Francesco Valerio Tommasi

In a very few places in his writing, Kant mentions “somatology.” As a lexical creation of Protestant Scholasticism, “somatology” is meant to be a science dealing with bodies. But this definition entails an ambiguity: A body can be every physical and material object, and in this sense somatology stays very close to physics. But somatology can also refer specifically to animal and human bodies: In that sense, somatology is the counterpart of psychology, and both constitute anthropology. This ambiguity is constitutive of the modern comprehension of the body, both in the Cartesian as in the scholastic approach. Kant’s references to somatology are therefore paradigmatic of a wider question concerning a philosophical science of the human body. The question regarding this science is for itself an unsolved problem of Kantian and modern anthropology.

An apparently paradoxical tendency in contemporary Philosophy of Religion consists in no longer seeking transcendence starting with invisible and immaterial elements, such as the soul, the spirit, or God known to reason. Instead a bridge between philosophy and theology has been singled out in the body. But how can one reach an idea of transcendence starting from the body? In these short reflections, I will try to show how finitude and immanence are the phenomenological meaning of the body. Consciousness itself is finite because it is embodied. So it is not possible to transcend the body. It is only possible to decide how to live out one’s finitude: The body can be oriented to the consumption of the other, by periodic attempts to prolong one’s own life and power. Or, on the contrary, it is possible to let the others eat and consume me. Only others, indeed, can survive me and transcend my finitude.

The thesis of a “metaphysical” Kant has been repeatedly affirmed by historiographic research and is now a given. Contrary to what is often assumed, however, Kant’s relationship to metaphysics should be interpreted as the search for an unconditioned outside ontology. Kant realises the inevitable correlation between foundation and limit. “Absolute position”, “a priori synthesis”, “fact of reason” and “highest good in the world” are four expressions that highlight the repetition of this correlation and the impossibility of placing an unconditioned in Kant’s passage from ontology to criticism, ethics and history.

Wie bekannt unterscheidet Kant eine Anthropologie »in physiologischer Hinsicht« und eine »pragmatische« Anthropologie, aber die Anthropologie bleibt doch stets ein empirisches Wissen und besitzteindeutig keine apriorische Universalität. Umso mehr muss man sich über eine Reflexion aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlass wundern, wo Kant eine »anthropologia transcendentalis« erwähnt. Bei allen Vorbehaltenwegen der Singularität dieser Formulierung besitzt die Stelle eine wichtige Bedeutung und erfordert eine genauere Analyse. Denn in jener Reflexion erklärt Kant auch, dass der Gelehrte vermeiden müsse,ein »Cyclop« zu werden, das heißt die Phänomene mit nur einem Auge zu betrachten. Dies sei nämlich die Haltung des »Egoisten der Wissenschaft «, der »seinen Kräften zu viel zutraut«. Jeder Arzt, Theologe, Jurist, selbst Geometer hat Kant zufolge »noch ein Auge nötig, welches macht, dass er seinen Gegenstand noch aus dem Gesichtspunkte anderer Menschen ansieht«. Dieser Gesichtspunktsteht hier ausdrücklich mit der »Critik« und der »Selbsterkenntnis« des menschlichen Verstandes und der menschlichen Vernunft in Verbindung: die Anthropologie wird hier also nicht nur als »transzendental« charakterisiert, sondern sie wird auch in direkten Zusammenhang mit dem anderen entscheidenden zentralen Titelwort der reifen kantschen Philosophie gebracht: »Kritik«.

This essay focuses on the thesis of the so-called »double truth« within the philosophical and theological milieu of the University of Altdorf during the XVIIth Century. The problem of the »double truth« that aroused in the scholastic discussions on Averroism, receives a particular form in the context of Altdorf. In fact, this unique discursive setting was inspired there by the two main tendencies that characterize that philosophical and theological milieu at that time, namely radical Paduan Aristotelism, and Lutheran orthodoxy. Only apparently opposed, these two positions converge on that point. And the synthesis of these two currents of thought gives rise to an interesting justification of the paradox of the conflict »between true and true«: the development of a theory of different fields and levels of truth.

An apparently paradoxical tendency in contemporary Philosophy of Religion consists in no longer seeking transcendence starting with invisible and immaterial elements, such as the soul, the spirit, or God known to reason. Instead a bridge between philosophy and theology has been singled out in the body. But how can one reach an idea of transcendence starting from the body? In these short reflections, I will try to show how finitude and immanence are the phenomenological meaning of the body. Consciousness itself is finite because it is embodied. So it is not possible to transcend the body. It is only possible to decide how to live out one’s finitude: The body can be oriented to the consumption of the other, by periodic attempts to prolong one’s own life and power. Or, on the contrary, it is possible to let the others eat and consume me. Only others, indeed, can survive me and transcend my finitude. Keywords: body, transcendence, finitude, phenomenology, philosophy of religion, consumption.

Two terms in the Kantian lexicon derives from the Latin metaphysical tradition of the res: Realität (Reality) and Wirklichkeit (Actuality or Effectiveness). The first one expresses one of the categories of quality and in the Kantian table it corresponds to affirmative judgements. The second one represents the scheme of the modal category of existence (Dasein), that is - according to Kant's words - «existence in a determinate time». It is worth notice that Realität has no proper scheme and it rather seems to express the general functioning of schematism: that is, the «realization» of categories. To be able to function and to apply to phaenomena, in fact, categories must be restricted and adapted to the forms of sensibility Schemes can therefore be interpreted as plastic and pragmatic functions and «reality» in its broader sense and in its general meaning can be understood as the product of this operations. This interpretation can be confirmed by following the main arguments of the early debate on the «thing-in-itself» among the first Kantian scholars. But this interpretation may be confirmed by a yet unknown possible source of the Kantian doctrine of schematism: the architectural treatise by Leonhard Christoph Sturm. In those pages, the idea materialis is the plastic figure used by architects as a model for a construction. And the tradition of the idea materialis is an important reference for the development of the Kantian Schematism.

Francesco Valerio Tommasi - Rhetoric & Dialectic in the Time of Galileo - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 358-359 Jean Dietz Moss and William A. Wallace. Rhetoric & Dialectic in the Time of Galileo. Washington, D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 438. Cloth, $69.95. "The setting for this book is Northern Italy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a time when arguments were more than entertaining verbal duels, where they might mean death or imprisonment for the orator or the author" . It defines the background in which the case of Galileo takes place, while delving into the scientific constitution of rhetoric and dialectic, the disciplines that..

La question de l’analogie – fondamentale pour toute la néoscolastique, de Gilson à Maritain – trouva sa consécration en 1932 dans le fameux Analogia entis d’Erich Przywara. À la suite de l’influence de Przywara, l’analogie a eu un rôle décisif aussi dans la pensée d’Edith Stein. Mais en décrivant la dialectique phénoménologique entre être fini et être éternel Stein confère à l’analogie de l’être une tournure que l’on peut qualifier de « personnelle ». Il s’agit du rapport entre deux « je suis » : le « je suis » humain et créatural et le « je suis » divin. L’analogia entis originelle est donc pour Stein le rapport entre deux personnes.