem of intentionality and not the hard one. Secondly, from the perspective of philosophers like Chomsky and Chirimuuta, one can question her commitment to metaphysical physicalism and reductionism. Questioning her metaphysical commitment reveals that her eliminativism about the intentionality of our mental states is unwarranted. Instead, I defend the view that it is more useful to stay metaphysically neutral and open-minded.

Recent innovative research has focused on major transitions in cognitive evolution, drawing from the existing literature on major transitions in the evolution of life. This prompts a careful examination of the distinctions and similarities between these two types of transitions. In this paper, I present four claims. First, a theoretically fruitful approach to understanding major evolutionary transitions (METs) in life is to conceptualize them as a set of objectively similar events, akin to a natural kind concept. Second, this framework allows for discussing major cognitive transitions (MCTs) while emphasizing that METs and MCTs represent two distinct subsets of possibility-expanding evolutionary events, each defined by different criteria. Third, the recent works of Barron (Barron AB, Proc Biol Sci 290(2002):20230671) and Ginsburg and Jablonka (Ginsburg S, Jablonka E, Phil Trans r Soc B 376:201907662019, 2021) serve as successful examples of applying a transition-oriented approach to cognitive evolution. Both provide coherent definitions of MCTs along with fine-grained explanations of these events in unique ways. Finally, drawing on the tradition of dialectical thinking, specifically the method of climbing down the ladder of abstraction, I argue that their contributions can be viewed as complementary rather than competing alternatives.

In this paper, I examine Frank Jackson’s (1998) defense of conceptual analysis and flag some of the problems with his defense. If I am right about my criticisms, then, firstly, we do not desperately need conceptual analysis because neither our science nor metaphysics need to be committed to completeness and entailment. This was shown by methodological physicalism. Secondly, conceptual analysis does not give us the expected results. If we expect the conceptual analysis to give us apriori results (in the sense of counterfactual intensions) we are mistaken. There is no fundamental reason to assume that any of our ordinary and natural language concepts are a good way to start to dig for real apriori results. It is equally possible that these results are not discoverable by the human mind. Thirdly, if we can give up apriori results with empirical discovery, then Lycan (1988) is right that we can give up large chunks of our folk concept of free will and still be realist about free will. There is no need to define free will in a way that is near enough to or a natural extension of the folk concept of free will to be a realist about free will.

My argument here is two-fold. I agree with Nagel that folk experience of absurdity and the way this experience is conceptually articulated (“the standard arguments for absurdity”) is distorted and confused. However, I argue that his proposed philosophical articulation of the absurd is not coherent and deprives the folk experience of the absurd from its true and original crux hidden behind its confused expressions. Here, firstly, I review the main argument of Nagel’s paper and compare his liberal “ironic view” of absurdity to Camus’s “heroic view.’ (Sect 1). Then, I highlight some inconsistencies in his argument and some difficulties in his account (Sect. 2). Finally, I will propose a eudemonic approach to absurdity. Here, I contrast socialist humor with liberal ironic or heroic attitudes to absurdity (Sect. 3).