Francesco Stellin Sturino

This paper explores the relationship between economic precarity and freedom of expression. As the influential liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill observed, financial insecurity can have a stifling effect on expression, as it pressures people of modest means to remain muted in order to avoid social punishments such as firing and ostracism that can undermine their ability to meet their basic material needs. In light of the fact that fears of economic hardship can generate self-censorship, it is argued that universal basic income (UBI) policies ought to be viewed as potent mechanisms for bolstering freedom of expression and stimulating productive public discourse. Such policies are equipped to establish a baseline of material wellbeing that can shield individuals and groups from financial turmoil in the event that they publicly express views that are controversial or strongly disfavoured. Moreover, by reducing the stress associated with economic precarity, guaranteed income policies may deescalate social tensions and create greater opportunity for people to participate in constructive communication with interlocutors whose worldviews are different from their own. This case for UBI is developed further by noting that such policies can benefit public discourse by challenging the dominance that economic elites often exert over the media marketplace and the conversations facilitated therein. Guaranteed income policies can help prevent worthwhile perspectives from being crowded out of the media marketplace by large firms that are owned and directed by highly affluent individuals who may be disconnected from the interests of large swaths of society.

Physical forms of media are increasingly being phased out and replaced by digital media. While this transition entails significant gains for consumers, it also presents risks that are worthy of attention and analysis. Thanks to the rise of channels of distribution such as streaming platforms, it is increasingly the case that content that has previously been made available in the marketplace can be disappeared or covertly edited in the absence of any significant scrutiny, criticism, or feedback. This paper presents two arguments regarding why this pattern of behavior may prove pernicious. The first argument posits that removing and revising culturally significant works is likely to distort people's understanding of the past, which has the potential to generate patterns of thinking and behavior that are corrosive for society. The second argument makes the case that the practice of removing and revising published content at will is damaging to the project of achieving accountability in the media marketplace. In light of these arguments, it is noted that there are alternative strategies for grappling with the existence of controversial pieces of media that are additive rather than subtractive, and do not pose a risk of generating distortion or undermining accountability.

Deepfake technology can be used to produce videos of real individuals, saying and doing things that they never in fact said or did, that appear highly authentic. Having accepted the premise that Deepfake content can constitute a legitimate form of expression, it is not immediately clear where the rights of content producers and distributors end, and where the rights of individuals whose likenesses are used in this content begin. This paper explores the question of whether it can be plausibly argued that Deepfake content involving the likenesses of real individuals violates the rights of these individuals.