Fernando Silva

The present article seeks to inquire the nature of Novalis’ difficult relation with philosophy. By founding this relation in a primordial spiritual conflict, wherein philosophy is the cause and the solution for the latter, as well as in an inescapable mythical understanding, wherein philosophy is at the same time necessary, and yet necessarily expendable, we intend to prove Novalis’ own seemingly contradictory, yet infinitely productive concept of philosophizing: one where philosophizing is a ductile, organic way of dealing with the problem between the human being and the absolute. Furthermore, we wish to prove how this is most visibly considered in the sub-problem of the origin of philosophy, which sets the tone for Novalis’ remaining philosophical edifice and inscribes him as one of the leading opposers of a systematic philosophy – and hence, as an advocator of the impossibility of attaining the absolute through philosophy.

The present essay proposes a new reading of Kant’s concept of poetry in his Lecture on Anthropology and within his anthropological thought in general. Rather than seeing poetry as merely an anthropological category or even as a disposition of the human spirit falling within the scope of anthropology, in this reading poetry is a key link between most of Kant’s anthropological topics and is therefore of paramount relevance for an understanding of Kant’s anthropological thought as a new science of human beings. In short, this reading aims to fill an important void in Kantian analysis. Until now, Kantian scholars have mostly failed to grasp the importance of Kant’s concept of poetry and, especially so, of Kant’s concept of poetry from a pragmatic point of view. The latter is neglected, or seen as the mere outcome of a special imaginative process—one which, however, is unrelatable to rationality, for poetry cannot be seen as a self-driven force, capable of enlivening the faculties of the spirit, nor as a driving force endowed with a purpose other than to delight or create new images. However, it is our view that Kant’s anthropological concept of poetry is indeed presented as relevant, especially in the sections devoted to the problem of human imagination [Einbildung]. Here, Kant proposes a revolution in the position, function, and whole joint disposition of the human faculties, one which displays the singularity of Kant’s proposition of a pragmatic anthropology as a science. In short, we aim to discover those potentialities that, to Kant, were unique in the human being’s poetic disposition; to show how Kant’s concept of poetry not only presupposes, but is also presupposed by an indeed revolutionary rearrangement of the inferior imaginative faculties; and to clarify how such a unique poetic disposition of the inferior faculties benefits the superior faculties, as well as rational knowledge, and hence fulfills a greater objective in Kant’s anthropology: to achieve that rare harmonious plane in human being’s state of mind which brings about a unique kind of anthropological pleasure—the pleasure of finding out something common to all mankind, which is clearly at the basis of the philosopher’s critical enterprise.

This book presents a critical reconsideration of the Kantian cognitive and practical subject. Special attention is devoted to highlight the complex relation between subjectivity as it is presented in the three critiques and the way in which it is construed in other writings, in particular the Anthropology. While for Kant our cognitive apparatus and the structure of our will are common to all humans, the anthropological subject reveals degrees of variation, depending on a myriad of external circumstances that pose a challenge to the unity of Kant's account and await theoretical solutions. The essays collected in the volume delve into how the different shapes of human nature are not unrelated. They explore how and why different "Kantian subjects" are closely connected and at their core, if not entirely unified. The notions of personality, humanity, and citizenship will serve as leading threads for the reconstruction of this possible underlying unity. An engaging read that promises to deepen our understanding of human nature, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy, politics, psychology, social anthropology, ethics, and epistemology.

The main point of our study is that the Kantian problem of a suitability between theory and practice, one of the key issues in Kant’s practical thinking in general, was erroneously perceived not only by those who defended it, and conceived of its possibility, but also by those who denied it and defended its impossibility. Our position, conversely, is that Kant, upon approaching a seemingly irresoluble problem, was forced to conceive of a via media, an “intermediate member of connection” between theory and practice; an alternative which, in our view, does not arise out of mere necessity, rather is intimately interconnected from the mid-1770s onwards with the formation of Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, a scheme which, in its tridimensionality, establishes Pragmatic Anthropology as a third dimension of human knowledge and therefore as the only suitable soil for the dialogue between theory and practice, beyond the mere possibility or impossibility of the problem. This proposition, we hope, will enable us to ascertain what Kant envisages by the “talent of nature”, the special “act of the power of judgment” that is to serve as connecting member between theory and practice; to explain how Anthropology is to be seen as the natural abode for this mediating interplay; and, finally, to better position, as well as delimit, the scope of Kant’s anthropo-cosmological view of Man in the World, which is to be seen precisely between the merely rational of theory and the merely empirical of practice.

