• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Florian Cova

University of Geneva
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    89
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    2
  •  News and Updates
    41

 More details
  • University of Geneva
    Post-doctoral fellow
École des hautes études en sciences sociale
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2011
Geneva, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Aesthetics
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
PhilPapers Editorships
Experimental Aesthetics
  • All publications (89)
  • Correction to:Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00559-0.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  12
    Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Xiang Zhou, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Hugo Viciana, Kevin Tobia, Emile Thalabard, Jan Sprenger, Paulo Sousa, Felipe Romero, Kevin Reuter, Navin Rambharose, Jonathan Phillips, Mark Phelan, Christian Mott, Tania Moerenhout, Edouard Machery, Shen-yi Liao, Anthony Lantian, Miklos Kurthy, Joshua Knobe, Markus Kneer, Hanna Kim, Kareem Khalifa, François Jaquet, Wenjia Hu, José V. Hernández-Conde, Ivar Hannikainen, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Brian D. Earp, Vilius Dranseika, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Rodrigo Diaz, Fiery Cushman, Matteo Colombo, Jordane Boudesseul, Renatas Berniūnas, James Beebe, Mario Attie, James Andow, Aurélien Allard, Angela Abatista, and Brent Strickland
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4): 999-1003. 2021.
    Philosophy of MindExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  376
    Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1): 45-48. 2018.
    Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.
    Philosophy of MindCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscEx…Read more
    Philosophy of MindCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  18
    The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia
    with Jing Zhu, Xueyi Zhang, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Giorgio Volpe, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Naoki Usui, Vera Tripodi, Noel Struchiner, Paulo Sousa, Sarah Songhorian, Andrea Sereni, Massimo Sangoi, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Carlos Romero, Barbara Osimani, Jorge Ornelas, Christopher Y. Olivola, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Masaharu Mizumoto, Carlos Mauro, Minwoo Lee, Yeonjeong Kim, Hackjin Kim, Kaori Karasawa, Veselina Kadreva, Yasmina Jraissati, Evgeniya Hristova, Amir Horowitz, Takaaki Hashimoto, Ivar Hannikainen, Maurice Grinberg, Laleh Ghadakpour, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Vilius Dranseika, Daniel Cohnitz, In-Rae Cho, Hyundeuk Cheon, Amita Chatterjee, Emma E. Buchtel, Renatas Berniūnas, Adriano Angelucci, Mario Alai, David Rose, Stephen Stich, and Edouard Machery
    Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3): 517-541. 2017.
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “…Read more
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.
    Experimental Philosophy: Epistemology, Misc
  •  3297
    Nothing at Stake in Knowledge
    with David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang, and Jing Zhu
    Noûs 53 (1): 224-247. 2019.
    In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some …Read more
    In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.
    Experimental Philosophy: Crosscultural ResearchExperimental Philosophy: Contextualism and Invarianti…Read more
    Experimental Philosophy: Crosscultural ResearchExperimental Philosophy: Contextualism and InvariantismEpistemic Contextualism and InvariantismEpistemic Contextualism and RelativismThe Concept of Knowledge
  •  358
    The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia
    with Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang, and Jing Zhu
    Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3): 517-541. 2017.
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “…Read more
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.
    The Gettier ProblemExperimental Philosophy: Crosscultural ResearchExperimental Philosophy: Epistemol…Read more
    The Gettier ProblemExperimental Philosophy: Crosscultural ResearchExperimental Philosophy: Epistemology, Misc
  •  519
    Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
    with Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld, and Xiang Zhou
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 1-36. 2018.
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi stud…Read more
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
    Philosophy of MindFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyEx…Read more
    Philosophy of MindFoundations of Experimental Philosophy, MiscCritiques of Experimental PhilosophyExperimental Aesthetics
  •  14
    What Makes Instrumental Music Feel Profound? An Empirical Assessment of the Main Philosophical Accounts
    with Manon Delphine Gouiran, Sasha Orphée Calame, and Florentina Ulmeanu Enea
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    What makes instrumental music sound profound? In this paper, we identify three main answers to this question: subject-based accounts, complexity-based accounts, and associative accounts. We then argue that all three types of accounts make predictions that can be empirically tested. We describe the results of a study that investigates which characteristics of pure instrumental pieces of music lead participants to rate them as deep or profound. Against complexity-based and associative accounts, ou…Read more
    What makes instrumental music sound profound? In this paper, we identify three main answers to this question: subject-based accounts, complexity-based accounts, and associative accounts. We then argue that all three types of accounts make predictions that can be empirically tested. We describe the results of a study that investigates which characteristics of pure instrumental pieces of music lead participants to rate them as deep or profound. Against complexity-based and associative accounts, our results suggest that pieces of music that are harder to process are not rated as deeper and that mental associations only play a minor role in participants’ experience of depth. Rather, in line with subject-based accounts, pieces of music that are perceived as deep are those experienced as being about something important to the listener’s life. Additionally, we investigate the role of emotions and in perceptions of depth and profundity and find that pieces of music that are moving are more likely to be rated deep and profound, possibly because feelings of being moved are closely connected to the experience that something is particularly important and meaningful to our lives. We conclude that emotions might play a crucial role in the perception of instrumental music as profound.
