Federico Zilio

Intuitively, we can conceive of the existence of a conscious state as a pure activity that does not necessarily require a body (or even a brain). This idea has found new support in certain recent theories that present the possibility of a totally disconnected and disembodied consciousness. Against this hypothesis, I argue that human experience is intrinsically embodied and embedded, though in a specific way. Using Sartre’s phenomenology of the body, I first analyze the concept of consciousness as intentionality and a world-disclosing activity, thus explaining how conscious activity can only be expressed through a body that is spatiotemporally related to the world. Then, I argue that bodily consciousness does not necessarily imply the actual presence of an anatomical body but, rather, a process of spatialization and temporalization (hodological space and temporal synthesis) through the “spatiotemporal body”. Finally, I test my thesis by critiquing some cases of apparent disembodied/disconnected consciousness, i.e., dreams, out-of-body experiences, and the brain-in-a-vat scenario.

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind.

In this paper, I will propose a provisional blueprint of the notion of consciousness. I will start an analysis of the notion from the way we generally use the term “consciousness” in our ordinary language. In this regard, I will use Saul Kripke’s direct reference theory to define the term “consciousness” in a non-descriptive way, that is, interpreting it as a rigid designator. Then, I will critically discuss the idea of a necessary a posteriori relationship between consciousness and brain activity, arguing instead that consciousness is intrinsically related to the concept of subjectivity.

People in unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state or minimally conscious state are characterized by the alteration – or the complete loss – of self-awareness and consciousness of the external environment. According to the functionalist and brain-centred approach, this kind of clinical situations also implies the loss of the moral status of person. This paper critically discusses this perspective and proposes an alternative paradigm of personhood concerning the disorders of consciousness (DOC). After a preliminary analysis, I will compare the function-based approach with the pragmatic perspective, arguing that the latter seems to deal better with the evaluation of the status of personhood in patients with disorders of consciousness, and specifically criticising the functionalist view from both the theoretical and ethical levels. Nevertheless, I will claim that the pragmatic view only works as a provisional approach, falling back into the functionalist perspective once the uncertainty of the clinical diagnosis is resolved or decreased. I will thus propose an ontological personalist approach that avoids the radical separation of the concepts of person and human being, considering personhood as an intrinsic condition of human existence, instead of an emerging property from certain contingent faculties or decisions made by a community of moral subjects. In this sense, the patient with DOC is understood as a human being with some damaged features (rationality, consciousness, self, etc.) but still a person worthy of care and attention precisely because of her/his human nature in a fragile and non-autonomous condition. Moreover, I will argue that such an ontological personalism could guide healthcare professionals towards a proactive attitude for the wellbeing of these patients.

The body is the core of our internal and external experiences. The existential and phenomenological complexity of the body is presented by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, and his multidimensional approach to corporeality has sometimes been interpreted as a failed attempt to overcome Cartesian ontology and the mind-body problem. This paper aims to reconsider the Sartrean approach not as a return of Cartesian dualism, but as an investigation of the irreducible dynamics of corporeality, which not only overcome Cartesianism but also offer an original answer compared to other phenomenological approaches. First, I analyse the intrinsic relationship between consciousness, the body, and the world in Sartre’s phenomenological analysis. Then, I present the three existential dimensions of corporeality, the body-for-itself, the body-for-others, and the body-for-itself-for-others, and argue that Sartre aims to stress the «tensional integrity» of bodily consciousness, through its paradoxical and multidimensional nature. This many-layered complexity is far from proposing a rigid dualism between the subjective and the objective body; rather, it represents a dynamic and dialectical process of attractions and oppositions. Lastly, I argue that the phenomenal richness of bodily experience developed by Sartre can offer a non-reductive interpretation of body for contemporary cognitive science.

“What is consciousness?” “What is the relationship between consciousness and the world?” Contemporary consciousness studies are dominated by a neurocentric paradigm that tends to reduce our mind to a mere product of the brain, thus impeding the complete understanding of the multifaceted nature of consciousness. It is therefore necessary to change the direction of research, focusing no more on the isolated brain or on the disembodied mind, rather on an interdisciplinary and nonreductive approach to experience that intertwines philosophy, phenomenology, and neuroscience. This neurophilosophical and neuroethical perspective will reconsider consciousness not merely in terms of the brain- or mind-relationship, but as intrinsically world-related.

Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.

