Philosophical debates on scientific understanding often contrast explanatory and objectual understanding. We here propose a novel way of slicing the debate, by distinguishing _scientific_ and _scientists’_ understanding. We argue that the former must be communicable in a way that requires the availability of an explanation, while the latter may often be thoroughly objectual. We offer support for the importance of this distinction by appeal to historical case-studies and argue that it dissolves k…
Read morePhilosophical debates on scientific understanding often contrast explanatory and objectual understanding. We here propose a novel way of slicing the debate, by distinguishing _scientific_ and _scientists’_ understanding. We argue that the former must be communicable in a way that requires the availability of an explanation, while the latter may often be thoroughly objectual. We offer support for the importance of this distinction by appeal to historical case-studies and argue that it dissolves key disputes in the literature, reconciles objectualist and explanationist accounts, and offers a new reason to resist the claim that scientific understanding can exist without explanation. Our account thus explains why many authors in the debate on scientific understanding have focused on explanation, while at the same time acknowledging the epistemic value and importance of objectual understanding.
