Ferdinard Fosu-Blankson

Gyekye’s position claiming the unalterability of Akan destiny is contrary to the Akan folk conception, moral cognition and social practice. Generally, Akan people believe in the idea that our entire life is predetermined (fatalism), yet they accept that we are capable of making responsible choices. This paper conceptually clarifies the interchanging expressions of Hyεbrε (destiny) and Nkrabea (fate) and argues for the alterability of destiny based on epistemic resources from oral tradition, including an Akan song (Yaw Ampadu’s Yaa Amanuah), Akan proverbs, and Akan literature (Efua Sutherland's Edufa). The argumentation resonates with the Akan folk conception of moral responsibility. This conclusively indicates that the Akan people philosophically identify with the compatibilist position, soft determinism, that despite being determined, individuals are capable of making moral choices which account for moral responsibility.

The research of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner are groundbreaking works in neuropsychology that make arguments against human freedom. However, Libet’s and Wegner’s arguments are marred with some philosophical inconsistencies including; misconceptions, logical errors, and causal fallacies which seems to emanate from the problem of subjecting the concept of free will to an empirical enquiry only. In this essay, it is argued that empirical enquiry alone limits the study of the role of consciousness and its involvement in decision-making. It is suggested that scientific assessment alone may not be exhaustive in the evaluation of the idea of free will considering the role of consciousness and the absence of causal evidence between the interactions of the mind and the brain.