  •  119
    La Philosophie Expérimentale (edited book)
    with Julien Dutant, Edouard Machery, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, and Eddy Nahmias
    Vuibert. 2012.
    La philosophie expérimentale est un mouvement récent qui tente de faire progresser certains débats philosophiques grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes expérimentales. À la différence de la philosophie conventionnelle qui privilégie l'analyse conceptuelle ou la spéculation, la philosophie expérimentale préconise le recours aux études empiriques pour mieux comprendre les concepts philosophiques. Apparue il y a une dizaine d'années dans les pays anglo-saxons, cette approche constitue actuellement l'un…Read more
    La philosophie expérimentale est un mouvement récent qui tente de faire progresser certains débats philosophiques grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes expérimentales. À la différence de la philosophie conventionnelle qui privilégie l'analyse conceptuelle ou la spéculation, la philosophie expérimentale préconise le recours aux études empiriques pour mieux comprendre les concepts philosophiques. Apparue il y a une dizaine d'années dans les pays anglo-saxons, cette approche constitue actuellement l'une des branches les plus dynamiques de la philosophie contemporaine. L'objectif de cet ouvrage est d'offrir un contact direct avec les travaux les plus connus et les plus discutés des philosophes expérimentaux. Il regroupe ainsi dix textes représentatifs de ce domaine jeune, mais déjà florissant, et couvre une large partie du champ philosophique contemporain (philosophie du langage, théorie de la connaissance, conscience, théorie de l'action, éthique et philosophie des sciences).
    Foundations of Experimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  14
    Beyond the equation: An evolutionary reassessment of the love formula
    with Jordane Boudesseul and Anthony Lantian
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 49. 2026.
    Kruglanski et al.’s love formula – partner merit, appreciation, and the quest for meaning – offers a novel perspective but overlooks key evolutionary insights. It oversimplifies mating preferences, neglects contextual flexibility, and downplays reproductive signals crucial to partner selection. While innovative, the model fails to account for the complexity of human romantic behavior shaped by ecological, social, and developmental factors.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  10
    Deciding What to Believe or Deciding What to Do? An Empirical Investigation of the Folk Conception of Critical Thinking
    with Céline Schöpfer and Julia Ghaliounghi
    Theoria 92 (5). 2026.
    This study investigates how the expression ‘critical thinking’ (CT) is understood and used by the general public in the United States, using the tools of experimental philosophy. Based on responses from 288 non‐philosopher participants, our findings suggest that CT is commonly associated with problem solving, decision making and logical analysis. This folk conception aligns more closely with psychological definitions than with philosophical accounts of CT. When compared with results from a paral…Read more
    This study investigates how the expression ‘critical thinking’ (CT) is understood and used by the general public in the United States, using the tools of experimental philosophy. Based on responses from 288 non‐philosopher participants, our findings suggest that CT is commonly associated with problem solving, decision making and logical analysis. This folk conception aligns more closely with psychological definitions than with philosophical accounts of CT. When compared with results from a parallel study conducted among French‐speaking participants, notable cultural differences emerged, particularly regarding the emphasis placed on scepticism and metacognition. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that conceptual issues long identified in the academic literature—such as the conflation of CT with other notions (e.g., intelligence or rationality), and the reduction of CT to a single component—are also prevalent in lay conceptions. These findings underscore the need for a more coherent conceptual framework and for increased attention to the ways in which CT is understood and appropriated outside academic contexts.
    Experimental Philosophy: EpistemologyExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  2901
    Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics
    with Amanda Garcia and Shen-yi Liao
    Philosophy Compass 10 (12): 927-939. 2015.
    In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology o…Read more
    In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology of aesthetics, aesthetic epistemology, aesthetic concepts, and imagination, as well as research from other disciplines that not only are relevant to philosophy of aesthetics but also open new avenues of research for experimental philosophy of aesthetics. Overall, we conclude that the birth of an experimental philosophy of aesthetics is good news not only for aesthetics but also for experimental philosophy itself, as it contributes to broaden the scope of experimental philosophy.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAesthetic ValueAesthetic CognitionExperimental Philosophy of Mind, Mi…Read more
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAesthetic ValueAesthetic CognitionExperimental Philosophy of Mind, MiscExperimental Philosophy, MiscExperimental Aesthetics
  •  1801
    The Puzzle of Multiple Endings
    with Amanda Garcia
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2): 105-114. 2015.
    Why is it that most fictions present one and only one ending, rather than multiple ones? Fictions presenting multiple endings are possible, because a few exist; but they are very rare, and this calls for an explanation. We argue that such an explanation is likely to shed light on our engagement with fictions, for fictions having one and only one ending seem to be ubiquitous. After dismissing the most obvious explanations for this phenomenon, we compare the scarcity of multiple endings in traditi…Read more
    Why is it that most fictions present one and only one ending, rather than multiple ones? Fictions presenting multiple endings are possible, because a few exist; but they are very rare, and this calls for an explanation. We argue that such an explanation is likely to shed light on our engagement with fictions, for fictions having one and only one ending seem to be ubiquitous. After dismissing the most obvious explanations for this phenomenon, we compare the scarcity of multiple endings in traditional kinds of fiction to their profusion in the case of interactive fictions. This contrast poses a challenge to accounts of our engagement with fictions in terms of games of make-believe. We conclude that solving this puzzle is likely to improve our philosophical understanding of fictions.
    NarrativeLiterature and KnowledgePhilosophy of Literature, Misc
  •  17
    List of Contributors
    with Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Justin Sytsma, Joseph Ulatowski, Chad Gonnerman, Eugen Fischer, Joachim Horvath, Theodore Bach, Paul Henne, James R. Beebe, Edouard Machery, Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Jonathan Waskan, Mark Phelan, Justin Bruner, Raff Donelson, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rodrigo Díaz, and Ian M. Church
    In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 417-420. 2023.
  •  13
    Index
    with Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Justin Sytsma, Joseph Ulatowski, Chad Gonnerman, Eugen Fischer, Joachim Horvath, Theodore Bach, Paul Henne, James R. Beebe, Edouard Machery, Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Jonathan Waskan, Mark Phelan, Justin Bruner, Raff Donelson, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rodrigo Díaz, and Ian M. Church
    In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 421-426. 2023.
  •  14
    Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: a reply to Feltz and Millan
    with James Andow
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (2015) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we fi…Read more
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (2015) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that Feltz and Millan’s error-theory rests on a conceptual confusion: it is perfectly acceptable for a certain brand of compatibilist to judge free will and fatalism to be compatible, as long as fatalism does not prevent agents from being the source of their actions. We then present the results of two studies showing that laypeople’s intuitions are best understood as following a certain brand of source compatibilism rather than a “free-will-no-matter-what” strategy.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceExperimental Philosophy: Free Will
  •  411
    Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis
    with Adam Feltz
    Consciousness and Cognition 30 (C): 234-246. 2014.
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect infl…Read more
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions.
    Experimental Philosophy: Free WillResponsibility and Reactive AttitudesFree Will and PsychologyFree …Read more
    Experimental Philosophy: Free WillResponsibility and Reactive AttitudesFree Will and PsychologyFree Will, MiscFree Will and ResponsibilityExperimental Philosophy: Folk MoralityExperimental Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  31
    From self-transcendent emotions to transcendent experiences: an exploratory study in the continuity between everyday and mystical experiences
    with Angela Gaia Abatista
    Philosophical Psychology 39 (5): 1749-1779. 2026.
    Mystical experiences are generally considered to be rare and special experiences, characterized by feelings of unity and self-loss. Still, certain researchers have recently proposed that mystical experiences could be placed on a continuum with more common and mundane experiences. In this paper, we present the results of an exploratory study, the goal of which was to identify ordinary experiences that might share (though to a lesser degree) the key characteristics of mystical experiences. To this…Read more
    Mystical experiences are generally considered to be rare and special experiences, characterized by feelings of unity and self-loss. Still, certain researchers have recently proposed that mystical experiences could be placed on a continuum with more common and mundane experiences. In this paper, we present the results of an exploratory study, the goal of which was to identify ordinary experiences that might share (though to a lesser degree) the key characteristics of mystical experiences. To this end, we asked participants to report past experiences of unity and self-loss. Our results suggest that everyday experiences of unity, mainly elicited by the feeling of being part of a social group, share many (but not all) features of mystical experiences, such as feelings of unity, insight, and presence of meaning. Moreover, both mystical experiences and everyday unity experiences were characterized by the presence of social emotions. On the basis of these preliminary results, we argue that investigating the continuity between mystical and everyday experiences might contribute to shed light on the psychological mechanisms underlying mystical experiences and on their evolutionary origin.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceExperimental Philosophy of Religion
  •  188
    Moral asymmetries and the semantics of many
    with Paul Egré
    Semantics and Pragmatics 8 (13): 1-45. 2015.
