Felipe Miguel

Several claims of philosophical significance have recently been made on the basis of findings from Cognitive Science (CS) and from its subdiscipline Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). In this essay, two such claims are evaluated. First, it has been claimed that CS indicates that evidentialism about epistemic justification is false and that CSR, specifically, indicates that religious evidentialism is false. And, secondly, it has been claimed that CSR indicates that theistic beliefs are not justified. The first part of this essay addresses the first claim. It begins with a presentation of the current debate on the nature of evidence and on evidentialism about epistemic justification. This is followed by an exploration of some of the main findings of CSR and of three main accounts of CSR findings that are pertinent to an evaluation of the first claim. It concludes with an evaluation of the compatibility of reformed epistemology with evidentialism and of religious evidentialism with those three CSR accounts, in addition to an exploration of the prospects for the formulation of an improved account of the sensus divinitatis given the three CSR accounts, and with an evaluation of more general CS objections against evidentialism. It is found that CS/CSR pose no obvious threat to evidentialism/religious evidentialism. The second part of this essay examines the second claim. It begins with an exploration of the nature of rationality and of defeaters, of Alvin Plantinga’s account of defeaters, and of recent challenges to the traditional notion of epistemic defeasibility. This is followed by a presentation and examination of the twelve objections against the rationality of theistic beliefs formulated on the basis of CSR findings. It is found that CSR poses no obvious threat to the rationality of theistic beliefs.

Suppose that you realize that a substantial majority of the most important philosophers of all time agreed with you on p. Intuitively, you have gained additional evidence in favor of p and you should increase your confidence that p is true. It turns out, a large number of the most important philosophers of all time (in fact, the vast majority, if we consider, as we will, a recent poll conducted with contemporary philosophers) were theists. In this paper, I explore the epistemic significance of agreement with these philosophers with respect to their theistic beliefs. I argue that agreement with such philosophers does provide evidence in favor of theism.