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685Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural MechanismsIn David Michael Kaplan (ed.), Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163. 2017.A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called function-theoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes the exercise of the cognitive capacity (in the system's normal environment). Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive cap…Read more
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Intentionality and the theory of visionIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. 1996.
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460Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural MechanismsIn David Michael Kaplan (ed.), Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163. 2017.A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capa…Read more
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Deflating Mental Representation (The 2021 Jean Nicod Lectures)MIT Press (open access). forthcoming.
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12Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology?In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop (eds.), Stich, Wiley‐blackwell. 2009-03-20.This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V References.
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178The Elusive Role of Normal-Proper Function in Cognitive SciencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 468-475. 2022.Comments on Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental
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333The Structure of Perceptual Experience: A New Look at AdverbialismIn Deflating Mental Representation (The 2021 Jean Nicod Lectures), Mit Press (open Access). forthcoming.In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogativ…Read more
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306The We-Perspective on the Racing SailboatIn Roberto Casati (ed.), The Sailing Mind, Springer. 2022.Successful sports teams are able to adopt what is known as the 'we-perspective,' forming intentions and making decisions, somewhat as a unified mind does, to achieve their goals. In this paper I consider what is involved in establishing and maintaining the we-perspective on a racing sailboat. I argue that maintaining the we-perspective contributes to the success of the boat in at least two ways: (1) it facilitates the smooth execution of joint action; and (2) it increases the chance that individ…Read more
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331The elusive role of normal‐proper function in cognitive sciencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2): 468-475. 2022.Comments on Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental
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2Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind" (review)Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1): 59-61. 1990.
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618A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capa…Read more
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725Content is pragmatic: Comments on Nicholas Shea's Representation in cognitive scienceMind and Language 35 (3): 368-376. 2020.Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the account secures determinate content only by appeal to pragmatic considerations, and so it fails to respect naturalism. But that is fine, because representational content is not, strictly speaking, necessary for explanation in cognitive science. Even in Shea’s own account, content serves only a variety of heuristic functions.
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901How to think about mental contentPhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 115-135. 2014.Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich …Read more
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56Explaining representation: a reply to MatthenPhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 137-142. 2014.Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy proje…Read more
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865The Nature and Function of Content in Computational ModelsIn Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, Routledge. 2018.Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. Th…Read more
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23Review of Cummins' Representations, Targets, and Attitudes (review)Philosophical Review 107 (1): 118. 1998.“Naturalistic” semantic theories attempt to specify, in nonintentional and nonsemantic terms, a sufficient condition for a mental representation’s having a particular meaning. Such theories have trouble accounting for the possibility of representational error. In his latest book, Robert Cummins traces the problem to the fact that the theories currently on offer identify the meaning of a representation with certain features of its use. Only a theory that takes meaning to be an intrinsic feature o…Read more
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319What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mindPhilosophy of Science 56 (December): 664-74. 1989.Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, b…Read more
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28Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Christopher Peacocke (review)Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 359-360. 1989.
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Intentionality and the Theory of VisionIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. 1996.The chapter discusses David Marr's theory of vision, which likens the visual system to an information-processing system with three levels: the topmost “theory of computation,” the algorithmic level, and the implementation level. Marr's work, which is based on computational theory, has been assumed by many acolytes of this field of study to be “intentional.” This chapter aims to refute this assumption utilizing the broad tenets of computational methodology. It argues that, in utilizing the formal…Read more
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1261A Deflationary Account of Mental RepresentationIn Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołęga & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations?, Oxford University Press. 2020.Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of connectionist, dynamical, embodied, and enactive approaches to cognition. In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in cog…Read more
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198Folk psychology and cognitive architecturePhilosophy of Science 62 (2): 179-96. 1995.It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science
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1125RepresentationalismIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive model…Read more
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151In defence of narrow mindednessMind and Language 14 (2): 177-94. 1999.Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology
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144Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 89--104. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Methodological Naturalism Internalism The Limits of Naturalistic Inquiry Computation and Content Intentionality and Naturalistic Inquiry.
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Intentionality and the theory of visionIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. 1996.
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503Wide ContentIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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