Fausto Fraisopi

the domain of Art critique and becoming a philosophical argument. How can we think of Perspective as symbolic Form? Is Perspective really a symbolic form? Why is Perspective so important? Because at the beginning of the Modern Age, Perspective as spiritual figure grounds many symbolic or even many scientific constructions. We could we say that perspective open the foundation of modern science as such. The “Geometrization” of Vision, beginning with perspective, will be for us the interpretative key in order to understand the Modern Age as a whole. This understanding will allow us to understand the anthropologic dimension arising from the Modern Age, called „Perspectivism“. Assuming that perspective was neither only an invention of painting nor of geometry nor of philosophy, taken as singular fields of human inquiry, we will try to sketch the genesis of “perspective” from an interdisciplinary point of view. By doing so, we will also try to fix its deep significance for the anthropology of the Modern Age. Living and feeling in a perspectival world is the real invention of the Modern Age, one that overcame the closed Cosmos of the Middle Ages in order to reveal to mankind its own potential. Our interdisciplinary approach will proceed from many points of view and converge on the idea of a new kind of human experience. Such an interdisciplinary approach will open new questions about our present time. Are we justified in thinking of our experience today as perspectival? What does it mean today to think from perspectives in the manifold dimensions of our living and to face to the complexity of our times?

The work on the sixth Logical Investigation presents, to Husserl and moreover to transcendental phenomenology a new set of problems, questions and theoretical issues, which are deeply related to the concept of intuitive fulfilment. Here, the relation between core and halo, developed in 1908, must be integrated with the concept of horizon as a fundamental stucture of perception and every other kind of experience. The experience also became a contextual experience, essentially related and determined from a contextual situationality. More generally, each appearance consists of a whole system of appearances that are empty of content but are also potential manifestations of the same type. The state of consciousness depends upon the openness to pre-traced potentialities. The horizon, which is part of the noematic dimension described in Ideen I, begins here to presents itself as this fundamental intentional structure. The transcendental fixation of the concept of horizon therefore requires the further elaboration found in §§ 33-34, texts that specifically address the notion of “empty representations.”

Dans cette première partie de questionnement de l’idée de logique spéculative chez Hegel, on retrace tout d’abord l’idée d’élément logique ou du « logique » ( das Logiche ) chez Hegel. Cela converge vers un questionnement de l’origine du spéculatif à la fois dans l’histoire de la pensée occidentale (tant chez les Grecs que chez Augustin) et dans la pensée kantienne, qui sert de base (critique) pour l’élaboration de l’idée de logique spéculative. Cette double approche sert de description d’un horizon général et problématique au sein duquel insérer l’approche des différentes « dialectiques » de la logique hégélienne.

Preface de Jocelyn Benoist La complexite est devenue desormais le trait essentiel de la plupart des approches scientifiques contemporaines. Cependant, elle n'a pas encore recu d'approche philosophique qui l'inscrit dans un discours de fondation ou de fixation ontologique. Pour cela, il faut s'adresser a la discipline qui fait de la description de la phenomenalite sa tache principale et constitutive: la phenomenologie. Quel rapport subsiste entre la phenomenologie et la complexite? Comment la phenomenologie, en tant que discipline d'interrogation de la phenomenalite comme telle, peut repondre aux problemes et aux questions souleves par la theorie de la complexite et, par consequent, au changement radical de paradigme dans les sciences? De telles questions s'averent etre essentielles, surtout parce que, au XXe siecle, l'importance de la phenomenologie pour la philosophie va de pair avec l'importance de la theorie de la complexite pour toutes sortes de disciplines scientifiques. En depit de cette specularite, la phenomenologie et la theorie de la complexite ne se sont jamais rencontrees, leurs parcours d'interrogation ne se sont jamais croises: elles n'ont jamais recu une thematisation commune, systematique, elles n'ont jamais ete interrogees ni problematisees dans leurs relations structurelles, et, si parva licet componore magnis, necessaires. Ce livre propose une approche systematique de la complexite du point de vue phenomenologique et s'oriente vers une nouvelle interaction entre les savoirs positifs et la philosophie.

Die geistige Gestalt Europas - was ist das? Die der Geschichte Europas immanente philosophische Idee" [E. Husserl]. Fur die Entstehung eines neuen Europa und einer neuen "europaischen Menschheit" spielt nach Ansicht Husserls das Aufzeigen der inneren Verbindung zwischen Europa und der Philosophie eine wesentliche Rolle, die Rolle einer neuen Urstiftung. Eine solche Urstiftung lasst notwendigerweise die Frage aufkommen, welche Traditionen und welche Motive des Philosophierens darin angenommen werden konnen. Husserls Erkenntnis, dass der ursprungliche Entwurf der Phanomenologie als Mathesis universalis und als strenge Wissenschaft zur Erneuerung des Menscheitsideals nur durch eine Konvergenz mit dem im Deutschen Idealismus waltenden Geist der Grundlichkeit vollendet werden konne, erscheint schon 1918 in seinem Werk und vertieft sich weiter bis zur Verfassung der Krisis-Schrift. Nach der Uberwindung des naturalistischen Objektivismus sowie der rechnerischen Vernunft verbinden sich Phanomenologie und Deutscher Idealismus, um den Weg zu jener Urstiftung zu eroffnen. Im vorliegenden Band wird die problematische Konvergenz zweier philosophischer Traditionen der Neuzeit, von denen die Idee der Vernunft bestimmt wird, untersucht: die Tradition einer analytisch-logischen Rationalitat, die als Mathesis universalis bezeichnet wird, und die Tradition der spekulativen Philosophie als Letztbegrundung des Wissens. Mit Beitragen von G. Bensussan, Ch. Bermes, H. Blomme, M. Cavallaro, S. Centrone, I. Chiaravalli, D. D'Angelo, F. De Buzon, A. Ferrarin, F. Fischbach, F. Forestier, F. Fraisopi, N. Grouls, C. Ierna, L. Ionel, D. Manca, I. Rogozinski, A. Schnell, A. Schuller, Ph. Schwab, S. Schwenzfeuer.

