Franjo Mijatović

This paper aims to present the convergences and divergences between biblical and philosophical theology, focusing on the issue of the relationship between morality and religion, especially in light of the “First Preface” to Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. The question of morality and religion is not only a matter of epistemology, but also concerns the political and social context triggered by Kant’s work. Due to their concentration on partial aspects arising from the division between biblical and philosophical theology, the contents of these disciplines are in danger of becoming absolute. However, the critical reason sets boundaries but in a way that remains open to biblical knowledge. Starting from this insight, Kant’s philosophical critical thinking faces two opponents: on the one hand, biblical theologians who deal with spiritual matters, and on the other, biblical scholars who oversee the scientific dimension of religion. The practical suggestions Kant mentions regarding the maintenance of balance between faith and reason should contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between biblical and philosophical theology.

In this paper, the author explores the foundational determinants of interests of reason and interests of inclination within the framework of the determining principle of action. Special attention is given to the concept of pure moral interest. The underlying assumption is the recognition that sensibility dictates what is pleasurable and promises sensory delight, while reason discerns what is morally good. Since every determination of the will arises through one of these two ways, it becomes clear that every act of the will is rooted in an interest. In this context, the paper addresses the challenges of elucidating pure moral interest in order to adequately express the obligation of the categorical imperative to respect the moral law. The conclusion emphasizes that the potential moral conflict between the interests of inclination and those of reason concerns only the individual who chooses the sensory incentive as a potential determinant of their actions, and does not pose a challenge to the moral law itself.