Felipe G. A Moreira

Current literature offers a pluralist, a monist and a nihilist reading of Rudolf Carnap’s works. Despite their differences, these readings assume that, while determining which objects have the property of being a logic and that of being logically correct, Carnap’s works aim at answering a question: What is the number of correct logics? This exegetical essay challenges this assumption; it proposes a not yet explored reading according to which Carnap’s works point, even if only in a tentative fashion, to logical experimentalism. The latter sets itself up for three tasks. The first is to deflate the dispute about the number of correct logics in the sense of showing its lack of pertinence. The second task is to react in a bottom-top way to the fact that those who use “logic” – say, to describe a use of language that they adopt – have and probably will continue to decide on their own what properties are those of the object, which they describe with this term. The third task is to settle a condition for dialogue with these users, while seeking to have a constructive interaction with them within a particular context of application of the term, “logic”.

Improvisações para MENINA RODAMOINHO com pedaços do seu corpo: rodando o braço direito com a mão esquerda, o coração saindo pela boca, os cabelos enrolados aos intestinos, o útero escorrendo pela orelha...”. Este é o trecho que abre Parque – um texto que faz parte do conjunto dos objetos que não necessariamente são mas têm sido chamados de “poesia” e que foi escrito quando Felipe G. A. Moreira tinha vinte e três anos. Hoje com quarenta anos, o autor também assina o texto filosófico de abertura deste livro, desenvolvendo uma interpretação segundo a qual Parque é traduzível para os termos de um argumento: se são imagináveis seres humanos – isto é, animais lógicos – que não têm nem a restrição animal e nem a restrição lógica, ter tais restrições não é uma propriedade necessária desses animais. Uma restrição animal é ilustrada por aquela de não poder viver por milênios. Um exemplo de restrição lógica é a de não se poder carecer de logos sem arcar com certas consequências como a de ser internado numa instituição psiquiátrica.

Under the influence of Max Weber, Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben argue for (CiR): the claim that capitalism is identical to a religion. Yet, these defenses of (CiR) seem quite easily refutable. This is insofar as it is not clear whether they:(i) rely on a plausible use of the terms “capitalism” and “religion”; (ii) spell out the justificatory resource that backs up belief in (CiR); and (iii) show the pertinence of revising ordinary use of language in calling “religious people”, apparently non-religious people who supposedly would follow the religion of capitalism. It is this essay’s aim, then, to bolster Benjamin’s and Agamben’s defense of (CiR) by articulating a new defense of this claim that accomplishes (i) to (iii) and reads Donald Trump as a “reverend” of the religion of capitalism.

This essay addresses Gilles Deleuze’s view on which criterion is to be adopted when dealing with disputes in metaphysics and metametaphysics, while answering on Deleuze’s behalf to the objection widely shared among analytic philosophers that he has no criterion to approach such disputes. It is argued that an alternative criterion to address disputes in metaphysics and metametaphysics can be drawn out of Deleuze’s works: namely, accordance with a left-wing practice of politicization. This practice is characterized by its champions’ tendency to privilege their power to show empathy toward others, and by their aim to bring to light the political character of apparently and/or allegedly apolitical approaches to the aforementioned disputes, such as the approaches of analytic philosophers themselves.

An extremely popular view among faithless persons is that persons of faith are not legitimate philosophical opponents. After all, one would be so if and only if one met a strong condition in: avoiding appeal to emotions or Scriptures, sus-pending judgment or seeking to convince others without using propositions of faith and respecting Pyrrhonist epistemic standards. The essay challenges this condition; it supports a weak condition according to which one is a legitimate philosophical opponent if and only if one recognizes one’s difficulty of distinguishing emotions and reasons for taking propositions to be true, is aware of some of one’s propositions of faith and acknowledges one’s argumentative limits. While criticizing the strong condition and backing up the weak one, the essay tackles two philosophical per-sonas: Faithless Descartes who purports but disrespects the strong condition; and Faithful Descartes who illustrates a person of faith who meets the weak condition. That is not yet an exegetical essay on Descartes. Hence, though based on his works, the stated personas are not exactly identical to Descartes’ own stance.

