Francisco Garcia Gibson

Shmuel Nili claims that when a country buys fossil fuels from dictatorships it becomes complicit with property rights violations in those dictatorships. Thus, Nili argues, people who have a strong commitment to property rights should support a ban on fossil fuel imports from dictatorships, and a transition to renewable energy. This article critically discusses Nili’s argument. The argument fails to consider competing moral reasons that some people may have to oppose a ban on fossil fuel imports from dictatorships, such as moral preference for family and compatriots. The argument also mistakenly assumes that renewable energy would be overwhelmingly economically attractive when fossil fuel imports are forbidden, and that switching to renewable energy would not involve importing stolen goods too. The article ends more propositively, by elaborating an alternative argument that Nili dismisses too quickly, and which may help persuade those who are strongly committed to property rights of transitioning to renewable energy: the argument that transitioning would help avoid violating those rights through contributions to harmful climate change.

Some corporations use their disproportionate lobbying power to obstruct policy. This obstructive lobbying violates most people’s claims to equal political influence. Occasionally, however, other corporations respond by using their disproportionate power to lobby in support of policy. Does this supportive lobbying violate claims to equal influence too? This paper argues that it does, using climate policy as an example. Supportive lobbying does not, in many cases, work to cancel out the influence from obstructive corporate lobbying. Moreover, supportive lobbying violates claims to equal influence even in cases where this lobbying helps equalise the distribution of influence, helps equalise the likelihood of congruence between policy and people’s policy preferences, and helps enforce claims to equal influence held by people in the supportive corporation.

In this article we identify three previously unnoticed problems with flexible moral theories, i.e., theories according to which different moral rules apply when there is full compliance and when there is partial compliance. The first problem is that flexible theories are necessarily very complex, which undermines their ability to motivate and guide action. The second problem is that flexible theories allow for a troubling kind of (moral) domination: the duties an agent has depend on other agents' willingness to comply. Finally, flexible theories introduce indeterminacy: it is sometimes impossible to determine which moral rules apply. When agents stand at the threshold—i.e., when a different rule would apply if a single additional act of noncompliance took place—it is impossible to determine which rule should apply.

RESUMEN Este artículo sostiene que la desobediencia coercitiva motivada por el cambio climático a veces es antidemocrática, pero no por eso es impermisible. El cambio climático representa un peligro tan grave para los derechos básicos de millones de personas en todo el mundo, que incluso el derecho básico a la democracia puede verse justificadamente desplazado como medio para disminuir el riesgo de una catástrofe climática. El articulo responde también a quienes afirman que la desobediencia coercitiva climática es siempre democrática porque sirve para igualar la influencia informal sobre las decisiones públicas o protege las precondiciones de la democracia. Estos argumentos solo rescatan algunos actos de desobediencia climática coercitiva. Los demás son antidemocráticos, pero no por eso impermisibles. ABSTRACT This article argues that when coercive disobedience is motivated by climate change, it is sometimes permissible, even if it is undemocratic. Climate change poses such a serious danger to the basic rights of millions of people worldwide that even the basic right to democracy can be justifiably displaced as a means to reduce the risks posed by a climate catastrophe. The article also replies to the claim that coercive climate disobedience is always democratic because it equalizes informal influence over public decisions, or protects the preconditions of democracy; these arguments only rescue some acts of coercive climate disobedience. The rest are still undemocratic, but they are not for this reason impermissible.

Climate change activists sometimes engage in protests that exert coercion on governments, businesses, and citizens, instead of protests that just attempt to persuade them. I argue that these coercive protests are sometimes undemocratic, despite recent attempts in the literature to describe them as democratic. Coercive climate protests do not always improve deliberative decision-making, and they are a means of exerting control over official decisions that is not available to all affected. I then claim that the fact that some of these protests are undemocratic is not a decisive objection against them. Climate change poses such an extremely serious threat to basic rights worldwide – risking hundreds of millions of lives – that people's right to democracy is outweighed when infringing it is a necessary means for achieving climate change mitigation.

In this article I argue that doing the lesser evil in politics is always permitted and even required. I call this view “pragmatism”. I defend it against “purism”, which claims that it is never permissible to do (the lesser) evil. I reject three arguments for purism, which are based on Alan Gewirth’s principle of intervening action, on an alleged epistemic difference between doing and allowing evil, and on rule-consequentialism. I also address Terrance McConnell’s and Thomas Hill Jr.’s attempts to constrain pragmatism by claiming that doing the lesser evil is not always permitted or required. Although those constraints may apply to most spheres of action, I contend that they do not apply to political action. Keywords: lesser evil, politics, purism, pragmatism.

En este artículo sostengo que ciertos principios igualitaristas de justicia distributiva tienen alcance solo local y no también global. Me baso en la teoría de Michael Blake, quien afirma que el contenido y alcance de los principios de justicia dependen del tipo de coerción que se ejerce en determinado ámbito. A esa teoría se le critica que no es capaz de identificar un tipo de coerción que solo exista en el ámbito local y no también en el global. Me propongo responder a esa objeción mediante una analogía que muestra que solo en el ámbito local el control coercitivo es continuo, mientras que el control coercitivo que existe en el ámbito global es intermitente.

