Federico Abal

The debate over military abolitionism has focused almost exclusively on the question of the effectiveness of a nonviolent defensive system in accomplishing the valuable tasks attributed to the regular army. However, even if it were concluded that an effective nonviolent defensive system is available, there are transitional costs of adopting such a system that it is arguable whether states should bear. In this essay, I argue that states that have contributed in the past to making the world a more insecure and violent place have a duty to bear the transitional costs of adopting a nonviolent defensive system. I also maintain, contrary to the standard position, that failure to comply with this transitional duty (in the so-called war-building dimension) is relevant to define what can be done in the face of certain external aggressions (in the war-making dimension).

RESUMO O pacifismo e a teoria da guerra justa têm a mesma abordagem binária para analisar a moralidade da guerra. De acordo com o binarismo, qualquer guerra é moralmente justificada ou moralmente injustificada, e quando travar uma guerra é moralmente injustificado, não travar essa guerra é moralmente justificado. O pacifismo da tragédia moral, defendido por Nicholas Parkin, argumenta que, embora travar a guerra seja sempre moralmente injustificado, em algumas ocasiões não travar a guerra também pode ser moralmente injustificado. Nessas ocasiões, os agentes enfrentam uma tragédia moral, na qual não há escolha moralmente justificada, considerando todos os aspectos. Neste ensaio, apresento três argumentos contra o pacifismo da tragédia moral e indiretamente a favor do binarismo.

Rivera López offers a coherent defense of three norms: the right to active euthanasia, the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatments, and the prohibition of consensual homicide. These norms appear to come to tension if an autonomy‐based justification for euthanasia is adopted. To resolve this tension, Rivera López appeals to a paternalistic argument and to the distinction between the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. In this paper, I argue that the paternalistic argument implies an anti‐egalitarian bias about the value of certain lives and that the distinction between the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity leads to consequences that are incompatible with the special duty of medical care.

Graciela Vidiella ha dedicado parte de su producción académica a indagar sobre la idea de una democracia deliberativa. En el marco de dicha indagación, Vidiella sostuvo que existe una incompatibilidad entre la idea de razón publica defendida por John Rawls y la concepción deliberativa de la democracia. Dicha critica deliberacionista contra la propuesta rawlsiana puede desagregarse en tres tesis: tesis del autogobierno procedimental, tesis sobre el uso crítico de la razón y tesis sobre el trato desigualitario. El presente artículo argumenta en contra de dichas tesis y en defensa de la compatibilidad de la idea de razón publica rawlsiana y la democracia deliberativa.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es evaluar la presunta incompatibilidad entre la idea de razón pública defendida por John Rawls y la concepción deliberativa de la democracia, tal como fue denunciada por Graciela Vidiella. La crítica deliberacionista de Vidiella contra la propuesta rawlsiana puede desagregarse en dos tesis: tesis del autogobierno procedimental y tesis sobre el uso crítico de la razón. Argumentaré en contra de dichas tesis y en defensa de la compatibilidad de la idea de razón pública rawlsiana y la democracia deliberativa.

El debate acerca de la tortura puede dividirse, siguiendo la clasificación de McMahan, en dos niveles: teórico y práctico. En el primero se discute acerca de la permisibilidad moral de la tortura en circunstancias excepcionales y las características que la convierten en una práctica, prima facie, inmoral. En el segundo se evalúan las posibles consecuencias de diferentes modelos de legislación para dar una respuesta a las situaciones del mundo real. El presente trabajo se inscribe en este segundo nivel y se propone analizar críticamente las propuestas legislativas de Jeff McMahan y Alan Dershowitz. Asimismo, busca ofrecer una exploración preliminar de las ventajas del modelo legalista.

RESUMEN Las redes sociales han tenido un papel importante en el desarrollo de reclamos cívicos recientes. Internet presenta rasgos favorables para un libre intercambio de razones entre ciudadanos y ofrece un espacio nuevo para la circulación de información. En el presente trabajo me propongo indagar sobre el alcance de los recursos electrónicos y su vinculación con las concepciones deliberativas de la democracia.PALABRAS CLAVE DEMOCRACIA DELIBERATIVA – REDES SOCIALES - RECURSOS ELECTRÓNICOS - LEGITIMIDADABSTRACT Social networks have played an important role in the development of recent civic complaints. Internet has favorable features for a free exchange of reasons between citizens and provides a new space for the circulation of information. This paper investigates the scope of electronic resources and its relationship to deliberative conceptions of democracy.KEYWORDS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY - SOCIAL NETWORKS – ELECTRONIC RESOURCES - LEGITIMACY.

Being a pacifist who refrains from lethal violence is considered a praiseworthy commitment but not morally obligatory. One reason for denying that pacifism is morally obligatory is the high cost that would be implied for agents under attack, who cannot defend their own lives. Thus, pacifists are usually seen as lambs between lions and, therefore, pacifism is seen as morally over-demanding. In this paper, I intend to clarify the over-demandingness objection and to show its limits against pacifism. First, I argue that the cost of an act is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to determine its obligatory nature. Second, arguing from an analogy to Batman, I maintain that there is a plausible moral obligation to never use lethal violence against another human being that arises from adopting a specific social role, namely, the leadership of a pacifist movement.

In a very short article, James Sterba argues that there is a moral duty to sacrifice one’s life to save the lives of others. Sterba justifies this duty by drawing an analogy with a series of cases in which some degree of sacrifice would be commonly accepted for the benefit of third parties. In this paper, I argue that Sterba’s argument reaches the correct conclusion, but is invalid. In addition, I point out two different arguments to support the existence of a duty to sacrifice one’s life to save the lives of others.

La concepción deliberativa de la democracia plantea algunas soluciones al desafío del pluralismo razonable. El hecho de que las personas estén divididas razonablemente por creencias omniabarcantes que reconocen como verdaderas y valiosas, establece inconvenientes en relación con la legitimidad de las decisiones políticas, su estabilidad y la justicia de las instituciones democráticas. Los teóricos de la democracia deliberativa resaltan la importancia del razonamiento público entre ciudadanos que se reconocen mutuamente como libres e iguales. Se analiza el componente normativo de este tipo de propuestas y el ideal de razón pública que permite su mejor desarrollo.