Since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes in metaphysics. This book reacts to this fact by supporting five theses. Thesis 1 is that disputes are micro-wars that have a significant social importance; they involve conflicting parties who may resort to some kind of violence and depend on normative factors. Thesis 2 is that disputes can be approached from right-wing or left-wing stances. Thesis 3 is that the grounds for endorsing an approach to a dispute are problematic starting points that may be rationally rejected. Thesis 4 is that disputes have an incommensurable greatness. Thesis 5 is that right-wing approaches to disputes may be less appealing than the left-wing one championed by the book for those who endorse that one is to avoid expressing “subtle” violence. This is the violence expressed by those who suggest that others who disagree with one’s criteria to deal with disputes fall short of logos or act as if such others did not exist.

A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical that could be opposed to something else non-physical, a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are merely prima facie, but not ideally conceivable. This objection is called the Obscurity of the Physical Objection.

This paper is focused on dismissive metaontological views about ontology. The paper's first section deals with radical dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Carnap's. The second section approaches moderate dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Hirsch's. My first claim is stated in section three: that there are significant differences between the mentioned authors. However, current literature on metaontology, not only does not emphasize such differences, but also insinuates that they do not exist. The authors I have in mind here are Eklund and Bennett. In the fourth section, I compare Carnap's radical dismissivism with Hirsch's moderate dismissivism. My second claim is stated in section five: that Carnap's radical dismissivism is more persuasive than Hirsch's moderate one.

Consider three widely shared claims that have not been discussed vis-à-vis one another. In his Proslogion, Saint Anselm argued that the claim “God exists” is true. If an intuition that a claim c is a useful a-priori justificatory resource, this can only be because such an intuition is a justification that c is true. And if an intuition that c is a justification that c is true, c can stand, not only for mathematical or logical claims, but also for controversial philosophical ones, e.g., “God exists”. This essay addresses to while dialoguing with the literature on Anselm and intuition and articulating an alternative reading of the Proslogion. The alternative reading is that regardless of whether the Proslogion backs up or aims to back up the claim that “God exists” is true, it implicitly articulates the Meaning Argument whose conclusion is that all persons of faith are able to understand that the claim “God exists” is meaningful. This argument, it is argued, is evidence that an intuition that c may be a useful a-priori justificatory resource even if such intuition does not track truth, but merely meaning in being a justification for taking c to be meaningful. It is also supported that an intuition that “God exists” is not a justification that this claim is true. This is an indication that there may be reasons for thinking that the same applies to other controversial philosophical claims.

This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics characterized by the conjunction of the following three claims: (O-i) an overcoming of metaphysics ought to be performed; (O-ii) this overcoming is to be performed by adopting a method of linguistic analysis that is suspicious of the metaphysical use of language and that interprets such use through a different use of language which aims to avoid metaphysics; and (O-iii) this overcoming contributes to the political task of resisting “diseased” metaphysical practices and promoting “healthy” non-metaphysical practices.

This essay presupposes that Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Carnap champion contrasting reactions to the fact that, throughout history, persons have been engaged in metaphysical disputes. Nietzsche embraces a libertarian reaction that is in agreement with his anti-democratic aristocratic political views, whereas Carnap endorses an egalitarian reaction aligned with his democratic and socialist political views. After characterizing these reactions, the essay argues for two claims. The first claim is that the stated contrasting reactions are to be considered, not only by the few scholars who are interested both in Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s writings, but by a far larger group that includes those who have addressed the continental-analytic gap; those who are concerned with the development of contemporary philosophy; and/or those who are interested in the writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, David Lewis and/or Peter van Inwagen. The second claim is that we have to entertain a synthesis of Nietzsche’s libertarian and Carnap’s egalitarian reaction in order to overcome the continental-analytic gap.

Are contemporary philosophers to follow Pyrrho of Elis in adopting his skeptic craft or at least core aspects of it as a reaction to the fact that, since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes in metaphysics? Over the last 2500 years or so, most Western philosophers have not done so in being more influenced by Aristotle’s dogmatic craft than by Pyrrho’s skeptic one. Over the last fifty years or so, a few Brazilian neo-Pyrrhonist philosophers, such as Oswald Porchat, Otávio Bueno and Plínio Junqueira Smith, have done the opposite in aiming to spell out the pertinence of Ancient Pyrrhonism to contemporary philosophy. On its part, this essay makes a case for the claim that one is to react to the stated fact by adopting a conflictual craft that promotes a synthesis of Pyrrho’s skeptic craft and the dogmatic craft. This synthesis: brings to light the core features of the skeptic and of the dogmatic craft; problematizes the dogmatic craft by means of the skeptic one and vice-versa so that the shortcomings of these crafts are avoided; and aims to keep certain positive aspects both of the skeptic craft and of the dogmatic one.