    We present the results of four experiments concerning the evaluation people make of sentences involving “many”, showing that two sentences of the form “many As are Bs” vs. “many As are Cs” need not be equivalent when evaluated relative to a background in which B and C have the same cardinality and proportion to A, but in which B and C are predicates with opposite semantic and affective values. The data provide evidence that subjects lower the standard relevant to ascribe “many” for the more nega…Read more
    We present the results of four experiments concerning the evaluation people make of sentences involving “many”, showing that two sentences of the form “many As are Bs” vs. “many As are Cs” need not be equivalent when evaluated relative to a background in which B and C have the same cardinality and proportion to A, but in which B and C are predicates with opposite semantic and affective values. The data provide evidence that subjects lower the standard relevant to ascribe “many” for the more negative predicate, and that judgments involving “many” are sensitive to moral considerations, namely to expectations involving a representation of the desirability as opposed to the mere probability of an outcome. We relate the results to similar semantic asymmetries discussed in the psychological literature, in particular to the Knobe effect and to framing effects.
    Experimental Philosophy: SemanticsExperimental Philosophy: Folk Morality
  •  55
    The role of self-transcendent emotions in psychedelic experiences: a two-process proposal
    with Federico Seragnoli
    Philosophical Psychology 38 (7): 3038-3064. 2025.
    Psychedelics are known to elicit intense and meaningful subjective experiences. These subjective experiences are supposed to play a major role in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy. However, not much attention has been paid to the role played by emotions in these experiences. In this paper, we argue that typical psychedelic-induced experiences share many phenomenological features with two emotions: awe (which involves a reduced sense of the self, need for cognitive accommodation, and alterations…Read more
    Psychedelics are known to elicit intense and meaningful subjective experiences. These subjective experiences are supposed to play a major role in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy. However, not much attention has been paid to the role played by emotions in these experiences. In this paper, we argue that typical psychedelic-induced experiences share many phenomenological features with two emotions: awe (which involves a reduced sense of the self, need for cognitive accommodation, and alterations of temporal perception) and being moved (which involve feelings of insight, meaningfulness, and connectedness). On the basis of this comparison, we argue that these two emotions might play an important role in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy and put forward a two-process model of the role of emotions in psychedelic-assisted therapy. Based on this model, we propose several testable hypotheses that can be derived from this model.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceExperimental Philosophy of Mind
  •  77
    Educated folk intuitions about free will and determinism: a case study in experimental public philosophy
    with Thibaut Giraud
    Philosophical Psychology 38 (5): 2187-2216. 2025.
    Experimental philosophers have been investigating folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, wondering whether our intuitive understanding of free will and moral responsibility make them compatible or incompatible with determinism. However, methodological worries have been raised concerning such studies: some have claimed that participants in such studies are simply unable to understand the materials they are presented with. To bypass such methodological worries, we investigated “…Read more
    Experimental philosophers have been investigating folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, wondering whether our intuitive understanding of free will and moral responsibility make them compatible or incompatible with determinism. However, methodological worries have been raised concerning such studies: some have claimed that participants in such studies are simply unable to understand the materials they are presented with. To bypass such methodological worries, we investigated “educated” folk intuitions, that is: intuitions of people who are not philosophers but have enough personal interest in philosophy to have a good grasp of philosophical concepts, and to which the vignettes and their context have been explained before they answer. To this end, we took the opportunity of a video and online survey (N = 4385) released by a popular French philosophy youtuber. The results suggest that, even in this context, the results of previous surveys replicate, suggesting that participants’ inclination toward compatibilism is not the mere product of a comprehension error.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceExperimental Philosophy: Free Will
  •  55
    Quantitative Vignette Studies: Correlations, Regressions, and Structural Equation Modeling—An Application to Experimental Philosophy of Free Will
    with Aurélien Allard
    In Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Mark Alfano, Aurélien Allard, Lucien Baumgartner, Florian Cova, Paul Engelhardt, Eugen Fischer, Henrike Meyer, Kevin Reuter, Justin Sytsma, Kyle Thompson & Marc Wyszynski (eds.), Experimental Philosophy for Beginners: A Gentle Introduction to Methods and Tools, Springer Verlag. pp. 137-223. 2024.
