Felipe Daniel Montero

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the role of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in the “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” I will proceed in the following manner. First, I will reconstruct Kant’s conception of the PSR, drawing from his lectures on logic and the Second Analogy of Experience. Kant distinguished a formal and a material version of this principle. In both cases, the PSR enables the attribution of actuality to propositions (in the case of the logical principle) or objects (in the case of the real principle). However, it will be essential to note that real actuality (existence) cannot be attributed to an object without reference to a possible empirical intuition. Second, I will show that keeping in mind this restriction, which sets the conditions to attribute existence to objects, is essential to understand Kant’s general argument in the Antinomy. In this context, it will be necessary to distinguish between the PSR and the supreme principle of reason. Whereas the former principle is a necessary rule for the possibility of experience, this is not true regarding the latter principle. Third, I will show that the supreme principle is a rule meant to satisfy reason’s logical maxim.

RESUMEN El propósito de este artículo es examinar en conjunto las filosofías del segundo Heidegger y del joven Marx para mostrar cómo, aunque difieren en algunos aspectos importantes, ambas filosofías están motivadas por preocupaciones similares y no son tan diferentes como para impedir un diálogo productivo entre ellas. En la medida en que puede decirse que ambos pensadores han pensado, tomando la palabra en el sentido heideggeriano, lo "mismo", el modo en que ambas filosofías divergen entre sí puede ser especialmente esclarecedor a la hora de ofrecer una interpretación clara de las mismas (una tarea especialmente importante para lograr una comprensión de la filosofía de Heidegger que a menudo resulta oscura). Veremos cómo la noción de finitud de Heidegger implica una serie de críticas a la filosofía de Marx. Por último, plantearé una pregunta sobre los límites de la crítica de Heidegger a Marx, considerando que esta crítica llega a criticar la idea de que todos los seres humanos son iguales e implica un rechazo de la idea de los derechos humanos. ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine the philosophies of the late Heidegger and the young Marx side by side to show how, while differing radically in some important aspects, both philosophies are motivated by similar concerns and are not so different as to preclude a productive dialogue between them. In so far as both thinkers can be said to have thought, taking the word in a Heideggerian sense, the "same", the way both philosophies diverge from each other can be especially illuminating when it comes to offering a clear interpretation of them (a task which is especially important to gain an understanding of Heidegger's philosophy which is often obscure). We'll see how Heidegger's notion of finitude implies a series of criticisms of Marx's philosophy. Finally, I'll pose a question regarding the limits of Heidegger's criticism of Marx, considering that this criticism goes as far as to criticize the idea that all human beings are equal and so implies a rejection of the idea of human rights.

In this paper I offer a critical reading of some aspects of Heidegger’s late philosophy and evaluate how these relate to his nationalist claim that we need to stay rooted in the soil of our homeland. In response to this claim, Žižek suggests thet being-rootless is the primordial state of being-human and that what we represent as our roots are secondary attempts to obfuscate this dimension. First, I will present Heidegger’s philosophy of technology to elucidate his thesis that the essence of modern technology determinates the way we come to experience the totality of beings in our times as “standing reserve”. In the second section, I expound his aesthetics where art is seen as a mode of approaching entities that follows a different logic to that of the Gestell. However, this analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy of art will reveal a political dimension to the concept of earth which I take to be a reactionary attempt to neutralize the eventual dimension of the Gestell. In the third section, I offer a critical re-interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy following Žižek’s clue. I argue that modern art is characterized by its self-reflexive character which can be deemed transcendental once we accept the ontological dimension of art following Heidegger. These works offer a rooting in our own rootless condition analogous to the grounding in the Abgrund of Hegel’s absolute knowledge. Finally, I offer an analysis of Quentin Tarantino’s Inglorius Basterds from the perspective of the conceptual framework developed in the previous pages.