Francesca Righetti

Temporal disorientation in episodic memory includes recalling episodes we struggle to posit in time. In this paper, we theorize how this disorientation arises by arguing for a constrained functional analogy between mental time travel and spatial navigation. We characterize temporal orientation as coordination between egocentric anchors and temporal structure (order, interval, and calendrical constraints); and, consequently, temporal disorientation as the breakdown of this coordination. Drawing on constructive accounts of episodic memory - and more specifically, the Scenario Construction Framework - we identify two distinct experiences of temporal disorientation. First, when attempting to situate a memory in time, we may become uncertain whether an event actually occurred. Second, we may struggle to construct the temporal sequence of events within remembered content. We propose that navigation in mental time and the feeling of temporal disorientation scaffold episodic construction. Our framework opens new paths for investigating the role of mental navigation in episodic memory construction.

This paper provides a proof of principle for the philosophical theory of Trace Minimalism, a novel account of episodic memory. It claims that remembering goes without the storage of representational content in memory. Remembering rather consists in the construction of a representation of a scenario, previously experienced, through the interaction of minimal traces with acquired statistical regularities. A minimal trace merely constitutes a causal link to the experience but possesses no trans-temporally transmitted representational (viz. categorical and compositional) content. Our proof of principle uses a neuro-computational model that is based on an autoencoder modeling the visual pathway and a transformer modeling the semantic information network. It assumes the hippocampus as the host of minimal traces. Our model demonstrates that minimal traces, which lack sufficient information for reliable categorization and composition of content on their own, can be enhanced through interaction with semantic information. This process allows for the accurate construction of past scenarios, respecting regularities in the world and supporting the reliability of episodic memory. Our findings suggest that episodic memory relies on sparse, fragmentary information rather than stored content, providing a robust proof of principle that remembering is possible without representational memory traces.

This paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand episodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification, which implies a reproduction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to be incoherent with the constructive theories of episodic memory, which highlight how subjects shift perspectives in memory or include information not present in the foregoing experience. Thus, according to these contemporary theories, episodic memory is unlikely to imply a replay of the past conscious experience. I argue that if we investigate the embodied dimensions, then it is possible to reconcile the phenomenological approach and the constructive theories. More precisely, I ground the investigation on the analysis of operative intentionality and its role in comparing procedural and episodic memory. I argue that two embodied features qualify the reproductive modification of consciousness: the flexible re-enactment of the previous operative intentionality and the pre-reflective mode of embodied resonance with an agent I am no longer.

This paper investigates the _madeleine_-memory (so-called from Proust's novel _In Search of Lost Time_) as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the _madeleine_-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the _madeleine_-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that _madeleine_-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the _madeleine_ within the phenomenological logic of _transcendence in immanence_. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of “epistemological inadequacy of perception” and “background experiences”. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections.

This paper investigates the madeleine-memory as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of “epistemological inadequacy of perception” and “background experiences”. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections.