Felipe Leon

This chapter aims to address the important objections Rasmussen raised in the previous chapter and to further clarify the liberal version of naturalism sketched in Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_9. This chapter therefore offers an extended exposition and defense of that view. Toward that end, I do three main things. First, I lay out my abductive methodology for evaluating large-scale theories. Second, in the spirit of seeking as much common ground as possible, I sketch a spectrum of hypothesis that seems to satisfy Rasmussen’s principle of non-arbitrary limits. Third, I argue that the data presented by Rasmussen in Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_8 are better explained on Liberal Naturalism than on theism. Finally, I raise several further concerns for the principle. Along the way, I offer replies to Rasmussen’s main objections.

The present chapter aims to address Rasmussen’s reasonable concerns regarding the possibility of a foundation that is at least partly material. Those concerns center around three main issues: (i) whether a partly material foundation is compatible with the grounds for a finite past, (ii) whether a partly material foundation is compatible with the grounds for it having a non-geometrical nature, and (iii) whether a partly material foundation is compatible with the grounds against arbitrary limits. I offer reasons for an affirmative answer on all three counts. The chapter, therefore, aims to incorporate Rasmussen’s important insights into a plausible theory of foundational reality that is friendly to both theism and naturalism.

This chapter aims to further shed light on our search for a foundational reality by raising three concerns for Rasmussen’s case for a metaphysically necessary foundation. First, there are worries that our knowledge of what is possible is limited to “ordinary” or “nearby” possibilities. Second, even if there are sufficient grounds for inferring a necessary foundation, it’s epistemically possible that the foundation is factually necessary, and not metaphysically necessary. Finally, the grounds for thinking things need a material cause calls into question the inference to a caused beginning of the universe. The aim is to shed further light on the nature of the foundation. In particular, I seek to build upon Rasmussen’s insights regarding a necessary foundation by offering tools to discern the type of necessity had by the foundation, and whether the foundation is at least partly material.

This chapter evaluates the lines of data Rasmussen raised in the previous chapter and their bearing on theistic and naturalistic hypotheses. For each, I do two things. First, I discuss concerns a naturalist might have for a theistic explanation of the data. Second, with our common goal in mind, I offer a naturalistic explanation of the data that grants as much common ground as possible to the theist. In particular, I take the data to be fundamental features of reality, rather than trying to reduce or eliminate them. In all of this, I aim to underscore how much the theist and the naturalist can hold in common without losing what is distinctive about each.

This chapter kicks off the final section of the book by offering a range of data that have a bearing on whether foundational reality is perfectly good. Toward that end, I do two main things. First, I explicate and defend a deductive version of the problem of evil, with an aim to note the key moves in the recent history of the debate on the argument, and to show where things stand at the present moment. I offer reasons for thinking that despite a long run of apparent victory on the side of the critic (esp. Plantinga), things are no longer so clear. Second, I offer a cumulative case argument against a good personal foundation of reality: horrors, hiddenness, revulsion, inhospitable environment, teleological evil, religious diversity, evolution, languishing, pointless pain, the ineffectiveness of prayer, and idolatry. I conclude by arguing that the deductive argument from evil, along with the cumulative case from the other 11 lines of data, makes the hypothesis of Liberal Naturalism at least as probable as theism.

This chapter wraps up Part II of the book. Toward that end, I offer some final replies to Rasmussen’s concerns for Liberal Naturalism, further clarifying the view and its merits. I then raise some concerns about Rasmussen’s appeal to perfection as an explanatory stopping point. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on how much progress we’ve made in our search for the existence and nature of foundational reality: We agree that the foundation is necessary in some sense, that it includes principles of reason and morality, and that it may well include both irreducibly physical and phenomenal properties. Our main differences are therefore few. I therefore gesture toward the final section of the book, which focuses on whether the foundation of reality is good.