    Do people have the intuition that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism? To find out, experimental philosophers have presented participants with vignettes describing agents in deterministic universes and probed their intuitions about the free will and moral responsibility of these agents. However, these debates soon got embroiled around the difficulty of assessing whether participants correctly understood the vignettes and the concepts of determinism and free will an…Read more
    Do people have the intuition that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism? To find out, experimental philosophers have presented participants with vignettes describing agents in deterministic universes and probed their intuitions about the free will and moral responsibility of these agents. However, these debates soon got embroiled around the difficulty of assessing whether participants correctly understood the vignettes and the concepts of determinism and free will and the extent to which different comprehension errors plagued participants’ answers. In this chapter, we clarify those debates by using the results of a brand new study (N = 772) on participants’ intuitions about free will. We introduce readers to correlations, regressions, multiple regressions, mediation analyses, and multiple mediation analyses through the use of structural equation modeling to show how different techniques may give different interpretations of folk intuitions on free will. We explain how to run these different analyses in R and provide detailed R code.
    Experimental Philosophy: Free Will
  •  30
    Introduction: Setting Out for New Shores
    with Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Mark Alfano, Aurélien Allard, Lucien Baumgartner, Paul Engelhardt, Eugen Fischer, Henrike Meyer, Kevin Reuter, Justin Sytsma, Kyle Thompson, and Marc Wyszynski
    In Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Mark Alfano, Aurélien Allard, Lucien Baumgartner, Florian Cova, Paul Engelhardt, Eugen Fischer, Henrike Meyer, Kevin Reuter, Justin Sytsma, Kyle Thompson & Marc Wyszynski (eds.), Experimental Philosophy for Beginners: A Gentle Introduction to Methods and Tools, Springer Verlag. pp. 1-18. 2024.
    “Experimental philosophy is philosophy with a little something extra” (Sytsma et al., 2023, 9). This “little something extra” is the fact that experimental philosophers conduct their own experimental studies to provide empirical insights to address philosophical issues. They use qualitative and quantitative research methods such as interactive experiments, reaction time studies, corpus analysis, vignette studies, interviews, and so forth.
    Foundations of Experimental Philosophy
  •  89
    Experimental Philosophy for Beginners: A Gentle Introduction to Methods and Tools
    with Stephan Kornmesser, Alexander Max Bauer, Mark Alfano, Aurélien Allard, Lucien Baumgartner, Paul Engelhardt, Eugen Fischer, Henrike Meyer, Kevin Reuter, Justin Sytsma, Kyle Thompson, and Marc Wyszynski
    Springer Verlag. 2024.
    This graduate textbook provides a basic introduction to experimental philosophy (x-phi). In nine chapters, different methods and tools used in X-Phi are explained, spanning quantitative vignette studies, interactive experiments, corpus analysis, psycholinguistic experiments as well as qualitative interview studies. Each chapter introduces a specific experimental method by means of a case study in an easily accessible way and covers the whole research process from the development of a research qu…Read more
    This graduate textbook provides a basic introduction to experimental philosophy (x-phi). In nine chapters, different methods and tools used in X-Phi are explained, spanning quantitative vignette studies, interactive experiments, corpus analysis, psycholinguistic experiments as well as qualitative interview studies. Each chapter introduces a specific experimental method by means of a case study in an easily accessible way and covers the whole research process from the development of a research question to the interpretation of the data.
    Foundations of Experimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  •  100
    Two kinds of respect for two kinds of contempt: Why contempt can be both a sentiment and an emotion
    with Julien Deonna, David Sander, and Fabrice Teroni
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40. 2017.
    Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that “contempt” refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.
    Varieties of Emotion, MiscMoral Emotion, Misc
  •  158
    The emotional shape of our moral life: Anger-related emotions and mutualistic anthropology
    with Julien Deonna and David Sander
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1): 86-87. 2013.
    The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidence.
    Evolution of MoralityPhilosophy of Cognitive ScienceVarieties of Emotion
  •  75
    Intellectually Rigorous but Morally Tolerant: Exploring Moral Leniency as a Mediator Between Cognitive Style and “Utilitarian” Judgment
    with Manon D. Gouiran
    Cognitive Science 48 (12). 2024.
