•  38
    Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–30) made seminal contributions to philosophy, mathematics and economics. Whilst he was acknowledged as a genius by his contemporaries, some of his most important ideas were not appreciated until decades later; now better appreciated, they continue to bear an influence upon contemporary philosophy. His historic significance was to usher in a new phase of analytic philosophy, which initially built upon the logical atomist doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgen…Read more
  •  1325
    In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, main…Read more
  •  12
    Could nothing matter?
    Analysis 62 (2): 125-135. 2002.
  •  166
    Relations
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.
    In this paper I provide a state of the art survey and assessment of the contemporary debate about relations. After (1) distinguishing different varieties of relations, symmetric from non-symmetric, internal from external relations etc. and relations from their set-theoretic models or sequences, I proceed (2) to consider Bradley’s regress and whether relations can be eliminated altogether. Next I turn (3) to the question whether relations can be reduced, bringing to bear considerations from the …Read more
  •  196
    The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these concepts is …Read more
  • Identity and Modality
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (2): 398-399. 2007.
  •  149
    Survey article. Listening to fictions: A study of fieldian nominalism
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3): 431-455. 1999.
    One cannot escape the feeling that these mathematical formulae have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own, that they are wiser than we are, wiser even than their discoverers
  •  48
    G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to fi…Read more
  •  12
    On How We Know What there is
    Analysis 58 (1): 27-37. 1998.
  •  39
    Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2). 2002.
    Book Information Articulating Reasons: An Introduction To Inferentialism. By Brandom Robert. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. 230. Hardback, £23.95.
  •  26
    Review (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3): 463-466. 1996.
  •  51
    "On The Origins of Order: Non-Symmetric or Only Symmetric Relations?"
    In M. J. Loux & G. Galuzzo (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 173-94. 2015.
    In this paper I contribute a further element to the case for admitting non-symmetric relations by dismantling the case against them. Armstrong and Dorr have both argued (1) that asymmetric relations give rise to ‘brute necessities’, whilst Dorr further argues (2) that admitting non-symmetric relations generates spurious possibilities and (3) that exploiting work of Goodman and Hazen, we can do without non-symmetric relations anyway. Against (1) I argue that neither Armstrong nor Dorr succeed in …Read more
  •  9
    Lewis’s Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1): 192-198. 2020.
    ABSTRACTIn ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.
  •  127
    Lewis’s Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1): 192-198. 2020.
    In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.
  •  69
    Whence the particular-universal distinction?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1): 181-194. 2004.
  •  73
    Review of O. Linnebo Philosophy of Mathematics (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2018.
    In this review, as well as discussing the pedagogical of this text book, I also discuss Linnebo's approach to the Caesar problem and the use of metaphysical notions to explicate mathematics.
  •  2
    XI*-Can the Property Boom Last?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3): 225-246. 2001.
  •  65
  •  7
    Where are Particulars and Universals?
    Dialectica 52 (3): 203-227. 1998.
  •  146
    Where are particulars and universals?
    Dialectica 52 (3). 1998.
    Is there a particular-universal distinction? Is there a difference of kind between all the particulars on the one hand and all the universals on the other? Can we demonstrate that there is such a difference without assuming what we set out to show? In 1925 Frank Ramsey made a famous attempt to answers these questions. He came to the sceptical conclusion that there was no particularuniversal distinction, the theory of universals being merely “a great muddle”. Following Russell, Ramsey identified …Read more
  •  131
    The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Truth-Making
    Philosophical Papers 31 (1): 27-37. 2002.
    There is no single problem of universals but a family of difficulties that treat of a variety of interwoven metaphysical, epistemological, logical and semantic themes. This makes the problem of universals resistant to canonical reduction (to a ‘once-and-for-all’ concern). In particular, the problem of universals cannot be reduced to the problem of supplying truth-makers for sentences that express sameness of type. This is (in part) because the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualita…Read more
  •  16
    The Julio César Problem
    Dialectica 59 (2): 223-236. 2005.
    One version of the Julius Caesar problem arises when we demand assurance that expressions drawn from different theories or stretches of discourse refer to different things. The counter‐Caesar problem arises when assurance is demanded that expressions drawn from different theories. refer to the same thing. The Julio César problem generalises from the counter‐Caesar problem. It arises when we seek reassurance that expressions drawn from different languages refer to the same kind of things. If the …Read more
  •  52
    This paper investigates the meta-ontological problem, what is the Julius Caesar objection? I distinguish epistemic, metaphysical and semantic versions. I argue that neo-Fregean and supervaluationist solutions to the Caesar objection fails because, amongst other flaws, they fail to determine which version of the problem is in play.
  •  54
    Truth-Making and Analysis: A Reply to Rodriguez-Pereyra
    Philosophical Papers 31 (1): 49-61. 2002.
    Philosophical Papers Vol.31(1) 2002: 49-61