Fernando Broncano

This chapter investigates the prospects of a knowledge-first approach to disagreement. This approach takes knowledge to be the central value of the epistemic domain, and norms governing moves in this domain – such as belief in the face of disagreement – to drop right out of this value. On our account, in a case in which A and B disagree about whether p – where, after the discovery of the disagreement, A has a doxastic attitude D with content p and B has a doxastic attitude D* with content not-p – A prima facie should conciliate in virtue of her disagreement with B if and only if A’s doxastic attitude thus adopted would thereby be closer to knowledge than D, or else hold steadfast.

This chapter investigates the prospects of a knowledge-first approach to disagreement. This approach takes knowledge to be the central value of the epistemic domain, and norms governing moves in this domain – such as belief in the face of disagreement – to drop right out of this value. On our account, in a case in which A and B disagree about whether p – where, after the discovery of the disagreement, A has a doxastic attitude D with content p and B has a doxastic attitude D* with content not-p – A prima facie should conciliate in virtue of her disagreement with B if and only if A’s doxastic attitude thus adopted would thereby be closer to knowledge than D, or else hold steadfast.

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: it argues that our mainstream epistemology of disagreement does not have the resources to explain what goes wrong in cases of group-level epistemic injustice. The second is positive: we argue that a functionalist account of group belief and group justification delivers an account of the epistemic peerhood relation between groups that (1) accommodates minority and oppressed groups, and (2) diagnoses the epistemic injustice cases correctly as cases of unwarranted belief on the part of the oppressor group.

The topic of this volume—theepistemology of group disagreement—aims to face the complex topic of group disagreement head on; it represents the first-ever volume of papers dedicated exclusively to group disagreement and to the epistemological puzzles such disagreements raise. The volume consists of 12 new essays by leading epistemologists working in the area, and it spans a range of different key themes related to group disagreement, some established themes and others entirely new. In what follows, we offer brief summaries of these 12 chapters, drawing some connections between them where appropriate.

We investigate to what extent it is epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that groups whose members disagree over some issue use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach collective agreements. Extant approaches in the literature to this ‘deliberation versus voting’ comparison typically assume there is some univocal answer as to which group strategy is best, epistemically. We think this assumption is mistaken. We approach the deliberation versus voting question from a pluralist perspective, in that we hold that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different, albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, and epistemic justice. Different answers to our guiding question, we show, correspond to different epistemic goals. We conclude by exploring several ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation in relation to each epistemic goal.

Group polarization—the tendency of groups to incline toward more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members—has been rigorously studied by social psychologists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions. This is the first book-length treatment of group polarization from a philosophical perspective. The phenomenon of group polarization raises several important metaphysical and epistemological questions. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an epistemological point of view, is group polarization best understood as a kind of cognitive bias or rather in terms of intellectual vice? This book compares four models that combine potential answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions. The models considered are: group polarization as (i) a collective bias; (ii) a summation of individual epistemic vices; (iii) a summation of individual biases; and (iv) a collective epistemic vice. Ultimately, the authors defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives. The Philosophy of Group Polarization will be of interest to students and researchers working in epistemology, particularly those working on social epistemology, collective epistemology, social ontology, virtue epistemology, and distributed cognition. It will also be of interest to those working on issues in political epistemology, applied epistemology, and on topics at the intersection of epistemology and ethics.

I propose to consider the interpersonal character of testimony as a kind of social bond created by the mutual intention of sharing knowledge. The paper explores the social mechanism that supports this mutual intention starting from an initial situation of modelling the other’s epistemic perspective. Accepting testimony as a joint action creates epistemic duties and responsibilities and the eventual success can be considered as a genuine achievement at the social level of epistemology. Trust is presented here as the symptom that both parties are involved in such a social bond.

In this paper, I examine the role of conversation in the formation of group beliefs against the background of the summativism/non-summativism debate, i.e., the debate about whether group beliefs are a function of the beliefs of individual group members. I address the question of whether it is possible for groups to form collective beliefs without communication between their members and explain how this bears on summative and non-summative views and, in particular, on Gilbert’s joint commitment account. I also discuss the negotiation of collective belief thesis originally put forward by Gilbert and Priest (Gilbert, On social facts. Routledge, London, 1989; Gilbert, Priest, Conversation and collective Belief. In: Capone A, Lo Piparo F, Carapezza M (eds). Perspectives on pragmatics and philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013), according to which the process of everyday conversation is structured around the negotiation of collective beliefs. I argue that this thesis only makes sense in a non-summative framework, but that when specific non-summative views are combined with it, the relevant non-summative views either become inapplicable or yield the wrong results. I conclude by noting that summativism offers a simpler and more neutral picture of the role of conversation in group belief formation.

In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability (robust virtue epistemology) is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent’s true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency (epistemic dependence). In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents’ cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard’s arguments are targeted against views that hold that all it takes to manifest one’s cognitive agency is to properly exercise one’s belief-forming abilities. I offer an account of the notion of cognitive ability according to which our epistemic resources are not exhausted by abilities to produce true beliefs as outputs, but also include dispositions to stop belief-formation when actual or modal circumstances are not suitable for it (precautionary cognitive abilities). Knowledge, I argue, can be accordingly conceived as a cognitive success that is also due to the latter. The resulting version of robust virtue epistemology helps explain how purely modal facts as well as other agents’ cognitive abilities may have a bearing on the manifestation of one’s cognitive agency, which shows in turn that robust virtue epistemology and epistemic dependence are not incompatible after all.

Turning to the Book of Job and Sophocles’ Antigone, Fernando Broncano interrogates literary examples of early forms of political action. Both Job and Antigone show how resentment can play a role in awakening political consciousness. Broncano begins by considering the notion of a “state of affliction” and then interprets these works as accounts of subjects who recognize the wrongs committed against them and demand to have their own voice. He examines the political nature of certain speech acts that involve someone breaking into the sphere of language and therefore the sphere of politics. In these acts, the subjectivity of the agent forms on the very edges of politics when what is in question is how this subjectivity pertains to the word itself.

What is the nature of knowledge? A popular answer to that long-standing question comes from robust virtue epistemology, whose key idea is that knowing is just a matter of succeeding cognitively—i.e., coming to believe a proposition truly—due to an exercise of cognitive ability. Versions of robust virtue epistemology further developing and systematizing this idea offer different accounts of the relation that must hold between an agent’s cognitive success and the exercise of her cognitive abilities as well as of the very nature of those abilities. This paper aims to give a new robust virtue epistemological account of knowledge based on a different understanding of the nature and structure of the kind of abilities that give rise to knowledge.

Summativism about group evidence holds that the evidence of a group is a function of the evidence of its members. In this paper, I put forward a novel knowledge-first summative view of group evidence formulated in terms of the notion of being in a position to know rather than knowledge. In developing this view, I address several crucial questions for any adequate account of group evidence: whether group evidence is factive, whether a group must be able to act on E for it to count as evidence, whether the logical consequences of the group members’ evidence should be included in the group’s evidence, and, more importantly, the nature of the epistemic relationship that must exist between E and a group for E to be part of its evidence. In addressing these questions, I respond to recent criticism by Jessica Brown (Noûs 56:494–510, 2022; Philos Stud 180:3161–3178, 2023; Groups as epistemic and moral agents, Oxford University Press, 2024) against summative views.

[EN]In recent decades, problems related to the accessibility and sustainability of science have increased, both in terms of the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge and its generation. Policymakers, academics, and, increasingly, citizens themselves have developed various approaches to this issue. Among them, citizen science is distinguished by making possible the generation of scientific knowledge by anyone with an interest in doing so. However, participation alone does not guarantee knowledge generation, which represents an epistemological challenge for citizen science. Simultaneously, economic and socio-institutional difficulties in science governance and maintenance have grown. To solve those problems, several market elements have been introduced, a solution rejected by those who consider science as a public good that states must guarantee. Alternatively, research and work on the commons are growing worldwide, the concept being extended from natural resources to knowledge resources. In this chapter, we propose science as a commons, underlining the essential role of citizen science. Difficulties also apply to citizen science itself, but the increasing development of a multitude of projects based on cooperation favours the conditions required for its sustainability and quality. Our philosophical proposal is based on empirical knowledge about citizen science coupled with socio-economic concepts, according to a sociopolitical epistemology.

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge.

A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology—the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues—is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the problem of eliminating luck—this makes their views instances of impure virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is to argue, firstly, that such a move lacks adequate motivation; secondly, that the resulting impure accounts equally fail to handle knowledge-undermining luck. On a more positive note, these results bolster a more orthodox virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge that assigns a fundamental explanatory role to the notion of ability. In this sense, the paper also sketches an account of ability and a corresponding account of knowledge that explains how success from ability is incompatible with success from luck.

Summary of Conocimiento expropiado Resumen: El libro Conocimiento expropiado trata varios de los temas nucleares de la epistemología política. Parte de la hipótesis de que en la interacción entre posiciones epistémicas y posiciones sociales se producen daños epistémicos que producen daños sociales. El marco teórico del libro es la epistemología de virtudes extendida a los aspectos sociales. Desde estos dos puntos de vista examino temas como la injusticia epistémica, las ignorancias estructurales, la opresión epistémica y las relaciones entre epistemología y orden social democrático. Abstract: The book Conocimiento expropiado deals with several of core issues of political epistemology. It starts from the hypothesis that in the interaction between epistemic positions and social positions epistemic certain harms are produced that amount to social harms. The theoretical framework of the book is virtue epistemology extended to social aspects. From these two points of view, I examine issues such as epistemic injustice, structural ignorances, epistemic oppression and, finally, the relations between epistemology and democratic social order. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, injusticia epistémica, epistemología y democracia. Keywords: Political epistemology, epistemic injustice, epistemology and democracy.

Replies to comments Resumen: Los temas principales discutidos son: en primer logar, las cuestiones sobre condiciones de posibilidad del testimonio y conocimiento común en situaciones de opresión, desigualdad o descuido institucional. En segundo lugar, las apreciaciones sobre el acceso a los recursos conceptuales necesarios para entender la situación social de víctima. En tercer lugar, la función positiva del activismo y otras formas de acción comunitaria. Por último, el problema del pluralismo de puntos de vista y la responsabilidad en el logro de la objetividad y la verdad. Abstract: The main topics discussed are: first, questions about the conditions of possibility of testimony and common knowledge in situations of oppression, inequality, or institutional neglect. Secondly, appreciations on the access to conceptual resources necessary to understand the social situation of victim. Third, the positive role of activism and other forms of community action. Finally, the problem of pluralism of viewpoints and responsibility in achieving objectivity and truth. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, injusticia epistémica, epistemología y democracia. Keywords: Political epistemology, epistemic injustice, epistemology and democracy.

«En estos tiempos en que todo lo que somos lo medimos y lo vemos como capital, disputar el concepto de conocimiento es disputar la vida misma.» Las formas más invisibles de injusticia tienen que ver con lo intangible, con el dominio sobre la información y el conocimiento. Modos de opresión y de exclusión que la política no suele considerar porque se ha construido sobre la mentira de que la verdad no cuenta, solo cuenta lo que se cree que es verdad: solo la manipulación de las opiniones. Se oculta cuidadosamente que tener el poder sobre aquello que se sabe, y sobre aquello que se ignora, es también una forma lacerante de desigualdad. El neoliberalismo es también una forma estratégica de ignorancia, de injusticia y de silenciamiento. Contra la ceguera, este libro afirma lo contrario: toda política es política epistemológica y toda epistemología es epistemología política. La democracia es, también, un proyecto de libertad, igualdad y fraternidad epistémicas.

Resumen: Este libro pretende convertir la tecnología en un objeto de reflexion seria y rigurosa que no se limite a pensar sobre las consecuencias de la tecnica, atienda el hecho de que los sistemas tecnológicos son objetos culturales, los mas importantes objetos culturales de nuestra civilizacion, y los ingenieros, por ello mismo, creadores de cultura con el mismo estatuto que cientificos o artistas. El volumen reune varios ensayos sobre cuestiones filosoficas, que plantea la teología actual : como determina nuestra cultura contemporanea, como se desarrolla y que relación existe entre desarrollo económico y social y el desarrollo tecnologico. La obra es parte de un programa de desarrollo de un análisis interno de los sistemas tecnológicos, de la lógica de las normas tecnologicas y de los nuevos metodos de conocer especificamente tecnológicos, como es el modelado de sistemas, a mitad de camino entre la lógica y la analogía. Se examinan, a modo de ejemplo, algunas tecnologias contemporaneas, en particular las ligadas a la reproducción funcional de seres vivos y del conocimiento, la inteligencia artificial y ciencias cognotivas. Jose Ortega y Gasset inauguro una tradición en filosofía de la tecnica a la que este volumen se honra en pertenecer.

Nuestro objetivo es examinar por qué la confianza puede ser considerada como una emoción secundaria y cómo ésta se aborda de diferente manera en un contexto estético u ordinario, lo cual proporciona otro modo de investigar las emociones secundarias_. _Nuestra tesis se desarrolla en tres secciones y una conclusión. En la primera sección, hemos desarrollado ejemplos y hecho observaciones a modo de análisis para probar por qué las narrativas son importantes para nuestras emociones secundarias. En la segunda sección, hemos examinado por qué la confianza puede ser considerara como una emoción secundaria así como establecer un criterio para identificarla como tal_. _En la tercera sección, presentamos una de las funciones de la confianza, el intercambio de conocimiento entre agentes, cuando se comparte conocimiento en un proceso epistémico con otros. Hemos comprobado que la construcción de la relación entre sujetos y objetos se produce mayoritariamente gracias a la confianza. Una emoción secundaria que representa lazos afectivos entre sujetos para acceder a una emoción primaria.