Francois Recanati

According to the Fregean criterion, if it is possible for a rational subject to believe an object _o_ to be _F_ and, at the same time, to believe _o_ not to be _F_, then there are distinct modes of presentation _m_ and _m’_ such that the subject believes _o_ to be _F_ under _m_ and disbelieves _o_ to be _F_ under _m’_. Several authors object that the criterion is unduly restricted to the point of view of a single subject at a single time. A new criterion is offered, which makes room for modes of presentation shared across times or across subjects.

This chapter discusses the relations between three approaches to the referential/attributive distinction: the Gricean approach advocated by Kripke and others, the two-dimensional approach pioneered by Kaplan and Stalnaker, and the Millian approach favoured by Donnellan. In contrast to the two-dimensional approach, the Millian approach honours the intuitions which led to the rejection of descriptivism, but it is subject to Gricean criticism based on the speaker’s reference/semantic reference distinction. The chapter shows that, suitably elaborated and revised, the Millian approach can be made immune to that criticism. The resulting view, it is argued, applies beyond the case of definite descriptions. It also supports Austin’s and Strawson’s speech act theoretic approach to reference and truth—an approach which Grice initially dismissed and which Travis insightfully attempted to defend and resurrect.

This chapter argues that the mental file approach makes it possible to treat so-called Frege cases as an instance of fragmentation; that is, as cases in which conflicting pieces of information are stored in the subject’s mind but remain insulated from each other in such a way that the inconsistency cannot be detected. The argument rests on a constraint on files which derives from Strawson’s work, to the effect that two coreferential files should be merged. The linking model, widely accepted in the mental file literature as a substitute for Strawson’s merge model, is shown to rest on the mistaken construal of recognition as a state, where in fact it is a transition between states.

The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain' is that they comport an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain', in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article, I have provided a counter-example to that claim, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining' receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I have argued that when there is tacit reference to a location, it takes place for pragmatic reasons and casts no light on the semantics of meteorological predicates. But several authors have reanalysed the counter-example, so as to make it compatible with the standard view. I discuss those attempts, and show that none of them is tenable.

This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer to them and serve as singular terms in the language of thought, with a relational (nondescriptivist) semantics. Crucially, files also play the role of ‘modes of presentation’. They are used to account for cognitive significance phenomena illustrated by so-called ‘Frege cases’. This book considers what happens to mental files in a dynamic setting. Mental files are construed as both continuants (dynamic files) and as time-slices thereof (static files). Dynamic files are needed to account for confusion, recognition and tracking. The book considers what happens to the relation of coreference de jure, central to the functional characterization of files, when one adopts a dynamic perspective. Only a weak form of coreference de jure is said to hold between stages of the same dynamic file. The second part of the book argues that communication involves interpersonal dynamic files. Special attention is paid to the communication of indexical thoughts (de se contents), and to communication using proper names.