Francoise Longy

Are functional explanations of natural phenomena eliminable? I argue that they are not, because what they explain cannot be explained otherwise. In order to bring to light the specific features of functional explanations, I consider a function attributed to cultivated corns instead of the more simple examples of biological and artefactual functions present in the literature. I show that this function attribution makes it possible to explain converging histories and long-term evolutions otherwise unexplainable. I make clear how this function attribution helps identify a dynamical loop which accounts for the stability and the plasticity of a strong causal connexion between a definite property of cultivated corns and a specific effect in harvesting through very long periods of time and various historical contexts. I analyse the particular sort of multirealizability that is thereby involved, and the role of structuring cause played by this functional dynamical loop. I explicate, then, why functions support top-down explanations that cannot be reduced either to bottom-up ones or to monolevel ones. Besides, I make explicit the insufficiency of the etiological theory of biological functions as a general theory of natural functions by showing that natural selection is only one among the many mechanisms that may create or support a functional dynamical loop.

What is a natural kind? This old yet lasting philosophical question has recently received new competing answers (e.g., Chakravartty, 2007; Magnus, 2014; Khalidi, 2013; Slater, 2015; Ereshefsky & Reydon, 2015). We show that the main ingredients of an encompassing and coherent account of natural kinds are actually on the table, but in need of the right articulation. It is by adopting a non-reductionist, naturalistic and non-conceptualist approach that, in this paper, we elaborate a new synthesis of all these ingredients. Our resulting proposition is a multiple-compartment theory of natural kinds that defines them in purely ontological terms, clearly distinguishes and relates ontological and epistemological issues —more precisely, two grains of ontological descriptions and two grains of explanatory success of natural kinds—, and which sheds light on why natural kinds play an epistemic role both within science and in everyday life.

To what do "natural selection" and "genetic drift" refer? To causes, as is usually thought? Or to mere statistical effects? The question arises because assessing causes faces specific difficulties when stochastic processes are concerned. In this paper, I establish that a central anti-causalist argument from Matthen and Ariew (2002) does not work, because selection doesn't depend on chance (or unknown factors) in the manner that current analogies with games of chance suggest. I then explain how a clear understanding of how chance and biases are involved in natural selection supports one form of causalism, while every other form has indeed to be rejected.

We need to distinguish two sorts of natural kinds, scientific and common NKs, because the notion of NK, which has to satisfy demands at three different levels—ontological, semantic and epistemological—, is subject to two incompatible sets of constraints. In order to prove this, I focus on the much-discussed case of jade. In the first part of the paper, I show that the current accounts are unsatisfactory because they are inconsistent. In the process, I explain why LaPorte’s analysis of “jade” as a vernacular NK-term with an open-texture meaning does not offer a way out. Using a reductio ad absurdum argument, I conclude that according to the main tenets of NK-term theories, today’s “jade” has to be an NK-term, and jade thereby an NK. In the second part of the paper, I argue for this conclusion in a positive manner. First, I present a series of thought experiments demonstrating that today’s “jade” has the specific features of an NK-term. Then, I show that the kind that we presently call “jade” exhibits the typical ontological and epistemological features of an NK. More generally, I expound on why common NKs are more than mere classes, and why categories such as “jade” are useful in many inferences and explanations.

The existence of dysfunctions precludes the possibility of identifying the function to do F with the capacity to do F. Nevertheless, we continuously infer capacities from functions. For this and other reasons stated in the first part of this article, I propose a new theory of functions (of the etiological sort), applying to organisms as well as to artefacts, in which to have some determinate probability P to do F (i.e. a probabilistic capacity to do F) is a necessary condition for having the function to do F. The main objective of this paper is to justify the legitimacy of this condition when considering artefacts. I begin by distinguishing “perspectival probabilities”, which reflect a pragmatic interest or an arbitrary state of knowledge, from “objective probabilities”, which depend on some objective feature of the envisageditems. I show that objective probabilities are not necessarily based on physical constitution. I then explain why we should distinguish between considering an object as a physical body and considering it as an artefact, and why the probability of dysfunction to be taken into account is one relative to the object as member of an artefact category. After clarifying how an artefact category can be defined if it is not defined in physical terms, I establish the objectivity of the probability of dysfunction under consideration by showing how it is causally determined by objective factors regulating the production of items of a definite artefact type. Ifocus on the case of industrially produced artefacts where the objective factors determining the probability of dysfunction can be best seen.

Most philosophers adopt an etiological conception of functions, but not one that uniformly explains the functions attributed to material entities irrespective of whether they are natural or man-made. Here, I investigate the widespread idea that a combination of the two current etiological theories, SEL and INT, can offer a satisfactory account of the proper functions of both organisms and artifacts.. Making explicit what a realist theory of function supposes, I first show that SEL offers a realist theory of biological functions in which these are objective properties of a peculiar sort. I argue next that an artifact function demonstrates the same objective nature as a biological function when it is accounted for by SEL, but not when it is accounted for by INT. I explain why a dual theory of artifact functions admitting both INT and SEL functions is to be dismissed. I establish that neither INT nor SEL alone can account for all artifact functions. Drawing the conclusion that we need a new etiological theory of function, I show how one can overcome the apparent inevitability of INT for some artifact functions. Finally, I outline a new etiological theory of functions that applies equally to biological entities and to artifacts

CETTE THESE CHERCHE A FAIRE RESSORTIR LA CONTINUITE EXISTANT ENTRE LES CONCEPTIONS DEVELOPPEES PAR LES NEOPOSITIVISTES ET PAR WITTGENSTEIN AUTOUR DES ANNEES TRENTE A VIENNE ET LES EPISTEMOLOGIES EVOLUTIONNISTES QUI SONT APPARUES A PARTIR DES ANNEES SOIXANTE DANS LE MONDE ANGLO-SAXON. L'ANALYSE DES THEORIES DE CARNAP ET DE WITTGENSTEIN MET L'ACCENT SUR LA TRANSFORMATION QU'ILS FONT SUBIR A L'A PRIORI KANTIEN ET EXPLICITE LA PERSPECTIVE NOUVELLE QU'ILS OUVRENT AINSI A LA REFLEXION PHILOSOPHIQUE. NOUS MONTRONS COMMENT A PARTIR DE LA SE DESSINE UN DOUBLE PARCOURS : LE PREMIER CONDUISANT DU CONVENTIONNALISME DES NEOPOSITIVISTES A L'EPISTEMOLOGIE EVOLUTIONNISTE DE POPPER, ET LE DEUXIEME DE LA THEORIE DU LANGAGE DE WITTGENSTEIN A L'EPISTEMOLOGIE EVOLUTIONNISTE DE TOULMIN. ENFIN, APRES AVOIR DEGAGE LES THESES CONSTITUTIVES DE CHACUNE DE CES DEUX CONCEPTIONS, NOUS ANALYSONS LES CONTRIBUTIONS QU'ELLES APPORTENT A LA REFLEXION EPISTEMOLOGIQUE CONTEMPORAINE. TROIS APPENDICES PERMETTENT DE DISTINGUER L'EPISTEMOLOGIE EVOLUTIONNISTE DE POPPER ET DE TOULMIN DE CONCEPTIONS APPROCHANTES, EN PARTICULIER DE L'"EVOLUTIONARE ERKENNTNISTHEORIE" ALLEMANDE DE CES QUINZE DERNIERES ANNEES.