Floriana Ferro

This paper investigates the phenomenon of empathy as a necessary condition for the establishment of human–robot intersubjectivity within the context of social robotics. Drawing upon the phenomenological analyses of empathy by Husserl and Stein, as well as Sartre’s account of being-looked-at, the paper demonstrates how empathy can arise in human–robot relationships, particularly through the perception of the robot’s gaze. The argument is substantiated by recent empirical research in Human–Robot Interaction (HRI), which highlights the significant influence of robot gaze on human emotions and behavior. The perception of a robot’s eyes, especially in the Gestalt configuration of “eyes-on-a-face,” can elicit basic empathic responses, while the recognition of its artificial nature calls for reflective processes of complex empathy. To account for these dynamics, the paper adopts a posthuman perspective that emphasizes the permeability of boundaries between humans and technologies. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh and developing the notions of _extended corporeality_ and _transcorporeal analogy_, the paper argues that empathy toward robots arises from the intertwining of similarity and difference across heterogeneous embodiments. Robots thus appear not merely as passive tools but as socially relevant agents, with significant implications for the design and deployment of social robotics in care, education, and companionship.

The paper examines a phenomenological approach to generative AI in MR environments, focusing on its role in supporting human imagination. Drawing on Husserl’s theories, it explores how AI supports phantasy through eidetic variation, producing digital objects that, while distinct from analogue ones, are fully real within an analogue-digital continuum. The study highlights a bi-directional and re-cursive exchange where AI externalizes imagination, merging human intentionality with machine-generated alternatives.

This paper explores the application of the phenomenological method of eidetic variation, developed by Edmund Husserl, to mixed reality (MR). Initially, MR is defined within the Reality-Virtuality (RV) continuum developed by Milgram and others (1994) and revisited by Skarbez and others (2021). MR objects, situated within this spectrum, are analyzed phenomenologically as both perceptual and imaginative, constituted by a network of relations. The paper then focuses on Husserl’s method of eidetic variation from Experience and Judgement, which involves arbitrary modification of object characteristics to grasp their essence. This method, though rooted in essentialism, is used by content designers in augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) to create objects and environments. Lastly, the paper suggests that MR reflects the externalization of imagination through digital technologies, proposing an Analogue-Digital (AD) continuum that integrates human bodily experience and MR technology, facilitating imaginative visualization and creation without searching for the essence of objects.

The article contributes to the debate on Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) in Italy, focusing on Graham Harman’s aesthetics. It develops three main points: OOO’s idea of objects, theory of beauty, and figure-ground relation. OOO’s positions are compared with the phenomenological perspective, highlighting discrepancies and points of contact. Harman’s theory of the quadruple object raises ontological and relational issues; the same can be said about OOO’s idea of part-whole relationships. However, Harman’s view of beauty as metaphor and the central role of the human beholder in aesthetic experience offer intriguing reflections and challenges for phenomenology.

Come può essere definito il digitale? Come percepiamo e interagiamo con oggetti, eventi e ambienti in questa nuova era? E come viviamo il nostro corpo in contesti diversi da quello analogico, come la realtà virtuale o aumentata? Si tratta di domande al centro della riflessione contemporanea, riflessione che si ispira alla tradizione filosofica, ma si apre anche al dialogo con le scienze dell’informazione. Partendo da questi interrogativi, l’autrice esplora i temi del digitale e dell’Intelligenza Artificiale attraverso la prospettiva fenomenologica. Viene così proposta una lunga introduzione alla fenomenologia del digitale, che rimodula la questione della tecnica e tratta lo sviluppo di nuove dimensioni, come la realtà aumentata e la realtà virtuale, e l’avvento di nuovi corpi, sia ibridi sia robotici. Nell’affrontare questi temi, l’autrice individua problemi cardine e possibilità di sviluppo della rivoluzione digitale, ispirandosi ai testi di filosofi come Husserl e Merleau-Ponty, e ampliandone le riflessioni attraverso pensatori del digitale e del postumano come Chalmers, Ihde, Verbeek e Braidotti. Malgrado le molteplici influenze, l’autrice non si limita a presentare una somma di posizioni diverse, ma si confronta criticamente con l’ingegneria informatica e con le teorie della Object-Oriented Ontology, della postfenomenologia e del transumanesimo. Oltre a ciò, pur considerando con favore le opportunità offerte dai dispositivi digitali, l’autrice riconosce le criticità del progresso, proponendo una comprensione ad ampio raggio della rivoluzione tecnologica. Il libro presenta una prospettiva in grado di coniugare il monismo ontologico di Merleau-Ponty con una visione postumana e non antropocentrica. Il risultato è una riflessione sulla stratificazione del reale e sull’intreccio tra umano e tecnologico, analogico e digitale, offrendo nuove possibilità per conoscere e agire in una realtà sempre più complessa.

