Francesca Cesarano

In this paper, we examine and respond to two concerns associated with gender socialization and assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). After providing an overview of feminist theorists’ work on gender socialization and women’s autonomy, we consider the concern according to which women’s choice to use ARTs to have children may be non-genuinely autonomous due to the influence of oppressive norms on this choice. We call this the autonomous-choice concern. In response to this concern, we argue that only subscribing to an overly demanding account of autonomy yields this conclusion and issue a caution about the implications of subscribing to such an account. Second, we consider the concern according to which the investment of public resources to make certain ARTs more widely accessible amounts to endorsing oppressive norms and may indirectly harm infertile and other women by making these norms more compelling. We call this the norm-legitimation concern. In response, we argue that when appraising the adverse downstream effects associated with legitimizing oppressive norms, it is necessary to consider both the costs of compliance and the costs of non-compliance with these norms, and that their consideration requires a differentiated approach. In closing, we consider objections to the arguments defended in the paper.

In this paper, I single out three opposing sets of features that characterize the debates on ideal vs. non-ideal theory vis-à-vis the desired anti-oppressive character of normative theories: idealization and abstraction vs. concreteness; unthematized situatedness vs. thematized situatedness; end-state theorizing vs. open-endedness. Theorists often tend to focus on these features separately as the main point of contention of three distinct debates concerning the need for appropriate normative tools to target and counteract oppression: the methodological, the epistemological, and the procedural debate. My central argument is that non-ideal theory is more likely to realize its anti-oppressive potential when it integrates its three defining features through a specific conception of open-endedness – namely, open-endedness as semantic practice dependence – which inherently entails concreteness and thematized situatedness. When integrated, these elements help to overcome the limitations each would face separately. At the same time, I emphasize that neither feature of non-ideal theory, either separately or jointly, can guarantee an anti-oppressive normative framework, and that ideal theory, too, can serve an anti-oppressive function.

Iris Marion Young (2011) introduces a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of responsibility through the elaboration of her Social Connection Model (SCM) to combat structural injustice. This model offers a shared political understanding of responsibility, aiming to avoid victim-blaming and the imposition of supererogatory duties on the oppressed. However, two objections emerge regarding the application of the SCM. First, Young’s approach of assigning differentiated duties based on individual circumstances raises concerns about potential evasion by both oppressors and victims, leading to the phenomenon of ‘undererogation’. Second, some question the SCM’s effectiveness in transcending blame, with the allocation of differentiated duties potentially resulting in a resurgence of victim-blaming. In this paper, I address both objections in relation to the issue of patriarchal bargains. To tackle the first, I propose turning to Serene Khader’s deliberative perfectionist approach (Khader 2011), which advocates for an intersubjectively defined spectrum of vulnerability. This spectrum can help determine the scope and degrees of victims’ duties, thus mitigating the issue of undererogation. To address the second objection regarding the risk of victim-blaming, I suggest two strategies: 1) Robin Zheng’s clarification of Young’s distinction between blaming and criticizing (Zheng 2018; 2019), and 2) differentiating between victim-blaming and blaming victims after the allocation of justified duties. While both strategies have their limitations, they provide valuable insights for navigating the complexities of Young’s reconceptualization of responsibility in relation to blame.

Gendered socialization has prompted numerous attempts to redefine what counts as an autonomous choice. However, there is strong disagreement among feminist theorists over the criteria to identify cases of autonomy impairment _vis-à-vis_ the embeddedness of individuals in patriarchal cultures. I argue that this focus on choice and autonomy has often neglected the costs of non-compliance to social norms and the trade-offs that women make to flourish within their community. Even if we were to find an effective way to determine whether a self-regarding choice calls for state interference because of its socialized nature, we would still lack a sufficient justification for interfering with women’s choices. To justify political action, my claim is that we should also look at the effects that preference interference would have on women within their societal context. Consequently, I develop a non-ideal feminist account aimed chiefly at analysing the costs of proposed feminist change. I shall focus in particular on women’s engagement with practices of body modification for the sake of conforming to gendered standards of appearance, such as cosmetic surgery and hymen restoration. In both cases, I argue that blanket bans risk backfiring into a form of double-jeopardy for those who are already the most vulnerable to gendered oppression, hence they are not justified. However, this does not imply passively accepting the status quo but urges us to reconsider new ways to offset transition costs, making resistance to social norms a collectively shared endeavour rather than a burden that exclusively befalls the most vulnerable.

In Pregnancy and superior moral status: A proposal for two thresholds of personhood, Robinson argues that pregnant women are unique beings with superior moral status (MS) to that of other adult human beings. Robinson’s defence of this view relies on metaphysical and moral claims. The first set of claims concerns the ontological status of the pregnant woman, whom she considers a ‘unique organism’,‘more than just one person’and ‘numerically increased’.1 The second set of claims concerns the ‘superior’ MS of the pregnant woman. In this commentary, we address this second set of claims and argue that Robinson’s view rests on a misunderstanding of the concept of MS and its role in supplying reasons for action (and forbearance from action). While we welcome the conclusion of Robinson’s argument—which we take to be that pregnant women ought to be treated with more consideration—on an appropriate understanding of MS, her argument does not yield that conclusion at all. We feel strongly that medical ethics needs to be grounded in good philosophy and worry that too much of the literature falls short of this ideal. As such, the spirit in which we write this commentary is that of constructive criticism. ### One plus one equals one plus one and the grounds of MS The philosophical literature on the grounds of MS essentially addresses the question of what properties (Ps) determine whether an agent (A) has MS.1 Examples of Ps are: sophisticated cognitive capacities,2 such as the capacity to value, being self-aware or rational, or more controversially, …

Gendered socialization has prompted numerous attempts to redefine what counts as an autonomous choice. However, there is strong disagreement among feminist theorists over the criteria to identify cases of autonomy impairment _vis-à-vis_ the embeddedness of individuals in patriarchal cultures. I argue that this focus on choice and autonomy has often neglected the costs of non-compliance to social norms and the trade-offs that women make to flourish within their community. Even if we were to find an effective way to determine whether a self-regarding choice calls for state interference because of its socialized nature, we would still lack a sufficient justification for interfering with women’s choices. To justify political action, my claim is that we should also look at the effects that preference interference would have on women within their societal context. Consequently, I develop a non-ideal feminist account aimed chiefly at analysing the costs of proposed feminist change. I shall focus in particular on women’s engagement with practices of body modification for the sake of conforming to gendered standards of appearance, such as cosmetic surgery and hymen restoration. In both cases, I argue that blanket bans risk backfiring into a form of double-jeopardy for those who are already the most vulnerable to gendered oppression, hence they are not justified. However, this does not imply passively accepting the status quo but urges us to reconsider new ways to offset transition costs, making resistance to social norms a collectively shared endeavour rather than a burden that exclusively befalls the most vulnerable.