Francisco Javier Lopez Frias

In this article, I critique the dominance of internalism in sport philosophy and outline an alternative theoretical framework that integrates internal and external elements while striving to transcend the dichotomous language used to conceptualize sport. The analysis begins by claiming that internalism conflates three fundamental teleological aspects of sport: goals, point, and purposes. I argue that this conflation limits internalism’s ability to explain the complexity of sporting practices. By carefully distinguishing these elements, I illustrate their distinct roles in shaping sport and explore how they interact. I conclude by proposing that the alternative pluralist framework briefly sketched here enables a more comprehensive understanding of sport.

Is using performance-enhancing substances and methods in sport morally legitimate? Sport governing bodies shape how people talk and think around sport by enacting regulations that establish how to play sport and, most importantly, who can play. Among the regulations and practices that have most significantly shaped sport are those concerning the use of technology to enhance athletic performance, or doping. Debates on whether to embrace or resist the use of technology in sport connect to fundamental philosophical questions, such as those concerning the nature of modern humans. By analyzing the ethical foundations of the World Anti-Doping Agency's core principles--performance enhancement, health, and the spirit of sport--this book offers a clear philosophical framework for understanding why anti-doping rules exist and when they might require revision. It provides readers, particularly sport administrators, with conceptual tools to determine whether current policies are well-grounded or in need of reform

On Bernard Suits’ Philosophy situates Suits’ work within philosophy, play and leisure studies, as well as the philosophy of sport. It introduces his core ideas and offers a comprehensive interpretation, presenting Suits as a thinker who explores gameplay to ask how one can live well. This book offers readers a clear and comprehensive introduction to Suits’ philosophy and its significance across philosophy, game and leisure studies, and the philosophy of sport. By situating Suits’ work within broader intellectual debates, the book helps readers grasp how his exploration of gameplay illuminates enduring philosophical questions, such as those concerning the nature of definitions and the good life. Its approach combines careful interpretation of both published and unpublished manuscripts, historical reception, and contemporary engagement to reveal the unity of Suits’ philosophical project. In doing so, it delivers the benefit of offering the first systematic and accessible framework for understanding Suits’ ideas, connecting The Grasshopper and Return of the Grasshopper as parts of a coherent philosophical project. On Bernard Suits’ Philosophy is intended for scholars, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates in philosophy, sport studies, and leisure or game studies. It also appeals to readers in related fields—such as political theory, work studies, and existential philosophy—and to general readers interested in perennial philosophical questions, especially those concerning how to live well.

This chapter comprehensively surveys the principal philosophical currents and traditions in sport ethics. It traces the historical evolution of the schools of thought that shaped this emergent philosophical sub-discipline, critically analyzing their strengths and inherent limitations. Particular emphasis is placed on the three main normative theories of sport: formalism, conventionalism, and interpretivism (or broad internalism). The chapter commences by situating the origins of these normative accounts of sport within early scholarly examinations of the relationships between play, games, and sport (dubbed the “tricky triad”). Subsequently, from this foundation, it chronicles the progressive development of these normative frameworks, beginning with formalism and explaining how this theory gradually gave way to conventionalism and, later, the emergence of broad internalism as the most widely embraced normative theory of sport.

Defining Sport: Conceptions and Borderlines is not about the variations of usage of the term “sport.” It is about the concept, the range of activities in the world that we unite into one idea—sport. It is through the project of defining sport that we can come to understand these activities better, how they are similar or different, and how they relate to other human endeavors. This definitional inquiry, and the deeper appreciation and apprehension of sport that follows, is the core of this volume. Part I examines several of the standard and influential approaches to defining sport. Part II uses these approaches to examine various challenging borderline cases. These chapters examine the interplay of the borderline cases with the definition and provide a more thorough and clearer understanding of both the definition and the given cases. This work is not meant to be the definitive or exhaustive account of sport. It is meant to inspire further thought and debate on just what sport is; how it relates to other activities and human endeavors; and what we can learn about ourselves through the study of sport. This book will be of interest to scholars in philosophy of sport, history, communications, sociology, psychology, sports management, cultural studies, and physical education.

