Felipe Leon

This chapter evaluates the lines of data Rasmussen raised in the previous chapter and their bearing on theistic and naturalistic hypotheses. For each, I do two things. First, I discuss concerns a naturalist might have for a theistic explanation of the data. Second, with our common goal in mind, I offer a naturalistic explanation of the data that grants as much common ground as possible to the theist. In particular, I take the data to be fundamental features of reality, rather than trying to reduce or eliminate them. In all of this, I aim to underscore how much the theist and the naturalist can hold in common without losing what is distinctive about each.

This chapter aims to address the important objections Rasmussen raised in the previous chapter and to further clarify the liberal version of naturalism sketched in Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_9. This chapter therefore offers an extended exposition and defense of that view. Toward that end, I do three main things. First, I lay out my abductive methodology for evaluating large-scale theories. Second, in the spirit of seeking as much common ground as possible, I sketch a spectrum of hypothesis that seems to satisfy Rasmussen’s principle of non-arbitrary limits. Third, I argue that the data presented by Rasmussen in Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_8 are better explained on Liberal Naturalism than on theism. Finally, I raise several further concerns for the principle. Along the way, I offer replies to Rasmussen’s main objections.

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda.

This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors’ own contributions to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things?