Federico Boem

_Embodied Cognition_ suggests that cognitive processes are deeply rooted into our bodily morphology and its sensorimotor interactions with the environment. _Evolutionary Embodied Cognition_ suggests that our cognitive abilities are inscribed within the evolutionary trajectory of our dynamic bodily architectures. This paper extends the framework of _Evolutionary Embodied Cognition_, by combining it, for the first time, with the _Endurance Running Hypothesis_, which suggests that our bodily morphology has been massively shaped by an evolutionary history in which our ancestors’ ability to run played a crucial role. We analyze several pieces of anatomical, physiological, biomechanical, neurobiological and neurochemical evidence, in line with the _Endurance Running Hypothesis_, to extend _Evolutionary Embodied Cognition_ to the case of running. We build a framework suggesting a special link between the bodily, motoric capacity of endurance running, and a particular set of our cognitive abilities, so as to show a special relation between running and the mind, via body and brain.

In this manuscript, we explore the potential therapeutic use of helminths. After analyzing helminths’ role in connection with human health from the perspective of their symbiotic and evolutionary relationship, we critically examine some studies on their therapeutic applications. In doing so, we focus on some prominent mechanisms of action and potential benefits, but also on the exaggerations and theoretical and methodological difficulties of such proposals. We conclude that further studies are needed to fully explore the potential benefits of this perspective, and we encourage the scientific community in doing so.

According to a shared functionalist view in philosophy of mind, a cognitive system, and cognitive function thereof, is based on the components of the organism it is realized by which, indeed, play a causal role in regulating our cognitive processes. This led philosophers to suggest also that, thus, cognition could be seen as an extended process, whose vehicle can extend not only outside the brain but also beyond bodily boundaries, on different kinds of devices. This is what we call the ‘Externally Extended Cognition Thesis.’ This notion has generated a lively debate. Here, we offer a novel notion of extended cognition, according to which cognition can be seen as being realized outside the brain, but still inside the body. This is what we call the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis’. Not only our thesis but also our approach while defending it is innovative. The argument we offer is supported by recent empirical findings in the life sciences and biomedicine, which suggest that the gut microbiota’s activity has a functional role in regulating our cognitive processes and behaviors. In doing so, we embrace the holobiont-perspective, according to which it is possible to claim that what we call biological individuals are not autonomous entities with clear boundaries, but should rather be seen as networks of multiple interactions among species. Thus, by analyzing different sets of evidence in light of the holobiont-perspective, we argue that the gut microbiota could be seen as a component of our organism. On the basis of the philosophical interpretation of this evidence, however, we also suggest that there are no impediments standing the way of considering the gut microbiota also as a functional extension of our cognitive system. If so, this amounts to extending cognition out of ‘our skull’, though still confining it within ‘our body’: to ‘our gut’. This is an instance of the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis,’ whose benefits for an original theory of extended cognition are discussed.

We argue that microbiome research should be more reflective on the methods that it relies on to build its datasets due to the danger of facing a methodological problem which we call “epistemic misalignment.” An epistemic misalignment occurs when the method used to answer specific scientific questions does not track justified answers, due to the material constraints imposed by the very method. For example, relying on 16S rRNA to answer questions about the function of the microbiome generates epistemic misalignments, due to the different temporal scales that 16S rRNA provides information about and the temporal scales that are required to know about the functionality of some microorganisms. We show how some of these exist in contemporary microbiome science and urge microbiome scientists to take some measures to avoid them, as they may question the credibility of the field as a whole.