This study examines Edmund Husserl’s and Giovanni Bruno Vicario’s perspectives on time. Husserl’s work focuses on consciousness and its processes of synthesis, thus on a transcendental concept of time. Vicario, a member of the Trieste Gestalt school of psychology, rather explores the issue through an experimental perspective. This difference leads Vicario to criticize Husserl, reinterpreting and, sometimes, misunderstanding his texts. Through a careful textual analysis of Husserl’s and Vicario’s works on time, it is argued that, despite methodological differences, their views can be integrated into a pluralistic understanding of time. This includes both phenomenological and psychological perspectives, and offers valid alternatives to a unified and physicalistic view of time.

L’articolo si incentra sul recente volume dell’autrice, “La filosofia a scuola e le relazioni con gli altri”, basato su una ricerca svoltasi attraverso interviste a studenti e docenti di filosofia in cinque istituti superiori di Udine. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto se la filosofia insegnata a scuola riuscisse a mutare la loro visione del mondo e, soprattutto, le loro relazioni con gli altri. L’articolo si sviluppa in tre parti: la prima analizza le premesse metodologiche del libro, la seconda verte sul cambiamento di Weltanschauung e sulle relazioni interpersonali, la terza sulla filosofia come disciplina scolastica. Attraverso la prospettiva fenomenologica, diviene così possibile comprendere gli effetti più o meno incisivi della filosofia sull’esistenza dei ragazzi.

This paper draws on previous research carried out by the author on the educative relationship between teacher and student in schools and universities, in order to enrich it with further studies and considerations on distance learning. The author uses the phenomenological method, assuming the point of view of both members of the relationship (student and teacher). The general characteristics of the relationship (reciprocity, asymmetry, and verticality) and the differences between the two parties involved (age and/or developmental stage, educational role, mastery of the discipline, and institutional role) remain, but are articulated differently: this mainly happens, because in distance learning the perception of the body of the other person is partial or absent, hindering the phenomena of pairing and empathy. It is thus shown that distance learning cannot replace face-to-face teaching, however, it is able to support and supplement it.

This paper aims to find, in Merleau-Ponty’s late thinking, a definition of the virtual which aligns with the latest advancements in digital technology while avoiding a reduction to the digital realm or a stark opposition to reality. The virtual is considered as a crucial characteristic in Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology, especially in The Visible and the Invisible, where a “virtual focus” or “virtual center” of the flesh is introduced. The argument posits that Merleau-Ponty’s monism of the flesh results in a dynamic view of virtuality, with significant ontological implications that reshape the relationship between the digital and the analogue. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the virtual is defined by several key features: it applies to a monist perspective on reality, to a dynamic relationality between dialectic poles, and to the fabric of reality. This interpretation of the virtual implies a divergence from the digital, as virtuality belongs to the whole spectrum of reality.

In this paper we aim to find a definition of virtual which fits the latest developments of digital technology, but also applies to the analog world. We consider the virtual as related to immanence, taking inspiration from Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and Merleau-Ponty’s last work. We first analyze Deleuze’s idea of immanence, from which virtuality emerges, then we focus on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh and its virtual center. We argue that both philosophers see immanence as a dynamic medium of virtuality, overcoming the traditional concept of substance and theorizing a deep intertwining of bodies and technology. Our analysis shows that the virtual is defined by the following features: it implies an epistemological and ontological monism, relationality, and entanglement with reality. The virtual clearly emerges in digital technologies, but also belongs to analog reality, as a general condition for our knowing and being in the world as such.

This paper discusses the possibility of the phenomenon of empathy between humans and robots, starting from what happens during their eye contact. First, it is shown, through the most relevant results of HRI studies on this matter, what are the most important effects of the robot gaze on human emotions and behaviour. Secondly, these effects are compared to what happens during the phenomenon of empathy between humans, taking inspiration from the studies of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Finally, similarities and differences between human-human and human-robot empathy are conceptualized through Merleau-Ponty’s idea of flesh, which is the extended bodily element of the world. If there is a common concept of body, including both machine-bodies and living bodies, then a transcorporeal analogy takes place, thus explaining why the phenomenon of empathy occurs both in human-human and human-robot interactions.

Kierkegaard and Levinas are both philosophers of singularity. The latter, in Difficult Freedom and Proper Names, strongly criticizes the former, accusing him of subjectivism, violence and underestimation of ethics. However, the distance separating the two is very short, especially if one reads carefully Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In this article it is argued that both thinkers refuse impersonal totality, conceive Infinity as irreducible, ethics as directed towards the other person and suffering as necessary during lifetime. Above all, both Kierkegaard and Levinas think of subjectivity as originally addressed beyond itself, towards Infinity.

In this paper, a phenomenological perspective on capitalism is given: it is considered as the economic expression of onto-theology. Capitalism is based on egotism, whose principles are private ownership (correlative of intentionality) and free market (correlative of liberty). The current crisis is the symptom of a disease, that is a lack of ethics, an indiscriminate pursuit of egotism. A moral revolution is here proposed as a remedy. The aim is not to destroy capitalism, but to save it with the introduction of an ethical attitude, based on original responsibility and uniqueness (Levinas), as well as on bi-directional respect (Ricoeur).

Nel presente scritto, l’attività di insegnamento filosofico viene sottoposta ad interrogativi riguardanti gli elementi che la caratterizzano, ovvero ciò che viene insegnato, chi insegna e a chi si insegna. Nasce così una riflessione teoretica su tre concetti basilari, ovvero la filosofia, il soggetto e l’altro. Attraverso le suggestioni di grandi pensatori, in primis l’Heidegger di Essere e Tempo, ma anche Platone, Aristotele, Cartesio, Deleuze e Levinas, vengono proposte possibili definizioni dei concetti suddetti. La filosofia viene così considerata in senso statico, come sentiero diretto al sapere, e dinamico, come prassi sempre rinnovantesi. Per quanto riguarda il “chi”, una volta stabilito che, per natura o necessità ontica, ogni uomo tende al sapere, viene definito il soggetto in grado di insegnare la filosofia ad altri. Questi può essere sia il semplice studioso di filosofia, che il filosofo vero e proprio. La differenza tra i due si configura come segue: il primo si occupa solo della conoscenza di sentieri già tracciati, il secondo ne traccia anche di nuovi. Il destinatario dell’insegnamento filosofico si configura, invece, come alterità a cui la soggettività docente deve relazionarsi. Si giunge pure qui ad una definizione duplice, ovvero dell’allievo come semplice conoscente, la cui componente attiva è limitata alla ricezione dei contenuti, e dell’allievo come praticante, che sperimenta vari metodi e si mette in gioco nella teoresi. Vengono infine delineate possibili configurazioni in base a queste tre coppie di concetti, configurazioni che, a propria volta, diventano molteplici nelle realtà singolari.

In questo testo si affronta, a livello ontologico, la questione della tecnica in relazione allo sviluppo del digitale. Parlare di “tecnontologia digitale” implica che il digitale porta alla luce l’homo technicus in maniera peculiare rispetto alla dimensione analogica. Non avviene un processo di smaterializzazione, bensì di ridefinizione della materia e di pervasività della dimensione digitale nei confronti della nostra corporeità e della nostra esistenza quotidiana. Viene proposta una lettura della relazione con la tecnologia digitale basata sulla fenomenologia della carne, traendo spunto dalle riflessioni di Merleu-Ponty ne Il visibile e l’invisibile. Si mostra che la carne, tessuto comune della corporeità del mondo, rende possibile concepire la relazione tra tutti gli enti secondo un’ontologia piatta. Questo consente di vedere il rapporto con il digitale come compartecipazione e di riconfigurare il problema della responsabilità legato ai dispositivi, ai robot e alle piattaforme digitali. In this paper the issue of technology in relation to its digital developments is addressed from an ontological point of view. The idea of “digital technontology” implies that the digital brings out the homo technicus in a unique way that differs from what happens in the analog dimension. What occurs is not a process of dematerialization, but a redefinition of the matter and a clear pervasiveness of the digital dimension in our corporeity and daily existence. This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between humans and digital technology based on the phenomenology of the flesh, taking inspiration from what Merleau-Ponty writes in The Visible and the Invisible. The idea of flesh, which is the common body of the world, allows us to conceive the relation among all beings according to a flat ontology. In this way, the relation between us and the digital can be seen as a form of involvement and the problem of responsibility concerning devices, robots, and digital platforms can be reconfigured accordingly.

La ricerca sulla quale si basa il volume ha coinvolto cinque istituti superiori di Udine e si è svolta attraverso interviste agli studenti e ai loro docenti del triennio. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto se la filosofia insegnata a scuola riuscisse a stimolare un processo di mutamento, o perlomeno di chiarificazione, della visione del mondo e, soprattutto, se avesse un impatto sulle relazioni con gli altri. Si è inteso così operare un rivolgimento della filosofia su se stessa e sul suo modo di avvicinare il mondo degli adolescenti. Attraverso la prospettiva fenomenologica, applicata alle riflessioni di studenti e docenti, è divenuto perciò possibile comprendere le ragioni per cui la disciplina ha effetti più o meno incisivi sull’esistenza dei ragazzi.

The paper discusses a posthuman reading of Merleau-Ponty’s later works and an application of the concept of flesh to the digital dimension. Whereas, in the Phenomenology of Perception, the world and other beings are seen from an egological and human perspective, in The Visible and the Invisible this perspective is reshaped. Human body is made of the same stuff of other bodies, and they constitute a common being, the flesh of the world. Merleau-Ponty sets out a path through flat ontology and posthumanism, opposing human perspective as a privileged one. His posthuman turn passes through the concepts of reversibility and divergence. Humans are made of the same stuff as non-humans, so they reverse into one another, but, on the other hand, they are not reduced to an undifferentiated entity, because of their divergence. Merleau-Ponty’s problematizing perspective is here actualized and applied to the hybridization between human bodies and digital protheses.

Il presente studio si pone l’obiettivo di analizzare l’antropologia trinitaria di Edith Stein, caratterizzata dall’interazione tra corpo, anima e spirito. A questo scopo, viene effettuata una lettura estetica di tale antropologia, a partire dalla dimensione sensibile ed espressiva. Ciò è possibile grazie a un’apertura originaria dell’individuo all’alterità, apertura che si verifica attraverso modalità empatiche. La prima parte dell’articolo è dedicata a Il problema dell’empatia, in cui viene esplicitato come avviene la costituzione dell’io tramite l’incontro con l’altro. L’aisthesis del Leib e la sua espressività rinviano così alle componenti animiche e spirituali. Nella seconda parte, ci si volge a Essere finito ed essere eterno, in cui la Stein riprende, in virtù di un percorso teologico-mistico, ciò che ha lasciato in sospeso nell’opera giovanile: un’approfondita trattazione dello spirito e della sua interazione con l’anima. Si delinea così la differenza tra le due componenti: la psiche è legata al corpo in virtù della sua funzione senziente e vivificante, mentre lo spirito è libero, capace di atti creativi e di compenetrazione con l’universale. È proprio il Geist a costituire la componente più elevata e feconda dell’uomo, in grado di superare la finitezza individuale e di comunicare, attraverso le espressioni sensibili, con gli altri spiriti incarnati, la natura e il divino.

This paper focuses on Levinas’ concept of ipseity and on its change between the 1960’s and the 1970’s, arguing that this change implies the undoing of the subject. In Totality and Infinity (1961), ipseity is considered as the deep core of the I, whereas, in Otherwise Than Being (1974), it is the other person inside the self. Levinas also theorizes another kind of other-in-the-same, which is illeity, the trace of God inside the human soul. It is shown that illeity is not problematic for the subject, since it does not cause its undoing. Furthermore, it is argued that ipseity, in Otherwise Than Being, is not a mere opening to alterity, but a source of alienation. Finally, it is shown that Levinas starts to change his mind on ipseity in 1968 (“Substitution”), however this modification becomes clear only in 1970 (“No Identity”).

From the Introduction: "William James and Gilles Deleuze gave two specific definitions of their own ways of thinking: James used the expression “radical empiricism”, whereas Deleuze wrote about “transcendental empiricism”. In both cases, empiricism is brought out as the main feature of their perspective on reality. I will show that both authors share an empiricist background, regarding especially the concept of “pure experience”. [...] Furthermore, I will bring out that Deleuze, even if he shares the same starting point of James’s philosophy, shifts the axis of repetition according to difference: he develops his perspective on pure experience through a redefinition of the transcendental."

The paper is focused on the concept of perceptual relation according to experimental phenomenology, belonging to Gestaltist and ecological traditions. First of all, it will be shown the meaning of “relation” in the perceptual domain, including a specific definition of object and subject. For this purpose, the paper will present the difference with the representationalist perspective, which challenges immediate experience and the perception of unified objects. Secondly, the concept of “perceptual relation” will be compared to the idea of Gestalttheorie’s “intrinsic relation”. It will be sustained that perceptual relations do not concern only connections between the parts and the whole of a configuration, but they extend to otherness, namely perceptual object, other subjects, and the Umwelt. For this purpose, the paper will provide some examples of ambiguity of the relation ground-figure, especially reversible and bistable figures.

Cosa si intende oggi per amore? A cosa ci riferiamo quando parliamo di attrazione, desiderio, donazione, sentimento? Perché consideriamo la bellezza una componente imprescindibile del fenomeno amoroso? Il volume cerca di rispondere a questi interrogativi adottando uno sguardo “estetico”. Ciò significa partire dalla sensibilità e riferirsi al concetto di bellezza, che sembra comunemente rinviare all’armonia, all’equilibrio tra le parti, a una fonte di attrattive corporee, tuttavia può riferirsi anche all’interiorità e alla spiritualità. Il testo mostra che la definizione di bellezza è strettamente legata alla concezione corrispondente di amore. Se questo viene considerato desiderio, allora ci si trova di fronte all’eros descritto da Platone; se, invece, viene visto come donazione, si tratta dell’agape cristiana. Tuttavia, questi due modi di concepire l’amore vengono rivisitati da altre due visioni molto note nella cultura occidentale: si tratta del romanticismo, in cui il desiderio e la donazione si intrecciano, e della psicanalisi freudiana, che considera l’eros come libido e come forza opposta a Thanatos. Queste teorie vengono interpretate come visioni onnicomprensive, come prospettive che considerano l’amore una chiave di lettura della realtà. Questa chiave di lettura porta con sé concezioni differenti di bellezza: l’amore in senso erotico si focalizza sulla bellezza dell’oggetto, considerata come insieme di attrattive, mentre l’amore in senso agapico insiste sulla bellezza del soggetto e sulle sue qualità. Ciò non implica una dicotomia tra materiale e spirituale, bensì un intreccio delle due componenti riguardanti entrambe le polarità della relazione. Il volume esplora così le definizioni offerte da Platone, dal cristianesimo, dal romanticismo e dalla psicanalisi freudiana, offrendo una lettura filosofica di testi appartenenti a fonti diverse e in grado di influenzare le idee e le pratiche attuali sull’amore.

The paper aims at connecting the concepts of beauty and possession, traditionally coupled with the male gaze, with eros as felt by women, by homosexuals, and by those who do not identify with a defined gender. First, I will outline the concepts of beauty and possession according to “male thinking”, well formulated by Freud, Plato, Levinas, and Sartre. I will show that, in Western tradition, beauty is seen from a masculine perspective, as a set of charms arousing the subject and stimulating his will to possess. The erotic relationship is consequently considered in a dualistic way: the subject is masculine and active, and desires his “object”, who can be either a man or a woman. However, the mentioned authors also highlight a crucial point: desire is doomed to be unfulfilled, because the transcendence of the other person is ungraspable. I will argue that, despite the latter point, such authors bring forward a reductionist view of eros and relationships between genders. I will suggest a solution to this reductionism, taking inspiration from the concepts of gender performativity, theorized by Butler, and queer orientation, developed by Ahmed. I will also propose to rely on Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the flesh, especially as it concerns its features of reversibility and divergence, in order to give account of every gender identity, including non-binary ones. The concepts of beauty and possession, together with the impossibility to grasp the transcendence of the other person, will not be rejected, but reconfigured through a different way of conceiving subjectivity.

The aim of the paper is to develop the concept of perceptual relation and to apply it to digital environments. First, the meaning of perceptual relation is phenomenologically analyzed and defined as the interaction between the whole and its parts, which is theorized by the founders of Gestalt psychology. However, this relation is not considered as an intrinsic, but as an extended one, implying also the relation with the surrounding world (Umwelt). Subsequently, this concept of extended relation is applied to a chosen object (a ball) as it is perceived in four different kinds of digital dimensions (on-screen, virtual, augmented, and hybrid). Through a phenomenological analysis, I argue that, whereas the whole-part configuration remains the same, some modes of appearance of the object (multisensoriality, figure-ground interaction, affordances, and persistence) are different. In order to define this dynamic, I have coined the concept of transdimensional analogy.