Filip Grgic

Ignorance is sometimes an excuse: in certain circumstances, if a person has done something wrong, she is blameless if she did not know what she was doing. What are those circumstances, and why is ignorance sometimes considered a legitimate excuse and sometimes not ? At first glance, Aristotle’s response to these questions is quite rigorous: a legitimate appeal to ignorance as an excuse requires an appropriate causal history of ignorance and action, as well as the corresponding mental state of the agent and the observers. Thus, it seems that the agent’s ‘I didn’t know’ is a genuine excuse only if the agent was subjected to bad luck. In this paper, I try to show that these strict conditions can still be somewhat relaxed and that there are many actions in which ignorance can be a legitimate excuse even though they do not belong to the type of genuine involuntary actions.

Sexto Empiricus retrata os céticos pirrônicos de duas formas radicalmente diferentes. Por um lado, descreve-os como investigadores ou examinadores, insistindo que o que os distingue de todas as outras escolas filosóficas é a persistência na investigação. Por outro lado, insiste em que a principal caraterística da atitude pirrônica é a suspensão do juízo sobre tudo. Muitos argumentaram que não é possível uma descrição consistente do ceticismo sextiano como sendo ao mesmo tempo investigativo e suspensivo. O principal obstáculo à caraterização do pirronismo como investigativo e suspensivo é o fato de parecer que os céticos maduros, depois de terem suspendido o juízo e assim atingido a tranquilidade, não têm motivação para continuar investigando. Qualquer investigação em que pareçam estar interessados depois de terem suspendido o juízo é a refutação de crenças (relevantes) necessárias para manter a tranquilidade. Tento mostrar que a remoção da perturbação dos céticos maduros não significa ipso facto a remoção do desejo de conhecimento. Isto porque a perturbação não é apenas uma questão de desejo insatisfeito, mas da crença de que uma das aparências opostas tem de ser verdadeira ou, mais genericamente, da crença de que a verdade é o único objetivo epistêmico valioso. Tendo abandonado esta crença, os céticos podem ainda se empenhar em investigações filosóficas. Isto porque Sexto não supõe que a filosofia é a procura da verdade: é-o apenas para os dogmáticos. Num sentido mais geral, aplicável também aos céticos, a filosofia é apenas uma investigação sobre certas coisas e, para os céticos, o seu objetivo epistêmico continua em aberto.

One of the most contentious issues in the contemporary philosophy of luck is the account of the so-called significance condition. Consideration of the significance condition pulls in two opposite directions: either into subjectivism and relativism about luck, which may result in the admission that luck cannot have the philosophical use attributed to it, or into eliminativism about the significance condition, which may result in an account of luck that does not do justice to the common usage of the term. In this paper, I discuss whether contemporary philosophers of luck can benefit from considering Aristotle’s view of luck (tyche) and offer a cautiously affirmative answer. Aristotle develops an objective account of luck that avoids problems plaguing contemporary theories, especially those concerning the significance condition. However, the use of Aristotle’s analysis in the context of current debates is limited due to at least three reasons: (1) Aristotle’s analysis depends on his peculiar understanding of teleology, which in turn presupposes a specific conception of the good that is difficult for many to accept today; (2) Aristotle’s analysis requires unexpected and sometimes strained explanations of our everyday attributions of luck; and (3) it seems that Aristotle does not treat cases of good luck and bad luck symmetrically.

The article explores the differences and similarities between the ancient concept of eudaimonia and the modern idea of happiness. It first highlights two key differences: eudaimonia requires virtue, whereas happiness does not; and while the ancient understanding of eudaimonia is objectivist, the modern view of happiness is more subjectivist. Then, an important similarity is pointed out: both the ancients’ pursuit of eudaimonia and our search for happiness are about finding the best possible life within the constraints of luck, whose influence pervades our lives.

In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes (sunaitioi) of our dispositions. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature (as well as social environment, early educators, etc.) is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are (efficient) causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions.

