Federico Boccaccini

Este artigo reabre a questão da unidade das categorias em Aristóteles ao situar a tese de doutorado de Brentano de 1862 no centro do debate oitocentista sobre o estatuto e a gênese dos conceitos. Ele explora as implicações da interpretação brentaniana da metafísica de Aristóteles e de sua concepção de substância, argumentando que sua definição de categorias como conceitos reais (Realbegriffe) estabelece um vínculo entre as tradições kantiana e aristotélica. Em particular, Brentano sustenta que os conceitos categoriais devem ser definidos por meio da experiência interna, em consonância com a corrente ideal-realista alemã. O artigo também investiga em que medida a leitura unívoca de Brentano sobre as categorias e a substância aristotélicas foi moldada pela postura anti-idealista de seu mentor em Berlim, Trendelenburg, e de seu colega de estudos, Ueberweg. Argumenta-se que a interpretação de Brentano transforma o problema das categorias de uma questão meramente lógica ou taxonômica em uma questão ontológica concernente à estrutura intencional da realidade.

Franz Brentano (1838–1917) was a leading philosopher and psychologist of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the impact of his scholarship was so great that he became synonymous with a school of thought and a new approach in scientific philosophy. The Brentano School stood against the Idealistic and post-Kantian German tradition and Brentano played a crucial role in the founding of Austrian philosophy. He had an enormous impact on the work of Husserl and Heidegger, as well as on Moore’s _Ethics_ and Stout and Russell’s analysis of mind. In particular, situated between the phenomenology movement and the analytic tradition, the concept of intentionality was redefined by Brentano and has been—and remains—a key concept of twentieth- and twentieth-first century philosophy of mind. But Brentano not only reshaped philosophy of mind; he was also a remarkable and innovative thinker in several other fields of philosophy, and recent debate in metaethics, metaphysics, and the history of analytic philosophy shows a strong resurgence of interest in Brentano’s thought. Published to coincide with the centenary of Brentano’s death, this four-volume collection, a new title from Routledge Major Works, provides an essential intellectual tool for the exegetical evaluation of all aspects of Brentano’s work. Bringing together early reviews and reactions from his contemporaries—many of which have never before been translated into English—as well as the best critical assessments of Brentano’s work, this ‘mini library’ provides Brentano scholars, historians of philosophy and psychology, and phenomenologists, with a rigorous historical appraisal of Brentano’s thought and influence. Brentano’s relationships with Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition are examined in depth, alongside investigations of key themes from his work on Aristotle, medieval and modern philosophy, philosophy of mind, logic, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history.

This introduction presents a brief overview of the concept of ‘mental power’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and focuses on the issue of how a sample of influential thinkers of that period conceptualized the human agent’s mental abilities and skills as governing perception, action and moral behaviour. This leads to innovative accounts which partially ground, in a broad sense, modern psychology. The representative thinkers included in this special issue are: Descartes, Cudworth, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume and Kant.

O presente trabalho visa mostrar a diferença substancial entre o projeto de psicologia descritiva de Brentano e a fenomenologia transcendental de Husserl e seu impacto na filosofia contemporânea da consciência. Em particular, consideraremos a questão da autorreflexividade da primeira pessoa ou, em outras palavras, o problema da referência do deíctico “eu” do ponto de vista da fenomenologia. Duas teorias de nível único, a teoria da consciência pré-reflexiva e a teoria da autorrepresentação, serão analisadas bem como a relação entre a consciência fenomênica e a intencionalidade.

Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) fut l'une des figures majeures de la philosophie allemande au XIXe siècle. Philosophe, logicien, psychologue, médecin, il a connu à son époque une renommée extraordinaire. Professeur de philosophie à l'Université de Göttingen, où il succéda à Herbart, il mena un parcours de recherche aussi original qu'influent. Entre romantisme et positivisme, entre naturalisme et historicisme, sa doctrine ne s'est jamais confondue avec les courants les plus importants de son époque. Admirée et suivie, autant en Allemagne qu'à l'étranger, sa pensée fut ensuite, après sa mort, condamnée à l'oubli en raison de son supposé éclectisme méthodologique et, finalement, classée sous la rubrique ambiguë d'idéal-réalisme. Le legs de Lotze s'inscrit dans un rapport complexe à la phénoménologie, à la philosophie analytique naissante, au pragmatisme américain et au néokantisme allemand jusqu'à Heidegger. L'analyse de ce legs n'a cependant jamais bénéficié d'une réflexion critique capable d'en mesurer la portée et les limites. Par un travail d'évaluation historico-critique, ce volume se propose de combler cette lacune.