Fortuna Verde

This article lays the groundwork for a patterned theory of inner speech by rethinking Vygotsky’s notion of internalization in light of 4E cognitive science and phenomenology. We begin by revisiting Vygotsky’s view of linguistic development as a dynamic and socially mediated process of transformation, central to the formation of subjectivity. Rather than treating internalization as a simple transfer of external norms, we focus on it as a developmental process that mediates the reorganization of the agent’s intra-psychic structures. This reorganization is understood as affecting the functional architecture of the mind, involving both cognitive and non-cognitive capacities—such as bodily, affective, and symbolic resources—integrated within intentional activity. Building on this reinterpretation, we critically engage with the 4E paradigm, highlighting how enactive and extended approaches often leave underexplored the internal structuring effects of linguistic practices. To address this, we propose that phenomenology offers the appropriate descriptive tools to trace the emergence of patterned forms of inner speech as they are lived and experienced. To address this, we propose that phenomenology offers the appropriate descriptive tools to trace the emergence of patterned forms of inner speech as they are lived and experienced. Inner speech, in this view, emerges within a newly constituted inner space of the mind—a structural feature of intentional experience that is shaped by embodied and social interactions, while also shaping how the agent interprets, evaluates, and acts in the world.