An often-adopted use of the predicate, “to be colonized”, is one that applies it loosely, not in reference to original Africans or indigenous people enslaved by Europeans or heirs of enslaved persons, but to academics who are citizens of former colonies like Brazil, their ways of thinking, philosophical works, academic communities, etc. But under what conditions one is to do that? And how can one avoid the attribution of such predicate to oneself or one’s works? These issues have not received much attention. While dialoguing with authors associated with decolonial studies, Brazilian, continental and analytic philosophers, this essay aims to contribute to change this situation. It does so by proposing an alternative use of the predicate, “to be ‘subtly’ philosophically colonized”, according to which this predicate is to be applied to philosophical works that have the thirteen features described in the essay or at least most of them. It is argued that this alternative use is to be endorsed because it is: precise; exemplified in a detailed way by at least one philosophical work; and “inexplosive” in not suggesting the “explosive” claim that practically all Western philosophical works are colonized by Western metaphysics. RESUMO Um uso recorrente do predicado, “ser colonizado”, é um que o aplica imprecisamente, não em referência aos africanos e aos povos indígenas originais escravizados pelos europeus ou a descendentes de pessoas escravizadas, mas, sim, a acadêmicos que são cidadãos de ex-colônias como o Brasil, seus modos de pensar, trabalhos filosóficos, comunidades acadêmicas etc. Mas sob quais condições se deve proceder desse modo? E como é possível evitar que tal predicado seja atribuído a si ou a um trabalho autoral? Essas questões não têm recebido muita atenção. Ao dialogar com autores associados aos estudos decoloniais, filósofos brasileiros, continentais e analíticos, este artigo procura contribuir para mudar essa situação. Ele assim o faz ao propor um uso alternativo do predicado, “ser ‘sutilmente’ colonizado filosoficamente”, segundo o qual esse predicado deve ser aplicado em referência a trabalhos filosóficos que possuem as treze características descritas neste artigo ou ao menos a maioria delas. Argumenta-se que esse uso alternativo deve ser aceito porque ele é: preciso; exemplificado de modo detalhado por ao menos um trabalho filosófico; e “inexplosivo” ao não sugerir a alegação “explosiva” de que praticamente todos os trabalhos filosóficos ocidentais são colonizados pela metafísica ocidental.

This essay proposes an alternative reading of David Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds (OpW) by drawing parallels between this book and a performance by Andy Kaufman, Andy Wrestles the Ladies (AwL). The proposed reading is ultimately grounded by a joke: that it is more credible to believe that similarly to Kaufman in AwL, Lewis impersonated a character in OpW by performing a reductio ad absurdum than to believe that he seriously defended modal realism. After all, to support this thesis is to face countless objections while showing varied lacks of awareness and justifying the attribution to oneself of Ostrichist. The latter abbreviates the predicate, “to act like an ostrich,” attributable to that which lacks varied kinds of awareness in acting in a way comparable to that of a bizarre ostrich that buries its head in the sand for no good reason.

Divine rebaptism occurs when a deity renames an entity with a proper name N*, which is pronounced differently or is orthographically distinct from the proper name N this entity previously had. Genesis 17:5 and 17:15 illustrate this phenomenon or alleged phenomenon while raising two questions not yet addressed. First, the identity question: Are those named “Abram” and “Sarai”, respectively, identical to those named “Abraham” and “Sarah” in Genesis? Second, the semantic question: What picture of the semantics of proper names best accounts for the divine rebaptisms portrayed in Genesis? This essay begins by motivating these questions; it indicates that they should—in an interdisciplinary fashion—appeal to Pentateuch specialists and philosophers interested in the semantics of proper names. Then, a case is made for the claim that though Genesis does not provide sufficient evidence to answer the identity question, it indicates a response to the semantic one: that especially in Genesis 17:5 and 17:15, this text points to gradation semantics. This is the view that proper names have the properties of being meaningful, indirect, flaccid, flexible, and lexically univocal in distinct degrees, depending on their context of use.