Competitive sport in its many specific forms is an important aspect of many cultures. Particular sports may be considered as what MacIntyre calls “social practices.” We argue that the appropriateness of a competitive sport should be evaluated as a social practice, according to its contribution to the human flourishing of those who engage in the practice. We critique mutualism, a popular putatively virtue-based approach to sport, as a valuable but incomplete position that is inconsistent with its Aristotelian roots. We analyze Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian understandings of flourishing as consisting in the development, exercise, and enjoyment of the full complement of human powers. We propose normative criteria for evaluating a sport as a social practice, according to its contribution to human flourishing. Our social practice-based critique of sport has ramifications for a larger cultural critique as well.

We argue that an unqualified use of the term solidarity in public health is not only equivocal but problematic toward the ends of public health. The term may be deployed normatively by public health advocates to strengthen the bonds among public health practitioners and refer to an ideal society in which the importance of interdependence among members ought to be acknowledged throughout the polity. We propose an important distinction between partisan solidarity and societal solidarity. Because any moralized belief in a vision of a broad societal solidarity will be a contested political ideal, political reality would limit solidarity based on such a vision to partisan solidarity. An idealized vision of societal solidarity is simply not politically feasible in pluralistic, liberal, democratic societies. However, although societal solidarity is unlikely with respect to any particular policy, it might be hoped for with respect to constitutional procedures that provide boundaries for the agon of the political process. We suggest that moralizing assertions of a solidaristic ideal in a pluralistic society might be counterproductive to generating the political support necessary for public health per se and establishing legitimate public health policy. A pragmatic political approach would be for public health advocates to generate sufficient strong political support for those public health policies that are most amenable to the political and social realities of a time and place.

In this article, I investigate whether states should regulate energy-drink marketing practices targeting gamers. Energy drinks are high-sugar, high-caffeine, non-alcoholic beverages that allegedly improve energy, stamina, cognitive performance, and concentration. First, I define what “gamer” means and identify the market agents that play a crucial role in the gaming community, including the energy-drink industry. In doing so, I analyze energy-drink marketing practices and explore calls for regulating them. Second, I draw parallels between regulation of energy-drink marketing and marketing of products such as video games and comics with explicit violent and sexual content, tobacco, alcohol, and food high in fat, sugar, and salt. Third, I examine arguments to justify regulation of energy-drink marketing practices that target gamers. Lastly, I formulate an autonomy-based argument for regulating such marketing practices.

En este texto analizamos el estudio que Bernard Suits hace del uso instrumental de la razón en The Grasshopper a través de su utopía. Para ello, analizamos el papel que juega la razón instrumental en la teoría del juego y en la utopía de Suits. Luego, comparamos el uso instrumental de la razón con lo que denominamos «actitud lúdica». Esta última encarna la racionalidad lúdica que los jugadores han de adoptar para jugar al juego y vivir en el mundo utópico de Suits. Para concluir, defendemos que la actitud lúdica ofrece una alternativa a la predominancia del uso instrumental de la razón en nuestra sociedad.

RESUMENEste trabajo analizará cuáles son las posibles consecuencias que los descubrimientos de la neurociencia pueden tener sobre la reflexión ética en torno al deporte. Siguiendo los trabajos en neuroética de Jonathan Haidt y Joshua Greene, parece ser que nuestro comportamiento moral está basado en una serie de mecanismos automáticos neuronales de carácter emotivo que acontecen en nuestros cerebros. Estos mecanismos podrían ser útiles a la hora de explicar el comportamiento de los hinchas deportivos, sin embargo, convertirían en inútiles los esfuerzos de la ética del deporte por establecer el principio del fair play como regulador ético de la práctica deportiva. Este trabajo ofrecerá dos contra-argumentos que mostrarán que, primero, nuestro comportamiento no está determinado por ciertos mecanismos automáticos que acontecen en el cerebro y, segundo, de hecho, la configuración de nuestro cerebro facilitaría en ciertos casos la posibilidad de que los hinchas desarrollen un comportamiento más ético. Por lo tanto, las metas de la ética del deporte no se ven socavadas completamente por los descubrimientos de las neurociencias.PALABRAS CLAVEÉTICA DEL DEPORTE, NEUROÉTICA, HINCHA DEPORTIVO, JUEGO LIMPIOABSTRACTThis work shall analyze whether or not the recent studies on neuroethics and neighbour disciplines have a critical impact on the ethical reflection on sports. Given Jonathan Haidt’s and Joshua Greene’s works on neuroethics, our moral behaviour seems to be mainly rooted in emotive mechanisms within our brain. If this is true, then sports supporters’ behaviour can easily be explained by appealing to such emotive brain mechanisms. However, they will turn the efforts to apply the moral principle that is supposed to regulate the sporting world—the fair play principle—into useless efforts. I shall give two counter-arguments that will show, firstly, that supporters’ misbehaviour cannot be totally explained by pointing out to several neural—natural—mechanisms, and, secondly, that our brains’ make-up can, nevertheless, make sports supporters more willing to abide by the fair play principle. Therefore, sport ethics’ aims are not undermined by neuroscientific knowledge.KEYWORDSSPORTS ETHICS, NEUROETHICS, SPORTS SUPPORTER, FAIR PLAY PRINCIPLE

