Felipe Eleutério Pereira

We seek to analyze, from an ecological-informational point of view, the possible impacts of new networked information and communication technologies, more specifically wearable computing devices, on the identity of persons. We understand that the notion of personal identity, in this case, should not be taken in its logical sense, but in reference to the notion of significant social information, operating, in turn, as part of an organizing process of relationships (Quilici-Gonzalez et al., 2023). In other words, a person's identity would involve their long-term evolutionary history, as well as their short-term history, in the context of immediate relations of interpersonal recognition, in sociocultural and more dynamic contexts, as we propose. In other words, once we adopt this ecological-informational perspective, we understand that the organizing dynamics of relationships are achieved by the concurrence of action and perception in the process of detection of affordances by organisms. Affordances are understood as significant information directly apprehensible in the environment (Gibson, 2015). This means that we are focusing here more specifically on the impact of sociocultural and technological affordances on the mechanisms of perception/action of persons. The possible Philosophy of Dress stands as a philosophical subfield that deals with specific reflections on the role of new modes of social presentation that are not considered superficial from contemporary externalist perspectives.

We aim to analyze how the epistemology of personhood precedes its moral significance. Specifically, the focus is on comparing two perspectives: the first-person perspective proposed by Lynne Baker and the second-person perspective on mental attribution advocated by Antoni Gomila and Diana Pérez. Both perspectives agree that personhood is contingent upon being part of a sociocultural community, but they differ in the importance placed on the expressivity of the body in communicating personal identity. Baker argues that personhood is attained when an individual possesses a first-person capacity in a strong sense, which involves acquiring language, engaging in dialogue, and self-reference. On the other hand, Gomila and Pérez contend that the moral standing of a social agent depends on establishing fundamental second-person relationships, where meaningful communication occurs through non-linguistic cues such as clothing, tone of voice, proximity, orientation, and gestures. Such contrast will allow us to analyze positive and negative aspects of each of the perspectives regarding the recognition of the condition of a person from a pragmatic and not spectatorial point of view, as otherwise would be from a third-person perspective on this matter - a perspective more commonly circumscribed and purposely ignored here.

En julio de 2023, Felipe Eleutério Pereira, estudiante de maestría en el programa de posgrado en Filosofía de la UNESP/Marília, realizó una pasantía de investigación en España como Investigador Colaborador en la Universitat de les Illes Balears (UIB), en Palma de Mallorca, con el apoyo financiero de la FAPESP con supervisión en Brasil de Mariana C. Broens (UNESP). Durante esta estancia, llevó a cabo una entrevista con el profesor Antoni Gomila, una de las principales referencias en los estudios sobre la Perspectiva de Segunda Persona (PSP). Como destaca el filósofo Lewis (2019), desde principios del siglo XXI se han producido numerosas contribuciones académicas en torno a la idea de la segunda persona en diversas disciplinas, como la Filosofía de la Mente, la Filosofía del Lenguaje, la Ética, la Epistemología, la Psicología del Desarrollo, la Psiquiatría e incluso la Neurociencia. Según lo planteado por Gomila (2001, 2002) y posteriormente revisado críticamente por Diana Pérez (2013), la PSP rechaza la noción de que la expresión lingüística actúe como portadora exclusiva de significado. En cambio, esta perspectiva enfatiza la presencia de una “intención-en-acción”, que surge del encuentro en tiempo real entre agentes sociales, y una dinámica relacional que emerge en el contexto de dicha interacción. En este marco, el comportamiento de un agente incita a otro a responder de forma coherente con el sentido de la situación compartida (Gomila, 2001). De esta manera, los estados intencionales de un agente repercuten directamente en los de otro, sin que ninguno de los participantes se limite a actuar como observador pasivo o externo (Escajadillo, 2018). Como explican Pérez y Gomila (2018, 2022), este enfoque relacional propio de la segunda persona no se reduce a las perspectivas de primera persona (más subjetiva) o tercera persona (más objetiva), sino que constituye la condición de posibilidad para su postulación y desarrollo.

Proposal, in Brazilian Portuguese, for a Philosophy of Dress in the context of discussions on the concept of Personal Identity in the era of new wearable digital technologies. A Second-Person Perspective is adopted, focusing on the dynamics of identity constitution through genuine interpersonal relationships. To what extent do new digital technologies constitute who we are? Is it in the same sense as traditional dress? Why has philosophy never addressed the concept of dress and its ethical, cognitive, and interpersonal significance? As William James once stated, it is more than a joke to say that a person is composed of body, soul, and clothes. Considering contemporary debates on the incorporation of new technologies, we propose a Philosophy of Dress that is not the same as a Philosophy of Fashion. Aligned with studies on mental attribution and enclothed cognition, we aim to deepen the discussion on the use of augmented reality glasses, especially in interactions where non-verbal communication predominates and, consequently, where mutual recognition of personhood takes place.

