• This book provides a defense and an exploration of illusionism regarding phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness supposedly encompasses mental states such as seeing a red spot, feeling pain in your back, or imagining the sound of a harp. All these states seem to feel like something, in a distinctive sense of “feel.” Phenomenal consciousness seems mysterious. It apparently resists scientific explanation and seems irreducible to brain processes. Our phenomenally conscious experiences se…Read more
  • Many think AIs would be morally significant if and only if they are phenomenally conscious in certain ways. This sentientist conception has been challenged, and alternative views emerged, on which agency, or the possession of desires, are sufficient for AI moral significance, even without consciousness. I argue that these alternative views face serious problems. They should probably be ruled out. I diagnose the mistake we made when formulating these views – a process I call “analytical drift”. I…Read more
  • How Should We Study Animal Consciousness Scientifically?
    Jonathan Birch, Donald M. Broom, Heather Browning, Andrew Crump, Simona Ginsburg, Marta Halina, David Jacob Harrison, Eva Jablonka, Andrew Y. Lee, François Kammerer, Colin Klein, Victor Lamme, Matthias Michel, Françoise Wemelsfelder, and Oryan Zacks
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (3-4): 8-28. 2022.
    This editorial introduces the Journal of Consciousness Studies special issue on "Animal Consciousness". The 15 contributors and co-editors answer the question "How should we study animal consciousness scientifically?" in 500 words or fewer.