The author discusses Aristotle’s notion of deliberation and shows that it differs considerably from the model of deliberation as is common in contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility. As opposed to the contemporary model, Aristotle’s account does not require that the deliberator has any belief (or lack thereof) concerning the availability of possible courses of action. However, the action chosen by deliberation, before it is performed, is still contingent––i.e. such that it can both be and not be done––and up to us. Moreover, the action’s being up to us can be seen as grounded in our having rational capacities that are necessarily two-sided. This might suggest that the agent can do otherwise than she has decided by deliberation. The author argues that this is not the case: after deliberation, or after forming the relevant desire, the agent can actualize only one arm of her two-sided capacity, and hence, she cannot act differently than as decided by deliberation. If it makes sense to say that she can act differently, it is only because there may occur, in the interval between deliberation and action, some other desire which takes over a role of the decisive factor.

In this paper I discuss some problems with Aristotle’s characterization of lucky events as events which are “for the sake of something”. I argue that there is no special sense of the phrase “for the sake of something” when applied to lucky events. Qua event, a lucky event has come about for the sake of something and thus unqualifiedly belongs among things that come about for the sake of something. But qua lucky event, it has not come about for the sake of that thing it has come about qua event, but it nevertheless is, or turns out to be, for the sake of something.

In this paper, we show that there are some strong philosophical and exegetical reasons to argue that according to the view developed in the first chapter of Aristotle’s De Memoria, the objects of memory are non-present, or absent, things and events rather than our past acts of awareness of them. We argue that on Aristotle’s account, the objects of memory can be particulars or universals, perceptibles or intelligibles, and that all these kinds of things are past in the same sense, namely, in the sense of previously having been present to the perceiver or knower. Aristotle’s claim that we remember that we previously learned or saw something is the description of how, rather than what, we remember. Keywords: Aristotle, memory, past, pathos, present.

In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try to show that the similarities between Aristotle's rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle's rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action.

In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck (eutuchia) that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle’s account is neutral in regard to character, intellectual, and physical dispositions of those who are subject to good luck.

This book consists of eleven new essays that provide new insights into classical and contemporary issues surrounding free will and human agency. They investigate topics such as the nature of practical knowledge and its role in intentional action; mental content and explanations of action; recent arguments for libertarianism; the situationist challenge to free will; freedom and a theory of narrative configuration; the moral responsibility of the psychopath; and free will and the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. Also tackling some historical precursors of contemporary debates, taken together these essays demonstrate the need for an approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of free will. This book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the current scholarship on free will.

In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes of our dispositions. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions.

This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not meant to provide an explanation of akrasia, as is usually supposed by commentators. Since the akratic knows that the action she is performing is not good for her, and actions are particulars, the akratic's knowledge is about a particular. I argue that Aristotle's discussion in EN 7.3 adds strength to the idea that knowledge of a particular is explainable only in terms of knowledge of a universal. More determinately, knowledge of a particular is explainable in terms of the actualization or use of knowledge of a universal, and such an actualization is in turn explainable by means of the syllogistic form. Thus, I argue that syllogisms in 7.3 (esp. at 1146 35-1147 10) are not "practical syllogisms", but that their function is epistemological: they are meant to reveal the structure and content of the akratic's knowledge, not to explain her actions

U ovom se radu pokušava pokazati da postoji određena vrsta relativizma koja je spojiva sa skepticizmom Seksta Empirika. Tvrdi se da se u PH I.217–219 Protagora ne shvaća kao aletički ili epistemički relativist, nego kao relativist u minimalnom smislu riječi, te da takvo stajalište nije protivno pironizmu kako ga Sekst karakterizira u PH I. Potom se pokazuje da nam prihvaćanje toga aspekta pironizma može pomoći da objasnimo neke inače problematične relativističke zaključke što ih nalazimo u Sekstovim spisima, naročito u M XI.In this paper an attempt is made to show that there is a kind of relativism that can be seen as compatible with Sextus Empiricus’ scepticism. It is argued that in PH I.217–219, Protagoras is not treated as alethic or epistemic relativist, but as a relativist in a minimal sense of the word, and that such a position is not at odds with Sextus’ characterisation of Pyrrhonism in PH I. It is then shown that recognising this aspect of Pyrrhonism can help us explain the otherwise problematic relativistic conclusions in Sextus’ works, esp. in M XI