Francesco Antilici

Several philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently argued that belief-attribution is slower, less efficient, and less automatic than knowledge-attribution. Although many findings initially appear to support this hypothesis, I argue that this impression dissolves under closer scrutiny, revealing contrary evidence and plausible alternative explanations. Specifically, I argue that the data are more consistent with a competing view—the modularity theory—according to which the mentalising system can support fast and efficient belief-attribution, though it can also interact with executive functions to enable more flexible forms of mentalising. While there is ongoing debate about which forms of belief-attribution are efficient and which are effortful, there is currently no compelling evidence that attributing beliefs is harder than attributing knowledge.

Several scientists and philosophers have argued that knowledge is more basic than belief, partly by appeal to evidence that non‐human primates attribute the former but not the latter. We re‐examine this evidence and argue that it is, in fact, more consistent with the presence of belief‐attribution than its absence. We also highlight the benefits of belief‐attribution and cast doubt on its alleged costs. While further research is needed to settle the debate, we recommend an attitude of cautious optimism: The understanding of the mind our close relatives possess may be more like ours than previously assumed.

The traditional approach to the analysis of knowledge sees it as a true belief meeting further conditions. I discuss an empirical challenge to this traditional approach, which I call the argument from development. Briefly, the argument is that belief cannot be conceptually prior to knowledge because children acquire the concept of knowledge first. Several prominent scientists and philosophers have argued that this latter claim is supported by many findings with infants and young children. Here, I defend the traditional approach by raising three challenges to the argument from development: the competence-performance challenge, the double-standard challenge, and the underdetermination challenge. I conclude that the developmental data are fully compatible with children acquiring the concept of belief first. In closing, I also argue that further research is needed to investigate when children acquire a concept of knowledge.

Rationalist accounts of the development of folk-psychology maintain that the acquisition of this capacity is aided by special-purpose mechanisms rich in innate structure. Rationalists have typically maintained that false-belief understanding (FBU) emerges very early on, before the age of two. To explain why young children nonetheless fail the false-belief task, rationalists have suggested that they may have troubles expressing their FBU. Here I do two things. First, I argue that extant proposals about what might prevent children from expressing their FBU cannot explain some of the relevant data. Second, I put forward a new rationalist proposal, the processing-time account, according to which young children fail because they cannot carry out all the required processing in the time available. I argue that the processing-time account overcomes the challenges extant rationalist accounts face while being compatible with the evidence in their support, thereby providing a compelling explanation of the development of FBU.