Emergentes não raras vezes nas Lições de Antropologia de Kant, os termos “Einbildungskraft”, “Einbildungsfähigkeit” e “Imagination” são comummente tomados – e, prova maior disto mesmo, traduzidos – como um só. O presente artigo propõe-se pôr em causa e demonstrar a incorrecção desta abordagem. Bem pelo contrário, estamos em crer que, no âmbito da antropologia kantiana, em primeiro lugar, “faculdade de imaginação” e “capacidade de imaginação” não são uma e a mesma coisa, antes significam diferentes estratos, diferentes dimensões conceptuais na compreensão do processo de representação humana; em segundo lugar, também “faculdade de imaginação”, enquanto “Einbildungskraft”, não é o mesmo que o seu correspondente na “Imagination”, antes duas dimensões de um e o mesmo problema antropológico, o problema por excelência do acto de representar, que surge entre o mundo e o designar humano. Tais distinções, que, assim o cremos, requerem uma compreensão mas também uma tradução mais criteriosa do que até aqui, trazem a uma mais distinta luz o modo como Kant estrutura e ordena as diferentes fases do processo da imaginação humana, e salienta aquelas que, para o filósofo, são as diferentes potencialidades desta última.__.

Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism. Keywords: Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism.

The central aim of this essay is to portray Kant’s notion of Witz as it unfolds from his Lectures on Anthropology, in a decisive stage of his intellectual evolution. This aim is sub-divided into two parallel objectives: first, to sketch a brief history of the concept of Witz, thus showing how Witz came to evolve from having a rational connotation to having an imaginative connotation, and how it came to be a pregnant philosophical issue, as well as an aesthetic principle. Secondly, to show how Kant read that singular course in the evolution of Witz; how, in his view, Witz and the power of judgement, imagination, and intellect are indeed opposed, but also how there is a necessity to unite both opposing parts; a convergence which is not only advantageous for both parts, but serves a greater purpose: to create an unsuspected link between imagination and understanding, as well as between philosophy and poetry.

ABSTRACT The question of human consciousness is a crucial part of Novalis’ aim of construing a self-critique of the I, or critique of human identity, as it is proposed in his “Fichte-Studien”. Namely, this question is an intermediary stage in said critique, serving as proof for Novalis’ theory of the opposites, the fundamental stage, and his position on philosophizing, the final stage of this endeavor, which will be at the basis of his whole philosophical system; and as such, it is a topic of great importance, as it is not only a link in a chain of thought which aims at proving the organicity or living heterogeneity - and not Fichte’s machine-like homogeneity - of the human but is also a key topic towards the resolution of Novalis’problem of philosophy as an existential problem. Given this, the present article intends to situate the question of human consciousness in the framework of Novalis’greater scope of a critique of the I; and from then, to comment on Novalis’own position on the problem of human consciousness, as it is stated in the formula “Consciousness is the Being outside of Being, within Being”; a position which further separates the young poet from Fichte, as it renders him closer and closer to other young idealists, such as Hölderlin or Schelling. RESUMO A questão da consciência humana é uma parte crucial no intento novaliano de construir uma autocrítica do Eu, ou crítica da identidade humana, como ela é proposta nos seus “Fichte-Studien”. Designadamente, esta questão constitui um estado intermédio em tal crítica, servindo como prova da teoria dos contrários de Novalis, o estádio fundamental desta, e a posição de Novalis sobre o filosofar, o estádio final da sua empresa, a qual está na base de todo o seu sistema filosófico; e, como tal, é um tópico de grande importância, visto ser não só um elo em uma linha de pensamento que visa provar a organicidade ou heterogeneidade viva - e não a maquinal homogeneidade de Fichte - do humano, mas também um tópico-chave tendo em vista a resolução da questão novaliana da filosofia enquanto problema existencial. Assim sendo, o presente artigo propõe-se situar a questão da consciência humana no contexto maior da crítica da identidade de Novalis; e, a partir daí, comentar a posição de Novalis sobre o problema da consciência humana, como ele surge exposto na fórmula “A consciência é o Ser fora do Ser, no Ser”; uma posição que decisivamente separa o jovem poeta de Fichte, enquanto o aproxima de outros jovens idealistas, tais como Hölderlin ou Schelling.