À partir d’une relecture de Naturalizing Phenomenology, nous réfléchissons à l’opportunité d’une conception naturalisée de l’intentionnalité d’un point de vue métathéorique et interdisciplinaire. Poussant la théorie de l’intentionnalité au-delà des limites de la phénoménologie descriptive et renouant par delà celle-ci avec la tradition de la Mathesis, nous interprétons l’intentionnalité comme un niveau morphogénétiquement stable de la morphogenèse des structures cognitives. Une fois repensée en ces termes et du même coup naturalisée, l’intentionnalité manifestera son importance stratégique comme seuil métathéorique entre phénoménologie « classique » et sciences cognitives.

In his work and during his life, from the Philosophy of Arithmetic to the Krisis of European Sciences and even beyond, Husserl fight constantly against a certain « crisis » and settle Phenomenology as answer to the forms of crisis that step by step he focuses as critical moments of our civilization. But the meaning of “crisis” is manifold, can be viewed from different perspectives and assessed by different forms, in continuity or incremental to each other. The evolution of the idea of « crisis » let us finally sketch the dynamic and speculative evolution of Phenomenology itself and its standing critical self-interpretation. In our paper, we will explain and focus the different meanings of “crisis” in Phenomenology in order to understand its evolution and the intrinsic continuity between the project of the Logical Investigations and the late period, in which Phenomenology itself is presented as an Hyper-Rationalism with a well defined role in the History of Europe and of the Mankind.

We often forget that art and science are not dissociated, nor indeed antagonistic, but rather allow a creative interplay to emerge from which arises the generation of new forms of knowledge. According to Parkinson, “the analogy between the new painting and the new physics consists in that elements formerly held as cognitive or conceptual a-prioris enter as constitutive factors in the very structure of the edifices of art and science”. How exactly does it work? If for us nowadays it’s relatively easy to think of the mimetic moment of art as a prelude to geometry, it is not so trivial to claim how higher-order representational symbolic epistemic structures arise from the lifeworld, or simply how both interact together. The aim of this paper is to stake out the complexity of processes going from the lifeworld and, before that, from the life of pictorial language, to h.o.r.s.e.s., in order to apply this model to further enquiries. In the first part, we will reactivate the Kantian interdependence between aesthetics and epistemology via the intersubjective dimension, in order to understand how the shaping of forms and the figuring-out patterns remain an essential component of any epistemic structure as such. In the second part, moving from Hacking, Husserl and Foucault, we will look into the way in which the evidence of symbolic structures can be maintained even alongside a genetic conception of science. Art plays an essential role in such a conception, in that it opens new horizons of figurativity in which new shapes can arise and new kinds of objectivities can be accepted as belonging to our epistemic experience of the world.

Das grundsätzliche Fragen liegt immer und ständig dem Wissen zugrunde. Ein grundsätzliches Fragen ist notwendig, wenn man die Komplexität unserer Zeit und unserer Welt verstehen will. Was uns aber heutzutage fehlt, ist die Verbindung zwischen der elementaren Situation jedes grundsätzlichen Fragens und der inflationären Vervielfachung von Wissensformen und partiellen Theorien. Damit einhergehend verliert die Philosophie den Sinn der Form eines ersten Wissens (prôtê epistêmê) als vorrangige Form eines Denkens, das den Wissensformen Einheit geben und den Sinn des Wissens für den Menschen erschließen könnte. Das Buch zielt darauf ab, im Dialog mit der phänomenologischen sowie mit der analytischen Tradition eine neue Schau zu entwickeln, welche die elementare Situation der Frage nach dem Sinn und die Komplexität des Realen wieder miteinander in Verbindung bringt. Ausgehend von der Frage nach dem Sinn kommen Grundfragen in den Blick, welche, jede auf ihre Art und Weise, einen Horizont öffnen, in dem das Denken eine Erweiterung seines Verstehens erreicht: der Horizont der Metaegologie, der Metatheorie, der Metaontologie und zuletzt der Metametaphysik. Durch die Entwicklung der Korrespondenz zwischen Grundfragen und Horizonten des Denkens öffnet sich nicht nur die Perspektive einer Archäologie, sondern die Perspektive der Zukunft des Wissens.

The emergence of complexity as an epistemological property of certain phenomena changed our idea of phenomenality. But, except from very technical approaches to epistemology, it has not been adopted by philosophical research. In any case, the large revolution the idea and the method of investigation of complex systems have lead to in science does not have an influence on the contemporary debate about realism in philosophy. In my paper I give a quick definition of the mutual relations between the philosophical problem of reality on the one side and the scientific issues of complexity theory on the other side. Further, I develop a realistic approach to complexity by the idea of meta-ontological modeling grounded upon a realistic background. That is to say that an approach to complexity of phenomena as such does never deny its basic strong certitude of reality. In this way a philosophical approach to complexity can provide a synthesis between constructivism and realism.