Franci Mangraviti

The paper is structured as follows. First, I will single out three salient moments of trans philosophy, drawing on both my own experience as a trans person and the various attempts to theorize transness as laid out by Talia Mae Bettcher's "Trapped in the Wrong Theory". From there, I will extrapolate three ways to see the relationship between logic and trans philosophy, and provide for each some examples of both current and possible future work. Finally, in analogy with the literature on feminist logic, I will attempt to address the further question of what trans logic could be, as a discipline and a system.

Mathematics, even more than the other sciences, is often presented as essentially unique, as if it could not be any other way. And yet, prima facie alternative mathematics are all over the place, from non-Western mathematics to mathematics based on nonclassical logics. Taking inspiration from Robin Dembroff’s analysis of critical gender kinds, and from Andrew Aberdein and Stephen Read’s analysis of alternative logics, in this paper I will introduce a practice-centered framework for the study of alternative mathematics based on the notion of critical math kind. After sketching a model of mainstream mathematics, I will provide examples of how deviation along several distinct dimensions can occur, and how deviations can vary in their gravity. I will then discuss how the framework can be used to think of questions concerning the alternativeness status and philosophical implications of alleged alternative mathematics, and help us in identifying alternatives that suit our purposes.

While much has been said on the connection between dominant rationality standards and systemic oppression, the specific role of logic in supporting epistemic injustice has not received much explicit attention. In this paper I highlight several ways in which it is possible for logic – as a discipline, as a particular system and as a gloss for rational common sense – to be implicated in epistemic injustice. Concrete examples are given for testimonial, content-based, hermeneutical and contributory injustices. I conclude by elaborating on how the need to address these injustices affects the attitudes we should carry toward logic.

This dissertation has two main goals. The first is to provide a practice-based analysis of the field of inconsistent mathematics: what motivates it? what role does logic have in it? what distinguishes it from classical mathematics? is it alternative or revolutionary? The second goal is to introduce and defend a new conception of inconsistent mathematics - queer incomaths - as a particularly effective answer to feminist critiques of classical logic and mathematics. This sets the stage for a genuine revolution in mathematics, insofar as it suggests the need for a shift in mainstream attitudes about the role of logic and ethics in the practice of mathematics.

The relationship between logics with sets of theorems including contradictions (“inconsistent logics”) and theories closed under such logics is investigated. It is noted that if we take “theories” to be defined in terms of deductive closure understood in a way somewhat different from the standard, Tarskian, one, inconsistent logics can have consistent theories. That is, we can find some sets of formulas the closure of which under some inconsistent logic need not contain any contradictions. We prove this in a general setting for a family of relevant connexive logics, extract the essential features of the proof in order to obtain a sufficient condition for the consistency of a theory in arbitrary logics, and finally consider some concrete examples of consistent mathematical theories in Abelian logic. The upshot is that on this way of understanding deductive closure, common to relevant logics, there is a rich and interesting kind of interaction between inconsistent logics and their theories. We argue that this suggests an important avenue for investigation of inconsistent logics, from both a technical and a philosophical perspective.