The present article seeks to inquire the nature of Novalis’ difficult relation with philosophy. By founding this relation in a primordial spiritual conflict, wherein philosophy is the cause and the solution for the latter, as well as in an inescapable mythical understanding, wherein philosophy is at the same time necessary, and yet necessarily expendable, we intend to prove Novalis’ own seemingly contradictory, yet infinitely productive concept of philosophizing: one where philosophizing is a ductile, organic way of dealing with the problem between the human being and the absolute. Furthermore, we wish to prove how this is most visibly considered in the sub-problem of the origin of philosophy, which sets the tone for Novalis’ remaining philosophical edifice and inscribes him as one of the leading opposers of a systematic philosophy – and hence, as an advocator of the impossibility of attaining the absolute through philosophy.

The present essay is devoted to analyzing Reinhold’s contribution to one of the most relevant questions in German idealism, namely, the possibility of an absolute principle of all philosophy, as a task left open by Kant’s critical enterprise. The main aim is to assess the extent to which Reinhold is the first to propose this philosophical problem as a question of language, and in doing so the possibility of an absolutely apodictic philosophical language, as it would be later resumed and developed by Fichte and other authors. Keywords: Reinhold, language, philosophy, principle, consciousness.

Partindo da inequívoca assumpção de que há um espírito comum entre Platão e o período do idealismo alemão, o presente ensaio propõe-se comprovar esta mesma tese analisando o conjunto de anotações intitulado “Über den Geist der Platonischen Philosophie”, coligido por Schelling ainda na fase pré-filosófica da sua evolução espiritual, em 1793. Da análise deste, e dos dois mitos aí contidos, esperase por sua vez que estes nos possam fornecer fortes indícios não só do quadro histórico-mitológico que está por detrás de toda a filosofia idealista, mas também da possibilidade de que destes mitos nasçam os primeiros frémitos da primeiríssima filosofia de Schelling.

RESUMO Seguindo a elevação de outros dons naturais do espírito humano a categorias ou princípios estéticos, o que ocorreria gradualmente durante o século XVIII, o génio e as suas várias problemáticas tornam-se uma das mais prementes questões na agenda filosófica da época. Entre outros, a questão assume particular relevância na filosofia de Immanuel Kant, e isso não apenas na sua obra publicada, mas também na sua actividade como Professor. O presente texto propõe-se abordar a questão do génio nas lições de antropologia do filósofo, e, tomando isto como ensejo, cumprir dois objectivos centrais: em primeiro lugar, traçar uma brevíssima história do conceito desde o século XVII até Kant, a fim de perceber que emprego desta faria o filósofo, e como ele próprio se associa ou dissocia desta. Segundo, compreender o modo como, dada a sua percepção histórica do termo, a teoria do génio em Kant trilha um curso singular, distinto em relação ao dos seus contemporâneos, e que faz com que o génio ostente uma posição central no seio da sua própria teoria; pois, na visão de Kant, o génio não só desempenha um importante papel como mediador das faculdades do ânimo humano, como é ainda peça indispensável na boa proporção entre estes e na insuspeitada produção de conhecimento por isto gerada. ABSTRACT Following the ascension of other natural gifts of the human spirit to the condition of categories or aesthetic principles, which would occur gradually during the 18th century, the topic of genius and its various issues becomes one of the most important questions in the philosophical agenda of the time. Among others, the question assumes particular relevance in Immanuel Kant's philosophy, not only in his published work, but also in his activity as a professor. The following text intends to approach the question of genius in the philosopher's Lectures on Anthropology, and taking the latter into account, to fulfil two central objectives: first, to etch a brief history of the concept from the 17th century until Kant, so as to realize what use Kant would make of this evolution, and how he himself associates or dissociates from it. Secondly, we intend to understand how Kant's theory of genius describes its own singular course, different from the ones of his contemporaries, and renders the genius a central piece within his own theory; for, in Kant's view, the genius not only plays an important role as mediator of the faculties of the spirit, but it is also an indispensable factor in the proportion between the latter, and in the unsuspected production of knowledge thus generated.