Modal cosmological arguments argue from the possible cause or explanation of some contingent feature of reality to the existence of a necessary being. Such arguments are often presented as more modest and defensible than traditional contingency arguments because they rely on purportedly weaker principles of explanation. However, I argue that the modal reasoning undergirding such principles undermines their claim to modesty when applied to the fact that a necessary being explains a contingent fea…
Read moreModal cosmological arguments argue from the possible cause or explanation of some contingent feature of reality to the existence of a necessary being. Such arguments are often presented as more modest and defensible than traditional contingency arguments because they rely on purportedly weaker principles of explanation. However, I argue that the modal reasoning undergirding such principles undermines their claim to modesty when applied to the fact that a necessary being explains a contingent feature. I also argue that even where such facts are left unexplained, this bruteness undercuts the motivation for positing a necessary being, leaving proponents of modal cosmological arguments no better off, dialectically, than traditional cosmological arguments.
