Francine F. Abeles

Dans une lettre adressée à Bertrand Russell, le 17 mai 1905, Hugh MacColl raconte avoir abandonné l’étude de la logique après 1884, pendant près de treize ans, et explique que ce fut la lecture de l’ouvrage de Lewis Carroll, Symbolic Logic (1896), qui ralluma le vieux feu qu’il croyait éteint. Dès lors, il publie de nombreux articles contenant certaines de ses innovations majeures en logique. L’objet de cet article est de discuter la familiarité de MacColl et son appréciation du travail de Carroll, et de comprendre comment cela l’amena à réinvestir le domaine de la logique. Rien n’indique que les deux hommes se soient jamais rencontrés ou aient échangé une correspondance personnelle. Cependant, MacColl recensa dans le journal The Athenaeum plusieurs ouvrages de Carroll, essentiellement en géométrie et en logique. Souvent, Carroll répondait aux critiques de MacColl dans les éditions suivantes de ses ouvrages. Une discussion de ces sources fournit des éclaircissements intéressants sur les investigations mathématiques et logiques de MacColl et Carroll.

Dans une lettre adressée à Bertrand Russell, le 17 mai 1905, Hugh MacColl raconte avoir abandonné l’étude de la logique après 1884, pendant près de treize ans, et explique que ce fut la lecture de l’ouvrage de Lewis Carroll, Symbolic Logic (1896), qui ralluma le vieux feu qu’il croyait éteint. Dès lors, il publie de nombreux articles contenant certaines de ses innovations majeures en logique. L’objet de cet article est de discuter la familiarité de MacColl et son appréciation du travail de Carroll, et de comprendre comment cela l’amena à réinvestir le domaine de la logique. Rien n’indique que les deux hommes se soient jamais rencontrés ou aient échangé une correspondance personnelle. Cependant, MacColl recensa dans le journal The Athenaeum plusieurs ouvrages de Carroll, essentiellement en géométrie et en logique. Souvent, Carroll répondait aux critiques de MacColl dans les éditions suivantes de ses ouvrages. Une discussion de ces sources fournit des éclaircissements intéressants sur les investigations mathématiques et logiques de MacColl et Carroll.

Charles L. Dodgson's reputation as a significant figure in nineteenth-century logic was firmly established when the philosopher and historian of philosophy William Warren Bartley, III published Dodgson's ?lost? book of logic, Part II of Symbolic Logic, in 1977. Bartley's commentary and annotations confirm that Dodgson was a superb technical innovator. In this paper, I closely examine Dodgson's methods and their evolution in the two parts of Symbolic Logic to clarify and justify Bartley's claims. Then, using more recent publications and unpublished letters, I argue that Dodgson approached the elimination problem in class logic differently than his contemporaries, and in doing so, anticipated several important concepts and techniques in automated deductive reasoning. These materials also provide additional insight into his reasons for writing this book

Hypotheticals, conditionals, and their connecting relation, implication, dramatically changed their meanings during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. Modern logicians ordinarily do not distinguish between the terms hypothetical and conditional. Yet in the late nineteenth century their meanings were quite different, their ties to the implication relation either were unclear, or the implication relation was used exclusively as a logical operator. I will trace the development of implication as an inference operator from these earlier notions into the first third of the twentieth century using as the starting point the ideas primarily of R. Whately and W. Hamilton before discussing the work of the transitional logicians, A. De Morgan and G. Boole on these topics. Then we discuss the relevant views of four prominent but relatively unknown nineteenth century British logicians, W.E. Johnson, J.N. Keynes, E.E.C. Jones, and H. MacColl, as well as those of the more influential logicians, W.S. Jevons and J. Venn, closing with a section on ‘implication as inference’ where we explore some key ideas of B. Russell and sketch the work of D. Hilbert, P. Hertz, and G. Gentzen who together are responsible for the development of the modern ideas related to the subjects of this paper.

John Venn and Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) created systems of logic diagrams capable of representing classes (sets) and their relations in the form of propositions. Each is a proof method for syllogisms, and Carroll's is a sound and complete system. For a large number of sets, Carroll diagrams are easier to draw because of their self-similarity and algorithmic construction. This regularity makes it easier to locate and thereby to erase cells corresponding with classes destroyed by the premises of an argument, a particularly difficult task in Venn diagrams for more than four sets. Carroll diagrams can represent existential propositions easily, so they are capable of clearly representing more complex problems than Venn's system can. Finally, both Carroll and Venn diagrams are maximal, in the sense that no additional logic information like inclusive disjunctions is able to be represented by them. Carroll's logic diagrams and logic trees constitute his visual logic system