Felix Westeren

There has been increasing scepticism about the meaning, relevance, and normative import of treason legislation. Relatedly, there is scepticism about whether treason constitutes a distinct moral wrong. These worries are often grounded in either the idea that the distinctive wrong is instead in the substantive act that is done with treasonous intent, such as assault or sabotage, or the view that the wrong of treason reflects a conception of the relationship between the individual and the state that is no longer relevant. I defend the idea that treason is a distinctive wrong. Instead of relying on the common thought that treason involves a betrayal, I argue that treason is distinctively wrong because it undermines our ability to fulfil important political obligations. I draw out some implications of this view.

The main purpose of climate policy is to preserve what is valuable in the face of dangerous changes to the climate. It must do so urgently. This urgency means that we cannot hope to change deeply held and widespread beliefs about value in time. Instead they ought to be, and can be, accounted for in policymaking. This thesis explores how a pluralist account of value can inform climate policy without falling into some of the pitfalls faced by traditional environmental ethics. I focus on some commonly held pluralist and anthropocentric beliefs about value and the impact they ought to have on key questions of climate policy, so that what is most valuable is preserved. I defend the widespread view that some things have irreplaceable value. I identify the class of things that have the strongest claim to such value, and argue that climate policy ought to give priority to their preservation. Another claim about value that I explore and defend is that the autonomy of future people is both valuable and something we can protect and advance today. I argue that we can make sense of the kinds of options future people will require to be autonomous, even if we cannot predict their conceptions of the good. Finally, I explore the widespread anthropocentric view that there is no value that is independent of humans. I argue that this view cannot be used to justify environmentally harmful policies, and that it does not on that account need to be avoided in policymaking.