: This paper uses Extended Mind Theory to explore Brain-Computer Interfaces, demonstrating how this conceptual framework provides a wide-ranging interpretation of the potential integration of user and computer. After a preliminary analysis of first- and second-wave EMT arguments and other pragmatic criteria, I present BCI technology, addressing the issues that arise. Can BCIs extend our mental processes and to what degree? What EMT criteria should be applied to this technology? What is the role of the body in the process of integrating user and computer? What are current limits to complete cognitive and bodily extension by BCIs? In line with this discussion, I suggest a pluralist approach to BCIs, allowing for specific and appropriate application of the various models and paradigms. I also advocate greater focus on the integration of body and tool, primarily for clinical purposes, but also for applications that will meet daily needs in the future. Keywords : Extended Mind; Brain-Computer Interface; Embodiment; Parity Principle; Cognitive Artefacts. Mente estesa e brain-computer interface. Un approccio pluralista all’integrazione uomo-macchina Riassunto: Il presente articolo fa uso della Extended Mind Theory per indagare le Brain-Computer Interfaces, dimostrando che questo framework concettuale offre un’interpretazione ad ampio raggio della potenziale integrazione tra utente e computer. Dopo un’analisi preliminare degli argomenti della EMT di prima e seconda generazione e altri criteri pragmatici, presenterò la tecnologia delle BCIs, affrontando alcune questioni a essa collegate. Le BCIs possono estendere i nostri processi mentali e fino a che punto? Quali criteri della EMT dovrebbero essere applicati a questa tecnologia? Qual è il ruolo del corpo nel processo di integrazione utente-computer? Quali sono gli attuali limiti per completare l’estensione cognitiva e corporea da parte delle BCIs? In linea con questa discussione, suggerirò un approccio pluralistico alle BCIs che permetta un’applicazione specifica e appropriata dei vari modelli e paradigmi. Sosterrò inoltre la necessità di una maggiore attenzione all’integrazione tra corpo e strumento, principalmente per scopi clinici ma anche per applicazioni future che soddisfino le esigenze quotidiane. Parole chiave: Mente estesa; Brain-Computer Interface ; Incorporamento; Principio di Parità; Artefatti cognitivi.

Riassunto : Nonostante le difficoltà teoretiche ed epistemologiche nell’affrontare il fenomeno della coscienza, l’autore individua una metodologia pragmatica e sperimentalmente consistente, fondata sull’approccio neurocognitivo bidimensionale: per evitare di rimanere incagliati nel “problema complesso” della coscienza, è preferibile infatti concentrarsi sul “problema reale”, ovvero sui meccanismi empiricamente rilevabili, lasciando in secondo piano le caratteristiche epistemiche e fenomenologiche degli stati mentali coscienti. Dall’analisi della relazione gerarchica tra stato di veglia e contenuto di coscienza emerge un’interessante interpretazione che tenta di rendere ragione dell’unitarietà della coscienza e, al contempo, della sua varietà fenomenica. Tuttavia, alcuni studi sul sonno, sulla fase REM e sugli incubi potrebbero mettere in discussione una certa versione forte di questa relazione gerarchica tra stati di coscienza. È inoltre importante chiedersi se una prospettiva bidimensionale sia sufficiente a definire esaustivamente le caratteristiche oggettive della coscienza o se sia auspicabile un diverso approccio tridimensionale. Keywords : Coscienza; Problema reale; Veglia; Consapevolezza; Fase REM A Pragmatic Approach to the “Real Problem” of Consciousness: Despite the theoretical and epistemological complexities involved in dealing with the phenomenon of consciousness, the author describes defines a pragmatic and experimental methodology, based on a two-dimensional neurocognitive approach. Indeed, in order to avoid the hard problem of consciousness, it would be better to focus on the real problem, i.e. on mechanisms that can be empirically observed, leaving out all of the epistemic and phenomenological features of conscious states. The idea of a hierarchical relationship between the level and the content of consciousness could give rise to an interpretation which justifies both the unity and, at the same time, the phenomenal variety of consciousness. However, studies on sleep, REM phase and nightmares might challenge at least the strong version of this hypothetical relationship between different features of consciousness. Furthermore, it is important to consider whether a two-dimensional perspective, rather than a three-dimensional one, would be sufficient to exhaustively define all the objective features of consciousness. Keywords : Consciousness; Real Problem; Wakefulness; Awareness; REM Phase