Francesco Striano

The way we human beings approach the world has always been mediated. To be precise, it is mediated by interfaces. The starting point of this paper, therefore, will be to define, in the most general way possible, the interface. I will then focus mostly on the analysis of contemporary digital visual interfaces, and on how they changed the human way of perceiving. In the light of this analysis, I will highlight the “ideology” that spoils current interface design and allows contemporary interfaces to “deceive” us much more than previous technologies did. The central part of the paper will be devoted to illustrating the peculiar way in which digital visual interfaces capture attention and predispose to courses of action. The case study provided by TikTok will help to explain this mechanism. Finally, I will point out the possible negative effects of ideological interfaces and I will review some possible solutions.

This paper delves into a philosophical exploration of the concept of “dividuality” in the context of contemporary media technologies and proposes an ethical framework capable of accounting for human and non-human agency, with the aim of providing direction for the transindividual structuring of a systemic collective. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the concept of divisum, introduced by Günther Anders. It highlights the impact of media technologies on human identity and the commodification of consumer products. The second section introduces the concept of the “dividual” as a more accurate representation of the human condition in the digital age. More than this, the basic thesis is that individuality is an abstraction and that the dividual condition has always been more appropriate to describe the human condition. In the digital age, however, the dividual condition produces anxieties that demand an ethical response. The two final sections propose a transindividual ethical framework. They focuse on collective growth and the integration of human, environmental, and technological interactions. In conclusion, the paper advocate for a society that values collective and emphasize the need for a systemic approach to address the challenges posed by digital technologies.

Can artificial agents act? Conceptual constellation for a de-humanised theory of action This paper embarks on an exploration of the concept of agency, traditionally ascribed to humans, in the context of artificial intelligence (AI). In the first two sections, it challenges the conventional dichotomy of human agency and non- human instrumentality, arguing that advancements in technology have blurred these boundaries. In the third section, the paper introduces the reader to the philosophical perspective of new materialism, which assigns causal power to matter itself. This perspective suggests that agency is an emergent property of material configurations, prompting a re-evaluation of nonhuman agency. The fourth and fifth section revisit the legacy of cybernetics to understand systemic properties and feedback mechanisms, while re-admitting in the discourse also linear conditioning (discarded by new materialism) and assigning it a role in system dynamics. In the sixth section, in the light of the conceptual background examined so far, the paper proposes a revision of determinism (again partly in opposition to the new materialism and its indeterministic view) that can include both linear conditioning and circular interactions. The seventh section is devoted to propose a novel theory of action that includes AI systems – and artificial entities in general – as agents that can impact their environment and human systems. The exploration concludes with a discussion on the implications of this perspective for our understanding of action and responsibility in the age of AI.

The discussion will begin with a narrative introduction, which will fo¬cus on the first occurrence in literature of testimony of a cyber-rape. From this introduction, the main philosophical issues involved in these phenom¬ena will emerge. This introduction will be followed by a brief discussion of the different forms of cyber-rape, which will refer, in particular, to feminist literature on the subject. Subsequently, the chapter will enter the heart of the philosophical dis¬cussion, addressing the first of the topics to which it is dedicated: the nature of acts of sexual and gender-based online violence. Three sections will be devoted to dismantling those arguments that, even accepting that The Dangerous Liaison cyber-rape is a moral wrong, it cannot be considered on the same level as rape. Then, having established that the seriousness of a “virtual” rape is com¬parable to that of a physical rape, it will show how the former occurs more frequently (but is not conceptualised as “real”) than the latter. This will be attributed to an asymmetry between the seriousness of the act and its common perception. Finally, the chapter will go on to question the reasons for this asymme¬try, first exploring the hypothesis—long held by many scholars—of ano¬nymity as a catalyst for violence, only to partially discard it in the face of more recent evidence and replace it with a more convincing explanatory hypothesis. In general, the aim of this chapter is to make a feminist contribution from the perspective of philosophy of technology to the issue of cyber-rape. Tools provided by philosophy of technology will be tested in order to, on the one hand, dismantle the idea that there can be such a thing as a virtual agency that is “less serious” than the real one, and, on the other hand, explore the ways in which digital technologies affect the perception of personal responsibility.

Those who appeal to humanism today defend a central role for human beings over increasingly alienating technical apparatuses and thus preserve values and ideals that are undermined by the growing role of machines and the marked autonomy that technical objects are acquiring. Simondon had already grasped this aspect when he argued that each era recreates its own humanism in response to the alienating elements that characterise it (Simondon, 2017, 118–121). Even if he does not highlight it, this was already the role played by the humanist instances present in antiquity, starting with the Greek paideia and the Latin humanitas, which were born respectively to counter barbarism with education and to defend a universal ideal of civilisation and the ethical formation of the free citizen. The same immunitarian dynamic was indeed participated in by late antiquity and medieval Christian humanism, which was found in the doctrine of creation “in the image and likeness of God” (Gen 1:26), a solid theological reference to safeguard the dignity of the human being and to attribute to him a central role in creation.

In this paper, we explore a new perspective on digital humanism, emphasizing the centrality of multi-stakeholder dialogues and a bottom-up approach to surfacing stakeholder values. This approach starkly contrasts with existing frameworks, such as the Vienna Manifesto's top-down digital humanism, which hinges on pre-established first principles. Our approach provides a more flexible, inclusive framework that captures a broader spectrum of ethical considerations, particularly those pertinent to the digital realm. We apply our model to two case studies, comparing the insights generated with those derived from a utilitarian perspective and the Vienna Manifesto's approach. The findings underscore the enhanced effectiveness of our approach in revealing additional, often overlooked stakeholder values, not typically encapsulated by traditional top-down methodologies. Furthermore, this paper positions our digital humanism approach as a powerful tool for framing ethics-by-design, by promoting a narrative that empowers and centralizes stakeholders. As a result, it paves the way for more nuanced, comprehensive ethical considerations in the design and implementation of digital technologies, thereby enriching the existing literature on digital ethics and setting a promising agenda for future research.

Can we say we live in a post-digital condition? It depends. This paper sets out to distinguish between the current mass digital culture and an authentic post-digital culture. If we mean “post-digital” as the full internalization and awareness of the result of the so-called digital revolution, then it is necessary a philosophical work to discuss related problems, identify the causes and propose solutions. An authentic philosophy of digital will, however, have to start from a clarification of the terms and basic objects of its investigation. Here media theory is inserted as an analytical tool: the purpose of this essay is to outline a road map for a good media theory that interfaces with questions of definition of digital, also in light of the notions of space, time, and matter. As will be seen, the description given here for a “good media theory” does, in fact, coincide with an already existing – and inserted in the contemporary debate – school. In conclusion we will try to delineate the field of philosophical inquiry opened by the clarification brought by the previous analysis, and to suggest a general framework within which philosophy will have to move in order to finally reach the authentic post-digital condition.

The way we human beings approach the world has always been mediated. To be precise, it is mediated by interfaces. The starting point of this paper, therefore, will be to define, in the most general way possible, the interface. I will then focus mostly on the analysis of contemporary digital visual interfaces, and on how they changed the human way of perceiving. In the light of this analysis, I will highlight the “ideology” that spoils current interface design and allows contemporary interfaces to “deceive” us much more than previous technologies did. The central part of the paper will be devoted to illustrating the peculiar way in which digital visual interfaces capture attention and predispose to courses of action. The case study provided by TikTok will help to explain this mechanism. Finally, I will point out the possible negative effects of ideological interfaces and I will review some possible solutions.