Filippo Ferrari

The meta-problem of consciousness prompts the metaquestion: is it the only problem consciousness poses? If we could explain all our phenomenal intuitions in topic-neutral terms, would anything remain to be explained? Realists say yes, illusionists no. In this paper I defend the illusionist answer. While it may seem obvious that there is something further to be explained -- consciousness itself -- this seemingly innocuous claim immediately raises a further problem -- the hard meta-problem. What could justify our continued confidence in the existence of consciousness once all our intuitions about it have been explained away? The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness.

Part I: Truth -- 1: Introduction, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt and Nathan Kellen -- 2: Truth: One or Many?, Dorit Bar--On and Keith Simmons -- 3: Truth Pluralism, Quasi-realism and the Problem of Double-Counting, Michael P. Lynch -- 4: The Metaphysics of Domains, Douglas Edwards -- 5: Strong Alethic Pluralism, Seahwa Kim and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen -- 6: Methodological Pluralism about Truth, Nathan Kellen -- 7: Normative Alethic Pluralism, Filippo Ferrari -- 8: Truth in English and elsewhere: an empirically-informed functionalism -- Jeremy Wyatt -- Part II: Logic -- 9: Core Logic, Neil Tennant -- 10: Connective Meanings in Beall and Restall's Logical Pluralism, Teresa Kouri Kissel -- 11: Generalised Tarski's Thesis Hits Substructure, Elia Zardini -- 12: Logical Particularism,Gillman Payette and Nicole Wyatt -- 13: 'Logical Nihilism, Aaron Cotnoir -- 14: Varieties of Logical Consequence by their Resistance to Logical Nihilism, Gillian Russell -- Part III: Connections -- 15: Pluralism about Pluralisms, Roy T. Cook -- 16: A Plea for Immodesty: Alethic Pluralism, Logical Pluralism, and Mixed Inferences, Chase Wrenn -- 17: Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists, Andy D. Yu -- 18: Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity, Rosanna Keefe -- 19: Alethic and Logical Pluralism, Kevin Scharp.