In this chapter, I take a final look at Rasmussen’s Geometry Argument, and a second look at his principle of non-arbitrary limits. Although I raise some doubts about both, I conclude that both are compatible with naturalism, thus indicating further potential agreement. I then end the chapter with a sketch of an account of the varieties of naturalism. The moral of that section is that naturalism is right at home in ontologies that include things in the metaphysical foundation beyond the narrowly physical, such as phenomenal states, objective moral values, abstract objects, and final causes. This sets the stage for the final two sections of the book, which aim to discern the finer-grained nature of foundational reality by considering a wider range of data.

We’re justified in believing some alethic modal claims: the losing team could have won; that bridge could collapse; two and two couldn’t equal five; etc. The epistemology of modality is concerned with the nature of this justification. How can we get it? How can we lose it? And what, exactly, explains why it’s available to us at all? The goal of this book is to give a hearing to those who are moving away from the purer strains of rationalism in modal epistemology, finding room for experience to play a larger justificatory role—or even the only role. At the same time, it makes room for those who want to construct modal epistemologies that answer primarily to ordinary modal claims rather than the ones that have been of interest to metaphysicians and philosophers of mind—e.g., teletransportation, disembodied minds, etc.

In this paper, I sketch and defend a thoroughgoing empiricist account of our knowledge of metaphysical possibility. I argue that our knowledge of Moorean metaphysical possibilities traces back to our knowledge of the actual world through empirical sources (such as observation and observation-sensitive theory). In this connection, I advocate a pluralist account, according to which deductive, inductive, and abductive inferences from actuality are all legitimate sources of our knowledge of possibility.

It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false.

This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors’ own contributions to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things?

The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge of the world requires extensive empirical investigation. But since thought experiments are done from the armchair, how can they tell us about the world? A standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments provides an answer to this question, and in a way that fits naturally with a standard picture of the nature of the facts philosophers investigate: Philosophers are about the business of investigating the essences of things and kinds. But a thing’s essential and accidental properties are modal properties. Thus, one can discern a thing’s essence by discovering its modal profile. But if so, then thought experiments are naturally suited as tools for the armchair philosopher. For thought experiments shed light on modal facts. Therefore, since philosophers investigate essences, facts about essence are modal facts, and the thought experiment is one of the few tools they have for discerning such facts, thought experiments play a legitimate and indispensable role in philosophical methodology. In my dissertation, I argue that the standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments is inadequate, and sketch a more promising account. First, I argue that our knowledge of possibility is restricted to the relatively humdrum. And if so, then since the standard account ties the utility of thought experiments to our knowledge of possibility, too many thought experiments will be ruled out as useless, which raises serious concerns about the significance, and perhaps even the legitimacy, of armchair philosophy. Thus, there is pressure for armchair philosophers to reject the standard account. Second, I sketch an alternative picture of the nature of facts philosophers investigate – one that’s more fine-grained than the standard modal-profile picture. Relatedly, I sketch a correspondingly fine-grained semantics for claims about such facts. This alternative picture underwrites the legitimacy of a hitherto underappreciated sort of thought experiment, which I call the non-modal thought experiment. Such thought experiments shed light on facts about the world that are more fine-grained than what can be discerned by merely examining their modal profiles. I argue that non-modal thought experiments often succeed at just the points where the more familiar modal thought experiments fail, and thus that the two are naturally suited to complement one another in the philosopher’s practice. Finally, I exploit the points mentioned above to sketch an account of the variety and utility of thought experiments that’s much more nuanced than that of the standard account. I then illustrate some of its virtues by indicating its ability to account for a wide range of epistemically forceful thought experiments – both humdrum and exotic –, and by demonstrating how it can be used to make progress in debates that have reached a stalemate due to conflicting modal intuitions.

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda.

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda.

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful.

In this paper we argue that defenders of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities do not need to construct a metaphysically possible scenario in which an agent is morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. Rather, there is a weaker (but equally legitimate) sense in which Frankfurt-style counterexamples can succeed. All that's needed is the claim that the ability to do otherwise is no part of what grounds moral responsibility, when the agent is indeed morally responsible.