Analisamos a crítica de Georges Politzer (1998) à hipótese freudiana do inconsciente (Freud, 1996, 2018), com base na abordagem que adotamos, a Perspectiva de Segunda Pessoa, desenvolvida mais recentemente por Diana Pérez e Antoni Gomila (2018, 2021). Em específico, buscamos entender melhor o reconhecimento de estados psicológicos através do relato pessoal, buscando superar a dicotomia epistemológica entre primeira e terceira pessoa, na qual se concentra Politzer. Nossa contribuição para os estudos em Filosofia da Psicologia consiste em delimitar e extrair consequências específicas do âmbito próprio de casos de segunda pessoa, como na prática clínica aqui focalizada, a fim de robustecer abordagens cuja tentativa de compreensão dos fenômenos psicológicos parecia até então limitada.

The objective of this work is to analyze the epistemological implications of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in second-person interpersonal relationships, focusing on their identity role. The second-person thesis explores how people recognize themselves daily through various expressive, immediately significant aspects, especially emotional ones (Gomila, 2001; Barone et al., 2022). Initially, we address the difficulty in justifying how a person remains the same throughout life, despite bio-sociocultural changes, known as the problem of personal identity. By rejecting traditional internalist conceptions, such as those of the soul or subjectivity, we opt for an externalist approach. This leads us to question the conditions for recognizing personhood over time in different contexts of communication and significant action. We highlight three perspectives on this dynamic of mutual recognition, with the second-person perspective being the most comprehensive, incorporating the first and third-person perspectives. According to Gomila (2008) and Pérez and Gomila (2018, 2022), second-person processes are fundamental to cognitive and moral life, being ontogenetically primitive and essential for the acquisition of conceptual language. Modifying these processes, as in new forms of synchronous interaction mediated by ICT, may imply a structural reconfiguration of intuitive/spontaneous interactions between people. Given this, we propose a new characterization of the Fourth Person Perspective, originally proposed by Melanie Swan (2013, 2014) in order to expand its scope. In our approach, the Fourth Person would operate in significant social interactions in contexts mediated by technologies incorporated by their users, in parallel with the new quantified knowledge about themselves provided by ICT data, a meaning originally proposed by Swan (2013, 2014). This perspective is assumed during synchronous interactions, operated by virtual non-verbal language and mediated by ubiquitous technologies, always collecting relevant data from users. Considering the hypothesis (H1) of the need for a new perspective (fourth person) for understand virtual interactions, we conclude that meaningful and interpersonal interactions are possible in virtual contexts, appealing to relevance criteria based on face-to-face reality. The reciprocal contingency of face-to-face interactions enriched by non-verbal communication, central to the second-person perspective, can be extended to virtual contexts, especially if the technology used is integrated with the person as an extension of itself. Thus, the qualitative elements, typical of bodily expressiveness in face-to-face interactions, would acquire specific nuances in the digital context according to the fourth-person perspective proposed here.

Neste artigo analisamos o conceito de eu quantificado a partir na Perspectiva de Segunda Pessoa, segundo a qual a eu-dade, ou pessoalidade, é atualizada em relações contexto-dependentes de total ou parcial transparência cognitiva não redutíveis aos aspectos considerados nas perspectivas de primeira ou de terceira pessoa. O eu quantificado designa o indivíduo que realiza medições sobre si mesmo por meio de tecnologias ubíquas em rede para obter um suposto maior autoconhecimento, instanciando, segundo alguns autores, um ponto de vista de Quarta Pessoa constituído por relações de alteridade (pessoa-máquina-pessoa) emergentes, em especial, em um cenário sociocultural permeado por tecnologias ubíquas e análises de big data. Procuraremos problematizar a tese de que o automonitoramento digital promoveria um aprofundamento do autoconhecimento, defendida pelos postuladores da quantificação do eu. Procuraremos mostrar que a coleta de dados sobre si mesmo por meio de tecnologias ubíquas não favorece necessariamente a constituição/atualização da pessoalidade porque o automonitoramento digital mediado pode interferir significativamente nos modos de interação social da Segunda Pessoa e no autoconhecimento que tal interação pode promover.