    Past research on people's moral judgments about moral dilemmas has revealed a connection between utilitarian judgment and reflective cognitive style. This has traditionally been interpreted as reflection is conducive to utilitarianism. However, recent research shows that the connection between reflective cognitive style and utilitarian judgments holds only when participants are asked whether the utilitarian option is permissible, and disappears when they are asked whether it is recommended. To e…Read more
    Past research on people's moral judgments about moral dilemmas has revealed a connection between utilitarian judgment and reflective cognitive style. This has traditionally been interpreted as reflection is conducive to utilitarianism. However, recent research shows that the connection between reflective cognitive style and utilitarian judgments holds only when participants are asked whether the utilitarian option is permissible, and disappears when they are asked whether it is recommended. To explain this phenomenon, we propose that reflective cognitive style is associated with a greater moral leniency—that is, a greater tendency to be tolerant of moral violations, and that moral leniency predicts utilitarian judgment when utilitarian judgment is measured through permissibility. In Study 1 (N = 192), we design a set of vignettes to assess moral leniency. In Studies 2 and 3 (N = 455, 428), we show that reflective cognitive style is indeed associated with greater moral leniency, and that moral leniency mediates the connection between cognitive style and utilitarian judgment. We discuss the implication of our results for the interpretation of the relationship between utilitarianism and reflective cognitive style.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceExperimental Philosophy: Ethics
  •  53
    Delving into depth: an empirical investigation of the ordinary concepts of depth and profundity
    with Celine Schopfer and Morgane Myling Bezat
    Synthese 204 (5): 1-35. 2024.
    We sometimes say about certain things (such as philosophical questions) that they are ‘deep’ or ‘profound’. But what does it mean exactly? Surprisingly, philosophers have been quite silent on this topic and there is neither consensual nor prominent conceptual analysis of ‘depth’. After surveying different proposals that have tried to capture depth in terms of explanatory depth, subject matter, emotional impact, understanding or complexity, we present the results of three studies in which we comb…Read more
    We sometimes say about certain things (such as philosophical questions) that they are ‘deep’ or ‘profound’. But what does it mean exactly? Surprisingly, philosophers have been quite silent on this topic and there is neither consensual nor prominent conceptual analysis of ‘depth’. After surveying different proposals that have tried to capture depth in terms of explanatory depth, subject matter, emotional impact, understanding or complexity, we present the results of three studies in which we combine qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the everyday concept of ‘depth’. Our results suggest that depth and profundity are generally characterized as (i) something with a meaning, (ii) that stimulates cognitive activity, to (iii) promote epistemic progress about (iv) important issues, thus (v) having an emotional impact. Based on these findings, we propose a first characterization of the ordinary concepts of depth and profundity.
    Experimental Philosophy: Epistemology
  •  2120
    The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia
    with Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, and Maurice Grinberg
    Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3): 517-541. 2017.
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “…Read more
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.
    The Gettier ProblemExperimental Philosophy: Epistemology, MiscThe Concept of Knowledge
  •  73
    Failure to Comprehend Determinism or Failure to Measure Comprehension? Methodological Issues in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will
    with Tristan Martinez
    Erkenntnis 90 (7): 3215-3253. 2024.
    In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have been investigating folk intuitions about the compatibility of determinism with free will and moral responsibility using vignettes depicting agents in deterministic universes. However, recent research suggests that participants massively fail to understand these vignettes. Moreover, it has also been proposed that these comprehension errors might even be systematic and thus unavoidable, threatening the project of probing folk intuitions about fr…Read more
    In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have been investigating folk intuitions about the compatibility of determinism with free will and moral responsibility using vignettes depicting agents in deterministic universes. However, recent research suggests that participants massively fail to understand these vignettes. Moreover, it has also been proposed that these comprehension errors might even be systematic and thus unavoidable, threatening the project of probing folk intuitions about free will and determinism through vignettes. Through five studies, we suggest that past studies have overestimated participants’ failure to understand vignettes depicting deterministic universes, mainly by relying on unreliable samples and by using non-validated measures. We also show that using new vignettes that take more time to better describe what determinism is substantially reduces comprehension errors and their impact on participants’ intuitions. We conclude that, at least in the current state of the art, skepticism about the possibility to probe folk intuitions about the compatibility of determinism with free will and moral responsibility through the use of vignettes is premature.
    Experimental Philosophy: Free Will
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback