F. Adam Sopuck

In this chapter, four auxiliary functions of horror are examined, each of which, plausibly, serves as a vehicle for the simulation of feelings that reinforce the status quo within exploitative systems of human organization. How elements of anti-tragedy often found in horror have the function of symbolizing idealized justice, not unlike ritualistic effigy punishment, is explored. Moreover, how the theme of indiscriminate violence or arbitrary harm often present in the films initializes simulated feelings of downward social comparison is considered. Finally, relying on Elias Canetti’s analysis of “The Survivor”, and borrowing from Nietzsche’s mature views on the nature of guilt and pity, two additional functions of horror, which I term, respectively, horror as survival and horror as submission, are developed.

This chapter presents the view that horror’s principal differentiating function is to induce fear. Some of the worries that have been noted in the literature regarding this thesis are dispelled. Topics considered include the distinction between “pure” and “hybrid” forms of the genre, the multifarious import of representations of violence and gore, and the instrumental value of objects of disgust within the project of fear inducement. A number of ways that horror films can induce rational fear are sketched. The analysis appeals to the simulated/non-simulated emotions distinction and relies on Robert C. Roberts’ neo-judgementalist account of emotions.

This chapter presents a theory I call “the sport model of horror”. By appealing to this model, I clarify the effectiveness of a number of horror’s quintessential plot, cinematic, and visual devices, and trace a logical trajectory of advances in horror’s scare value, one that ultimately tends towards increases in representations of indiscriminate violence (and arbitrary harm) within the genre. The chapter explores a number of peculiarities and important expansions concerning the model. A Neo-Santayanan doctrine of expression factors into these expansions, and supplies a novel framework by which to understand how horror films are themselves proper aesthetic objects despite the fact that it is an activity of the percipient that is the primary aesthetic object, according to this model.

This chapter presents a modified Santayanan view on the nature of aesthetic objects, according to which evil or its representation, properly understood, negates the aesthetic value of the object in which it is contained. This contrasts with Santayana’s official early view—a variant of “co-existentialism”. By interpreting themes from Santayana’s early aesthetic theory through the lens of his later account of complex essencehood, I propose a revision to this view. The proposed revision affirms the intrinsic positivity of art, and is what I call “aesthetic optimism”. It also rejects more generally Santayana’s early conception of aesthetic objects as units of pleasurable feeling and imagistic profiles compounded together during episodes of immediate appreciation.

This chapter introduces the driving issues that govern the subject matter of this book and presents an overview of the central claims that will be defended. Some provisional discussion of Santayana’s view on the nature of beauty and the paradoxical nature of horror is provided, and a cursory description of the modified Santayanan account from which I approach the aesthetics of horror is offered. A preliminary sketch of the “sport model” of horror’s aesthetic is provided, and a key concept that will factor into later analyses, namely, “necropolitics”, is articulated. The chapter establishes a road map for the rest of the book: It identifies the topics covered and the logical order in which they are covered, and begins to situate the theoretical project within the context of scholarship on the nature of horror.

There is a tension in Santayana's ontological system, one that is generated by the interactions of his doctrine of existence, doctrine of systematization, and critical agnosticism on the infinity of material substance. From and, in conjunction with what will be called the expansionist postulate, an infinite material expansion is generated, one that is in conflict with. This tension is remediated by a coherentist proposal regarding Santayanan existence, the relevant feature of which is that existents at distinct orders of organization are in symmetrical dependence relations. "Metaphysical coherentism," which has recently been described as "one of the least explored areas in contemporary...

There is an interesting controversy in recent literature over the nature of Reid's theory of perception. Interpreters are divided over whether Reid's theory of perception is compatible with an acquaintance model of perception. This article discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff's objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I argue that these objections are inadequate insofar as they do not account for the possibility that Reid offers a ‘state conceptual’ – rather than a ‘state nonconceptual’ – acquaintance theory of perception. I provide textual support for thinking that a state conceptual acquaintance interpretation of Reid is a live possibility, and show how such an interpretation is immune to Wolterstorff's criticisms.

This book analyzes the nature and functions of horror films from the vantage of a theoretical reconstruction of George Santayana’s account of beauty. This neo-Santayanan framework forms the conceptual backdrop for a new model of horror’s aesthetic enjoyment, the nature of which is detailed through the examination of plot, cinematic, and visual devices distinctive of the popular genre. According to this model, the audience derives pleasure from the films through confronting the aversive scenarios they communicate and rationalizing a denial of their personal applicability. The films then come to embody these acts of self-assertion and intellectual overcoming and become objects of pride. How horror films can acquire necropolitical functions within the context of abusive systems of power is also clarified. These functions, which exploit the power of anti-tragedy, downward social comparison, or vicarious emotion, work to remediate aggressive, ascetic, or revolutionary impulses in ways that are not injurious to the status quo. This book champions horror as a source of self-empowerment and unmitigated beauty, but also attests to the potential social harms of the genre.