En este trabajo me propongo desarrollar un estudio crítico de la concepción mecanicista de la explicación científica. En primer lugar, argumento que la caracterización mecanicista de los modelos fenoménicos (no explicativos) es inadecuada, pues no ofrece un análisis aceptable de los conceptos de modelo científico y similitud, que son fundamentales para la propuesta. En segundo lugar, sostengo que la caracterización de los modelos mecanicistas (explicativos) es igualmente inadecuada, pues los análisis disponibles de la relación explicativa de relevancia constitutiva implican una tesis metafísica que es rechazada por los mismos mecanicistas. Concluyo que el mecanicismo no ofrece todavía una elucidación aceptable de la explicación científica. In this paper, I offer a critical assessment of the mechanicist approach to scientific explanation. Firstly, I argue that the mechanicist characterization of (non explanatory) phenomenological models is inadequate, since it does not develop an explication of the concepts of scientific model and similarity, which are indispensable to the approach. Secondly, I claim that the mechanicist conception of (explanatory) mechanicist models is inadequate as well, since all the available analices of the explanatory relation of constitutive relevance imply a metaphysical thesis that is rejected by the mechanicists themselves. I conclude that mechanicism needs to be emended if it aims to be considered as a genuinely illuminating approach to scientific explanation

En este trabajo cuestiono las razones que ofrecen David Miller y Laura Valentini para afirmar que el deber de reducir la desigualdad dentro del propio Estado tiene prioridad sobre el deber de reducir la pobreza extrema global. Según Miller, los deberes globales, a diferencia de los domésticos, no pueden legítimamente hacerse cumplir mediante la fuerza, y por esa razón son meros deberes humanitarios que tienen menor peso que los deberes domésticos, que son deberes de justicia. Según Valentini, el deber de reducir la desigualdad doméstica tiene prioridad sobre los deberes humanitarios globales porque el primero es un deber de no dañar, mientras que los segundos son meros deberes de ayudar. El problema principal de ambas propuestas consiste en que fallan en su intento de mostrar que los deberes de reducir la pobreza extrema global no son también deberes de justicia. In this article I question David Miller and Laura Valentini's reasons to claim that duties to reduce inequalities inside the State should be prioritized over duties to reduce extreme global poverty. According to Miller, global duties, unlike domestic ones, cannot be legitimately enforced, and they are therefore mere humanitarian duties that weigh less than domestic duties, which are duties of justice. According to Valentini, domestic duties should be prioritized over global humanitarian duties because the former are duties not to harm, while the latter are mere duties to help. I argue that both views fail in their attempt to show that duties to reduce extreme global poverty are not duties ofjustice too

En el presente artículo me ocupo de la discusión acerca de cuán exigentes son nuestras obligaciones de contribuir con dinero y tiempo a las agencias humanitarias que asisten a personas en situación de pobreza extrema en el mundo. Defiendo una posición intermedia, moderada, frente a la posición extrema formulada por Peter Singer y frente a la posición según la cual nuestras obligaciones son mínimas. La objeción principal contra esas dos posiciones es que, cuando analizan la situación en que los potenciales donantes se encuentran frente a las personas en situación de pobreza extrema, omiten el carácter iterativo que es propio de esa situación. La posición moderada, en cambio, tiene en cuenta ese carácter, gracias a que entiende a nuestras obligaciones hacia los pobres globales como obligaciones imperfectas. In this article I engage in the debate about the demandingness of our duties to contribute with money and time to humanitarian agencies that assist people who live in extreme poverty around the world. I defend an intermediate, moderate, view against Peter Singer's extreme view, and also against the view according to which our duties are minimal. The main objection regarding those two views is that, when they analyze the situation in which potential donors are vis-à-vis people who live in extreme poverty, they miss its distinctive iterative character. The moderate view, on the contrary, pays heed to that character, thanks to its account of our duties towards the global poor as imperfect duties

When we make public policy choices, is it helpful to know how utopia would look? Amartya Sen argues that it is neither necessary, nor sufficient, nor even contributory. He claims that before making a policy choice one should compare several feasible institutional designs to see which promotes justice most, and that it is misleading to use the perfect design as a standard in those comparisons. Principles of justice are the proper standard. The present article contends that the perfect design has nevertheless an important role to play in the prior task of identifying and refining our principles of justice. It also shows that the perfect design—in at least one sense of this term—may be a legitimate long-term goal for present policy choices

Cuando dos agentes reclaman legítimamente un mismo bien, una solución posible al conflicto consiste en que (a) el agente con el reclamo de mayor peso normativo obtenga derecho a todo el bien. Pero existe otra solución, que consiste en que (b) el agente con el reclamo de mayor peso obtenga derecho sólo a una parte bien –la parte mayor–, mientras que el agente con el reclamo de menor peso obtenga derecho al menos a una parte del bien –aunque la parte menor–. En este artículo propongo un argumento a favor de utilizar pro tanto la solución (b) para todos los conflictos distributivos. Luego muestro que las razones para utilizar (a) valen para menos casos de los que parece.