While sport has been practised since pre-historic times, it is a relatively new subject of systematic philosophical enquiry. Indeed, the philosophy of sport as an academic sub-field dates back only to the 1970s. Yet, in this short time, it has grown into a vibrant area of philosophical research that promises both to deepen our understanding of sport and to inform sports practice. Recent controversies at the elite and professional level have highlighted the ethical dimensions of sport in particular. Lance Armstrong’s use of performance-enhancing drugs raised new issues in the ethics of cheating, middle-distance runner Caster Semenya has challenged prevailing rules around sex classification in sport, and Oscar Pistorius’s prosthesis has problematized the distinction between able-bodied and disabled sport. While philosophical analysis may help to achieve a deeper understanding of sport, such analysis may also illuminate problems of philosophy beyond sport, ranging from the nature of skill to the ethics of altruism. This entry proceeds in three sections. Section 1 introduces the philosophy of sport with particular emphasis on the history of systematic philosophical thinking about sport. Section 2 examines the nature and value of sport, and it considers the main normative theories of sport developed in the literature. Section 3 addresses a cluster of topics that are central to the philosophy of sport, including: sportsmanship; cheating; performance enhancement; violent and dangerous sport; sex, gender, and race; fans and spectators; disability sport; and the aesthetics of sport.

En este artículo, la filosofía analítico-lingüística es identificada como la metodología predominante en la filosofía del deporte. Según esta propuesta metodológica, la búsqueda de la definición del deporte es la meta principal de la filosofía. La hermenéutica del deporte es opuesta a la de tipo analítico-lingüístico. Analizando el concepto de verdad de Heidegger, se comparan dos concepciones de la tarea de la filosofía: ontología y descrip-ción. La tarea de la hermenéutica del deporte tiene que ver con la descripción. Las expli-caciones hermenéuticas del deporte son un intento de describir la facticidad del deporte, que está compuesta por tres momentos diferentes: corporalidad, capacidades, y tradici

En este artículo analizaremos el impacto que el libro de Alasdair MacIntyre Tras la virtud ha tenido en el ámbito de la filosofía del deporte. Nuestro punto de partida será que los filósofos del deporte han diferenciado entre propuestas internalistas y externa-listas del deporte siguiendo la distinción de MacIntyre entre bienes internos y externos a las prácticas sociales. Con el fin de mostrar si esta apropiación del lenguaje de MacIntyre es adecuada, responderemos a la pregunta de si el deporte actual puede ser considerado una práctica social en sentido macintyreano. Defenderemos que sólo el deporte amateur encaja con la definición de “práctica social” de modo que nuestro deporte contemporáneo no puede ser considerado como tal. Según esto, defenderemos que, en tanto que el paradigma internalista y externalista es una consecuencia de la recepción de la obra de MacIntyre, la filosofía del deporte debe ir más allá de este paradigma dualista hacia uno que no esté fundado en los conceptos de práctica social y bienes internos del filósofo escocés.

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we provide a normative analysis of the Women’s Tennis Association revised policy on maternity leave, which is regulated by its special ranking rule. To do so, we first explore how the revised policy functions when probed in relation to the nature of competitive sport. Then, we examine the revised policy through the lens of the literature on maternity discrimination. We argue that, when compared to its previous formulation, the revised special ranking rule is morally defensible because it better protects female players’ interest in being able to combine their professional careers and their personal lives. However, we also identify several pronounced vulnerabilities and criticisms to the revised policy.

Given current studies in moral psychology and following recent cases of wrong behaviour occurred in elite sporting events ? e.g. the racist chants scandals in the English Premier League or the events following Mourinho's poke in the eye scandal ? I shall analyse the extent to which supporters' brain make-up is determining them to behave in an ?unfair way?. Yet this paper is not just a work on descriptive ethics, but a normative ethics work. Therefore, once I have developed the ?psycho-biological account of sports supporters?, I shall explore whether or not a more virtuous account of sports supporting can be drawn. In order to fulfil this normative task I shall appeal to the concept of ?fair play?. The common view of fair play defines it as ?the act of abiding by the rules?. However, my account of fair play is more complex and it is based on the moral principle of respecting others. This is the reason why fair play is not just something related to athletes but to supporters as well. To conclude, I shall sketch the boundaries of fair-play-based supporting behaviour in order to propose some policies or strategies that can help us to promote a ?healthy? and virtuous behaviour among fans

How to Build a Better Human, escrito por el filósofo norteamericano Gregory E. Pence, resulta un soplo de aire fresco en lo que se refiere al debate bioético sobre la mejora humana (human enhancement). Consciente de que este tema es, sin duda, la cuestión del momento dentro de la bioética, Pence se propone elaborar una metodología, así como una propuesta, que se alejen de las de quienes simplifican demasiado la realidad del debate adscribiéndose a uno de los grupos que le dan vida: bioconservadores y transhumanistas. Con ello trata de mostrar los errores lógicos y teóricos más comunes de ambas corrientes; por ejemplo, la tesis de que no existe diferencia moral alguna entre todas aquellas intervenciones e innovaciones tecnológicas cuya finalidad es mejorar las condiciones de vida de los seres humanos —conocida como “tesis de la continuidad” o del “esto-ya-lo-hemos-hecho-antes”, por usar la expresión de John Harris.

Uno de los debates más recientes referentes a la innovación tecnológica entre los especialistas en ética es aquel sobre la mejora humana, el cual ha surgido a raíz de la posibilidad de modificar los límites de la naturaleza humana usando el poder de la ciencia. Muchos filósofos nos han avisado del peligro de modificar técnicamente nuestra naturaleza humana. Otros, por contra, defienden que no existe diferencia moral relevante alguna entre las nuevas técnicas biomédicas de mejora y las tecnologías aceptadas como habituales por los seres humanos. Este artículo pretende examinar críticamente tal argumento. El fin de este análisis crítico será doble, primero, mostrar que los autores que defienden esta posición poseen visiones sesgadas y prejuiciosas de la realidad y, segundo, que es necesario establecer una definición más precisa y acotada del término “mejora”

La finalidad de este artículo es triple. Primero, las secciones 1 y 2 expondrán la estructura del argumento de Jürgen Habermas respecto a las tecnologías de mejora humana. Para ello, éste será descompuesto en tres partes, que son sus pilares básicos: a) los sujetos diseñados no pueden auto-concebirse a sí mismos como autores únicos de sus vidas; b) la distinción kantiana entre objetos y personas se desvanece como consecuencia del modo en que los sujetos modificados experiencian su cuerpo; c) la relación entre los padres y su descendencia se vuelve asimétrica, de modo que es contraria a las normas de la acción comunicativa. Segundo, en la sección 3, que es concebida como un diálogo entre Habermas y sus críticos, se presentarán algunas objeciones teóricas a su argumento. Tercero, la sección 4 analizará la validez de los argumentos habermasianos y afirmará firmemente que la posición de Habermas arroja luz sobre el modo correcto de analizar las tecnologías de mejora humana desde un punto de vista moral. A saber, en función de la influencia que tienen sobre el modo en que los sujetos se auto-conciben como seres autónomos y responsables.The aim of this paper is threefold. First, the structure of Jürgen Habermas’ argument on human enhancement technologies shall be exposed in sections 1 and 2. In order to do so, this paper shall discompose Habermas’ argument in the following three parts, which will be taken to be its central pillars: a) designed people cannot self-conceive themselves as the sole authors of their lives; b) the Kantian distinction between objects and persons falls apart due to the way in which modified people experience their bodies; c) the relationship between parents and their modified offspring turns into an asymmetric one, so it is contrary to the rules of communicative action. Secondly, several objections to Habermas’ claims shall be exposed in section 3, which is mainly conceived as a dialogue between Habermas and his critics. Thirdly, section 4 shall analyse the validity ofHabermas’ claims. It shall firmly argue that his position sheds light on the right way to analyse human enhancement technologies from a moral point of view.

The ethics of using genetic engineering to enhance athletic performance has been a recurring topic in the sport philosophy and bioethics literature. In this article, we analyze the ethics of cloning horses for polo competition. In doing so, we critically examine the arguments most commonly advanced to justify this practice. In the process, we raise concerns about cloning horses for polo competition, centering on normative aspects pertaining to sport ethics usually neglected by defenders of cloning. In particular, we focus on how this practice could have a detrimental impact on the central skills of polo, and how it unjustly creates an uneven playing field. We suggest that the polo community would benefit from critically considering the ethical quandaries posed by the practice of cloning horses for polo competition.

In this article, I revise the normative account of sport that I proposed in ‘William J. Morgan’s “conventionalist internalism” approach. Furthering internalism? A critical hermeneutical response.’ I first present Habermas’ discursive ethics, placing emphasis on his interpretation of the relationship between moral (Kantian) and ethical (Hegelian/hermeneutical) principles. Then, I provide a reformulation of my account by both drawing on Habermas and going beyond him—as I go beyond Habermas, I will refer to the account as ‘discourse-ethics based.’ To further explore the normative potential of the account, I connect its main tenets to the three main normative theories of sport (formalism, broad internalism, and deep conventionalism) and illustrate it with examples from anti-doping governance.

En este artículo se analiza el concepto de imperativo metanoético que Peter Sloterdijk presenta en ¡Has de cambiar tu vida! Nuestro objetivo es iluminar la naturaleza de lo que, en trabajos anteriores, hemos denominado -a raíz de la obra de Bernard Suits-: razón lúdica. Para ello, primero, expondremos y analizaremos el sentido del imperativo metanoético en Sloterdijk, así como los elementos principales de su razón ascética. Segundo, mostraremos cómo ambos son consecuencia del análisis ontológico de corte heideggeriano en la que Sloterdijk basa su propuesta de filosofía moral. Tercero, presentaremos en términos sloterdijkianos tanto el análisis ontológico de Suits, como el posible imperativo metanoético que se desprendería de su razón lúdica. Por último, centrándonos en el papel que Sloterdijk otorga a la figura del «ocioso», mostraremos las posibles conexiones entre Suits y Sloterdijk. Mostraremos la relación que existe entre los imperativos lúdicos y ascéticos donde, además, el acto «jugar» recibe un papel central en la «respuesta a la pregunta por el ser». In this article, we analyze Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of “metanoethical imperative” in You Must Change Your Life. Our goal is to shed light on what, by drawing on Bernard Suits, we call “ludic reason.” To do so, we will present and examine in depth the meaning of Sloterdijk’s metanoethical imperative, as well as the main features of his concept of “askesis.” Second, we will argue that both concepts are the result of the Heideggerian ontological principles underlying Sloterdijk’s moral philosophy. Third, we will provide a “Sloterdijkean” interpretation of Suits’ account of games by focusing on the metanoethical imperative that could be derived from the notion of the ludic reason. To conclude, we will focus on the role that the figure of the “Good-for-Nothing” plays in Sloterdijk’s account, showing connections between Suits’ and Sloterdijk’s approaches. We will argue that, in the philosophical approaches of both philosophers, the idea of game playing is closely tied to the “question on Being.”

ABSTRACTIn this article, I will identify two key normative principles at the core of Robert L. Simon’s mutualist theory of sport, namely, the respect-for-the-opponent principle and the idea that sport is a practice aimed at pursuing excellence. The former is a Kantian principle grounded in human beings’ rationality, and the latter is an Aristotelian principle related to the development of excellences as a means to human flourishing. After having presented and analyzed both principles, I will critically evaluate Simon’s attempt to combine them within his mutualist approach. To conclude, I will highlight the challenges that mutualism should face to complete such a combination more successfully.Abbreviation: Categorical imperative