Federico Brandmayr

Social theories are politically flexible if people use them to support opposite political claims. But is this even possible? And what kind of theories have such a property? Moving beyond epistemological debates about neutrality and value-leadenness, this article defends an empirical approach to the study of flexible and rigid political uses of social theories. I identify two main sources of flexibility: endogenous properties of theories, notably their generality, ambiguity, and neutrality, and exogenous features of the contexts in which they are used and of the individuals who use them, notably differences in political and epistemic culture.

The terrorist attacks that struck France in 2015 had reverberations throughout the country’s intellectual fields. Among the most significant was a widespread polemic that turned around whether sociological explanations of the attacks amounted to excuses and justifications for terrorists. When prominent politicians and pundits made allegations of this nature, sociologists reacted in three main ways: most denied the allegations, others reappropriated the derogatory label of excuse, while others still accepted criticism and called for a reformation of sociology. These epistemological stances can be properly understood only by studying the long history of debates around ‘sociological excuses’ in France and by analysing French sociology as a field of forces and struggles.

The social sciences are predominantly seen by their practitioners as critical endeavours, which should inform criticism of harmful institutions, beliefs and practices. Accordingly, political attacks on the social sciences are often interpreted as revealing an unwillingness to accept criticism and an acquiescence with the status quo. But this dominant view of the political implications of social scientific knowledge misses the fact that people can also be outraged by what they see as its apologetic potential, namely that it provides excuses or justifications for people doing bad things, preventing them from being rightfully blamed and punished. This introduction to the special issue sketches the long history of debates about the exculpatory and justificatory consequences of social science and lays the foundations for a theory of social scientific apologia by examining three main aspects: what social and cognitive processes motivate this type of accusation, how social theorists respond to it and whether different contexts of circulation of ideas affect how these controversies unfold.

This paper contributes to two topics that have received insufficient attention in science and technology studies: the social dimensions of causal reasoning and how the knowledge-making site of expert testimony affects the production and reception of social scientific knowledge. It deals with how social scientists make causal claims when testifying as expert witnesses in trials where causal claims are relevant, using as a case study the so-called L’Aquila trial, in which experts were summoned by the parties to testify on the causes of risk-related behavior by the inhabitants of an Italian city in early 2009. In particular, I analyze the process of selection of causal loci, the attribution and removal of agency, the increase and decrease of causal factors in the explanation of an event, and the delimitation of the explanandum. As a general insight derived from the case, it is argued that the position of experts in a trial––which side summons them––may be a more important factor than their branch of expertise to account for certain types of these practices.

Science is sometimes depicted, both in scholarly and lay accounts, as a consensual and orderly progression in the direction of truth; at other times, it is portrayed as an arena in which lone geniuses struggle against rivals and authorities to impose unconventional interpretations of reality. The paper introduces the concept of ‘order-conflict dichotomy’ to stabilize the content of these definitions. It then shows, through an in-depth analysis of the Irving trial, an English libel suit involving historical knowledge about World War II and the Holocaust, how these definitions can be used as rhetorical devices to promote professional and situational goals. Six couples of opposing sub-definitions of science are identified by analyzing court records. As a tentative hypothesis derived from the case, it is argued that the conception of science actors deploy in this kind of controversies reflect the overall structure of the market for knowledge about nature and society rather than disciplinary culture.