Fraser Logan

The chapter presents an original interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of “amor fati” (love of fate), as expressed in The Gay Science, particularly GS 276. The author argues that Nietzsche’s “fate” is not a general notion of accepting everything as necessary, but rather his specific “passion for knowledge.” This passion is depicted as an irrepressible force, which he struggles to embrace due to its potentially destructive effects. Through close readings of surrounding passages in GS Book IV, the author explores how Nietzsche attempts to justify his passion for knowledge by appealing to naturalistic metaphors, such as “new suns,” and through the virtue of honesty (Redlichkeit). The author’s reading is contrasted with other scholarly interpretations, suggesting that many overemphasise the literal meaning of Nietzsche’s words. Ultimately, the chapter situates Nietzsche’s personal struggle to affirm his fate within the broader context of his development as a philosopher.

Nietzsche (1844–1900) struggles with complexity and many-sidedness throughout his life. He is a nuanced thinker who offers fragments instead of a rigid philosophical system, yet he admires the ‘virtuous energy’ with which systematic thinkers, especially the pre-Socratic philosophers, express themselves. His ability to write with comparable energy is hindered by university philosophy, which privileges restraint and consistency. Therefore, he adopts a practice of spontaneous life writing in order to become simple and honest in thought and life. Inspired by figures such as Emerson, Diogenes, and Sterne, he grasps the ‘nearest shoddy words’ and continually produces new insights in disjointed monologues and aphorisms. Nietzsche's vague metaphors, loose language, inconsistency, and hyperbole stem from this practice, and his autobiography, Ecce Homo (1888), is the closest that he ever comes to rekindling the energy of the pre-Socratics.

From 1874–1888 Nietzsche commits himself to the “scheme” of Schopenhauer as Educator, and in this early text he endorses honesty (Ehrlichkeit), a deeply interpersonal virtue by means of which he counteracts the harmful effects of dissimulation (Verstellung). Despite its lifelong importance to Nietzsche, Ehrlichkeit has been widely neglected by scholars. Nietzsche’s practice of Ehrlichkeit is partially inspired by Diogenes’s outspokenness (parrhēsia), and he becomes simpler (einfacher) and more honest (ehrlicher) over time by writing spontaneously and confessionally, in defiance of scholarly conventions. In his middle-period writings Nietzsche criticises Ehrlichkeit by means of Ehrlichkeit, and I formulate a “preservative” notion of self-overcoming to describe this self-critical mechanism. His commitment to Ehrlichkeit increases over time, and his autobiography, Ecce Homo, is the book of Ehrlichkeit par excellence. Nietzsche’s priority is to practise, not merely analyse, Ehrlichkeit, and with this in mind I provide a Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche scholarship. Nietzsche also introduces, in 1880, a stricter type of honesty (Redlichkeit) whose purpose is to recognise obscure truths, particularly those overlooked by the occasionally naïve Ehrlichkeit. I explain the development of Redlichkeit in Nietzsche’s writings and its links to cruelty (Grausamkeit), the avoidance of relevance fallacies, and the passion for knowledge (die Leidenschaft der Erkenntniss). Throughout Book IV of The Gay Science Nietzsche associates Redlichkeit with naturalistic metaphors, such as new suns, as a way of justifying his irrepressible passion for knowledge and further combatting the harmful effects of dissimulation.

Nietzsche commits himself to a practice of honesty (Ehrlichkeit) in Schopenhauer as Educator. This article argues that this practice is an adaptation of Diogenes’s parrhēsia, the Cynic virtue of outspokenness, and that Nietzsche’s commitment to Ehrlichkeit increases from 1874 to 1888. The article emphasizes the interpersonal dimensions of Ehrlichkeit and parrhēsia and the author resists the widespread tendency to conflate Nietzsche and Diogenes in terms of shamelessness. The article demonstrates that, using Diogenes as an exemplar, Nietzsche gradually renounces the scholarly pretense of hiding the personal significance of his opinions behind needlessly theoretical language. This development culminates in his explosive autobiography, Ecce Homo, which the author interprets, against the grain of Nietzsche scholarship, as the book of Ehrlichkeit, not Redlichkeit, par excellence.